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ABSTRACT 
The Vagaries of British Compassion: A Contextualized Analysis of 
British Reactions to the Persecution and Mass Murder of the Jews 
Under Nazi Rule 
By Russell Mark Wallis 
 
This thesis explores British reactions to the persecution and mass murder of 
the Jews under Nazi rule. It uniquely provides a deep context by examining 
British responses to a number of man-made humanitarian disasters between 
1914 and 1943. In doing so it takes into account changing context, the 
memory of previous atrocities and the making and re-making of British 
national identity. It shows that although each reaction was distinctive, 
common strands bound British confrontation with foreign atrocity. Mostly, the 
British consciously reacted in accordance with a long ‘tradition’ of altruism 
for the oppressed. This tradition had become a part and parcel of how the 
British saw themselves. The memory of past atrocity provided the framework 
for subsequent engagement with an increasingly dangerous and unpredictable 
world. By tracking the discursive pattern of the atrocity discourse, the 
evidence reveals that a variety of so-called ‘others’ were cast and recast in the 
British imagination. Therefore, a disparate group of ‘foreign’ victims were the 
beneficiaries of nationwide indignation almost regardless of the way the 
government eventually was able to contain or accommodate public protest. 
When Jews were victims there was a break with this tradition. The thesis 
shows that atrocity was fully comprehended by Britons but that Jews did not 
evoke the intensity or longevity of compassion meted out to others. In other 
words it shows that the reaction to Jewish suffering was particular. They were 
subject to a hierarchy of compassion. 
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Introduction  
 
The twentieth century was a time of unparalleled violence.1 The numbers affected by 
man-made humanitarian crises reached their height between 1914 and 1945. This 
upsurge of violence abroad coincided with an extraordinary expansion of the British 
mass media. Reports of brutality in foreign lands were read by all sections of society. 
They were the subject of headline news, government discussion, Parliamentary 
debate and everyday conversation. In many cases, overseas brutality evoked 
humanitarian action on behalf of perceived victims. All this was part of Britain 
coming to terms with an increasingly dangerous world. 
 
From the onset of World War One British society responded to a series of atrocities 
and humanitarian crises in different parts of the world. The first of these was the so-
called ‘rape of Belgium’ by German forces in late 1914. Part of that response was 
that atrocity was un-English, it was something the ‘Prussians’ did. In this sense, 
responses were framed by a sense of national identity: in other words, who the 
English thought themselves to be. However, after 1918 the response to German 
actions was complicated by British involvement in colonial atrocities. Once German 
violence was qualified by news of atrocities committed by the British, the memory of 
wartime ‘frightfulness’ reified, but in its new form it helped to shape the response to 
later atrocities. This thesis will show how a similar process was repeated in the case 
of the Armenian genocide, the treatment of Jews in Eastern Europe after World War 
One, the Abyssinian crisis of the mid-1930s, the Spanish Civil War and Japanese 
atrocities in China. In each case it will show how context affected responses. A part 
of the context was the sense of national identity at any one time and the memory of 
previous atrocities. 
 
The thesis culminates in an examination of responses to the persecution and mass 
murder of the Jews of Europe between 1933 and 1943. It seeks to explain this 
response in the light of earlier responses and to determine whether the reaction to the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Bartov, Omer, Grossmann, Atina and Nolan, Mary, Crimes of War: Guilt and Denial in the 
Twentieth Century (New York: The New Press, 2002) p.xii; Hobsbawm, Eric, The Age of 
Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century 1914-1991 (London: Abacus, 1994) p.12. 
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plight of the Jews was singular, primarily conditioned by anti-Semitism, or part of a 
generic pattern. In particular it questions whether the response can be framed solely 
in terms of ‘liberalism’. In other words, whether the British liberal imagination 
curtailed the ability to perceive the illiberal nature of Nazi violence, an argument 
proposed by Tony Kushner.2 
 
Britain’s response to each atrocity will be examined within its own particular 
context. However, in accordance with Kushner’s plea for a more intellectually 
productive historiography, this thesis adopts a ‘social and cultural history 
perspective’ and takes ‘a long time span’ in order to analyze ‘the complex processes 
of history and memory’.3 By examining the response to atrocity case by case, and 
showing how one instance reacted on others, this argument challenges mono-causal 
explanations, including the tyranny of realpolitik and shows that it is unfeasible to 
look at any one case in isolation. It offers a shaded and complex account of British 
responses involving a taxonomy of tolerance and empathy, influenced by the 
multifaceted historical and ideological context and the interplay of contemporary 
forces. The thesis therefore evaluates the vagaries and selectiveness of British 
compassion.  
 
Specifically therefore, this account tracks the intensity of response in Britain to a 
variety of foreign atrocities and more pertinently to a range of different victims. In 
most cases the British reacted with a level of humanitarianism that was in accordance 
with a widely believed and much-lauded national tradition of compassion for the 
oppressed. This principle had substantial basis in fact. After all, the ‘history of Great 
Britain in the nineteenth century is punctuated by humanitarian crusades.’4 The 
movement to abolish the slave trade, Gladstone’s campaign against the Bulgarian 
atrocities in 1876 and the massive outpouring of indignation on behalf of the 
Armenians under Turkish rule in the 1890s were all seen as part of this tradition. 
Moreover, these events helped to cement the belief that this form of humanitarianism 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Kushner, Tony, The Holocaust and the Liberal Imagination: A Social and Cultural History 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), pp.18-20. 
3 Kushner, Tony, ‘Britain, the United States and the Holocaust: In Search of a Historiography’ 
in Stone, Dan. (ed.) Historiography of the Holocaust (London: Palgrave, 2004) pp.267-9. 
4 Cookey, S.J.S., Britain and the Congo Question 1885 – 1913 (London: Longmans, 1968) 
p.1. 
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was a crucial aspect of the national character. This belief lasted at least until the end 
of World War Two and adherence to its precepts was astonishingly consistent. Tom 
Buchanan, for example, when writing about Britain’s response to the Spanish Civil 
War, has identified three reasons why ‘foreign causes have become major political 
issues.’ Among these, he suggests, are firstly, ‘a pressing sense of national peril 
making the conflict appear directly relevant to British interests’; secondly, ‘[o]ne 
side in the conflict has been seen as representative of political or religious values 
with which a section of the population is in profound sympathy and opposing an 
equally well-defined ideological enemy’; and lastly, ‘there has been a strong sense of 
humanitarian identification with one side, generally those regarded as the victims’.5 
These criteria were not only met, as Buchanan suggests, for the Spanish Civil War 
but also for most other major outbreaks of foreign violence in the interwar years. 
This thesis will show however, that British responses to atrocities against Jews were 
notably muted by comparison, whether in Poland in 1919 or under Nazi rule after 
1933. Therefore what follows is part of the history of the Holocaust. 
 
Placing British reactions to anti-Jewish persecution in the wider context of responses 
to atrocity over a long time period provides a unique insight into one important 
aspect of the Holocaust: the responses of western democracies. Saul Friedlander 
states:  
 
The “history of the Holocaust” cannot be limited only to a recounting of 
German policies, decisions, and measures that led to this most systematic and 
sustained of genocides; it must include the reactions (and at times the 
initiatives) of the surrounding world and the attitudes of the victims, for the 
fundamental reason that the events we call the Holocaust represent a totality 
defined by this very convergence of distinct elements.6 
 
In the context of Holocaust research reactions of the British has been placed under 
the category of ‘bystanders’. Yet the word ‘bystander’ requires qualification, not 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Buchanan, Tom, Britain and the Spanish Civil War (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1997) p.30. 
6 Friedlander, Saul, The Years of Extermination: Nazi Germany and the Jews 1939-1945 
(London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2007) p.xv. My italics. 
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least because it seems ‘morally conceived’ and ‘based on a potentially religious 
conception of the obligations of witness.’7 In addition, this sense of moral 
condemnation often seems ‘determined by the present rather than the past.’8 Clearly, 
if this is the case then the very use of the term ‘bystander’ can be anachronistic.9 
There is also a danger that all British contemporaries are squeezed into simplified 
categories or worse, one monolithic block. The ‘bystander’ category should be 
treated with caution not least because, as Kushner states ‘we like our bystanders to be 
as bifurcated as the categories of victim and perpetrator.’10 Instead, as David 
Cesarani suggests historians should work towards a ‘taxonomy of rescuers’.11 The 
development of nuance in an area of research that seems so susceptible to bias is 
therefore crucial. Thus, this thesis, by examining events from a ‘British history’ 
perspective, explores a further nuance, that of the perceived victim. My argument 
will show that, when it came to reacting to foreign atrocity, a hierarchy of empathy 
existed in the British imagination. This was not something that was rigid but rather 
subject to a variety of forces. For example, the Chinese had long been associated 
with degeneration. A once great empire had fallen and now, for many in Britain, 
Chinese opium dens signified something immoral and pernicious in their character.12 
All this changed in a remarkably short space of time when Japan embarked on a 
merciless imperial mission in Chinese territory just before the Second World War. 
The Chinese were quickly recast in the role of victim and evoked nationwide 
indignation.  
 
The ‘bystander’ category has almost exclusively been used in the context of 
Holocaust historiography. The historiography of British responses to the Holocaust 
demonstrates a continued, if slow, development of much needed nuance. The first 
attempt to analyze British reactions to German atrocities against Jews was written by 
Andrew Sharf in 1964. The British Press and Jews Under Nazi Rule was publicized 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Cesarani, David and Levine, Paul A., (eds.) Bystanders to the Holocaust: A Re-evaluation, 
(London: Frank Cass, 2002) p.269. 
8 Lawson, Tom, The Church of England and the Holocaust: Christianity, Memory and Nazism 
(Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2006) p.4. 
9 Cesarani and Levine, (eds.) Bystanders p.4. 
10 Kushner, ‘In Search of a Historiography’, p.257. 
11 Cesarani, David, ‘Mad Dogs and Englishmen: Towards a Taxonomy of Rescuers in a 
‘Bystander’ Country – Britain 1933-45’ in Cesarani and Levine (eds.) Bystanders, p.28. 
12 For example The Times 23 January 1919, p.7; 12 August 1933, p.8. 
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as ‘a revealing study of British reluctance to admit’ the ‘horrifying facts of Hitler’s 
final solution’. As such it focused on the ‘habit, deeply ingrained in these islands, of 
making the best of every situation, refusing to believe the worst.’13 This, of course, 
refers to a popular interwar English stereotype. Something fondly evoked by Stanley 
Baldwin who, in his summary of the English national character, suggested that ‘the 
Englishman has a mental reserve owing to that gift given him at his birth by St. 
George, so, by the absence of worry keeps his nervous system sound and sane.’ The 
very reason why Baldwin saw the English as ‘made for a time of crisis’ is the starting 
point for Sharf’s book, which is introduced as a form of antidote to this aspect of 
national character.14 This ‘inveterate British inability to grasp imaginatively what 
could happen on the continent of Europe’ is posited as the major cause of inaction.15 
More specifically, Sharf’s study was commissioned by the Institute of Race 
Relations and sought to show the relevance of the study ‘to many other situations’. 
Therefore, it was ‘more by analogy than directly’ that they were concerned with 
Jewish ‘problems’.16 What Sharf did, that few emulated subsequently, was to 
examine the period from 1933 to the end of the Second World War, thereby 
maintaining the sense of continuity between pre-war and wartime reactions to anti-
Jewish measures.  
 
One of the weaknesses relating to the historiography of British responses is the 
tendency to study selected sections of time after Hitler came to power. Good 
examples of this trend are the studies of A.J. Sherman and Bernard Wasserstein. 
Sherman’s Island Refuge, published in 1973, concentrates on the period between 
1933 and 1939. He further narrowed his field of enquiry by concentrating on newly 
released government sources and within that charts the development of refugee 
policy. Despite this focused approach his conclusions are achieved only by 
comparison with the response of other nations to Jewish refugees. Britain’s record 
was said to be ‘not unimpressive’.17 Sherman’s history squares up to the 
‘acrimonious debate’ and deliberately attempts to empty the issue of emotional 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Sharf, Andrew, The British Press and the Jews Under Nazi Rule (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1964) p.v. 
14 Baldwin, Stanley, On England and Other Addresses (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1938) p.13. 
15 Sharf, British Press, p.209. 
16 Ibid., pp.v-vi. 
17 Sherman, A.J., Island Refuge: Britain and Refugees from the Third Reich 1933-1939 
(London: Elek Books, 1973) p.264. 
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content. ‘[L]ack of imagination’ on the part of British administrators is, for him, 
largely a problem of practicality.18 Wasserstein’s book Britain and the Jews of 
Europe takes up where Sherman left off. Written in 1979, it remains a leading study 
of British policy during wartime. ‘[I]gnorance’ of events in Europe and anti-
Semitism are rejected as defining factors in British responses.19 Instead he suggests 
the low priority accorded to the Jews gave way ‘to what were believed to be 
inexorable strategic realities’ of the total war effort.20 Jews were therefore the victims 
of ‘an ocean of bureaucratic indifference and lack of concern.’21 However, 
Wasserstein detected a wave of public concern after the Allied declaration on the 
destruction of European Jewry in December 1942. I will argue that, on the contrary, 
the government was driven more by fear of public protest than its actual 
manifestation.  
 
Wasserstein was also struck by the ‘imaginative failure’ of officials to ‘grasp the full 
meaning of consequences of decisions’ because they and the Jewish victims as well 
as being separated by physical distance, inhabited ‘different psychological 
universes’.22 Walter Laqueur in The Terrible Secret showed that the Allies did not 
suffer from want of information about the Final Solution. He argued that paralysis in 
the face of mass murder was due to a number of reasons including incomplete 
information, ‘fear’, ‘reckless optimism’ and ‘disbelief stemming from a lack of 
experience or imagination or genuine ignorance’.23 For those in London, he suggests, 
the ‘evil nature of Nazism was beyond their comprehension.’24 This theme is a 
mainstay of Kushner’s The Holocaust and the Liberal Imagination. Since its 
publication in 1994 Kushner’s innovative and sophisticated analysis has remained 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Ibid., p.264. 
19 Wasserstein, Bernard, Britain and the Jews of Europe 1939-1945 (London: Clarendon 
Press, 1979) pp.349-351. 
20 Ibid., p.352. 
21 Ibid., p.345. 
22 Ibid., p.356. 
23 Laqueur, Walter, The Terrible Secret: Suppression of the Truth About Hitler’s “Final 
Solution” (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1980) p.208. 
24 Ibid., p.203. 
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largely unchallenged. It has been less successful as a catalyst for a more nuanced 
historiography, something that has been a source of frustration for Kushner himself.25  
 
Kushner sought to address one of the principal weaknesses of the existing 
historiography; over-concentration on the importance of government decisions. He 
did this by attempting to ‘connect everyday life and high politics, and to rethink each 
in the light of the other’,26 thus opening new vistas for research. This thesis thus also 
tackles what might be called the ‘crucible of interaction’ between national decision-
makers and public opinion. For Kushner, however, ‘the nature and origins of Nazi 
anti-semitism were rarely understood’.27 He implies that violence specifically 
directed against Jews somehow bounced off the British conscience.28 In other words 
the ‘liberal imagination’ was incapable of comprehending the ‘illiberal phenomenon’ 
of Nazi violence.29 The evidence that follows reveals that from 1914 onwards, the 
British government and its population grappled with occurrences of large-scale 
violence against certain groups in other parts of the world. Elected and permanent 
officials, the media and the public were engaged by tumultuous events in foreign 
lands, especially when they involved man’s inhumanity to man. These terrible 
happenings were observed, dissected, and absorbed into public consciousness. Far 
from keeping quiet about them, British society evolved what might be termed an 
‘atrocity discourse’. After 1914, each new atrocity added a layer of ‘memory’, which 
in turn influenced the way others were interpreted. This meant that news of foreign 
atrocity was rarely received in a vacuum. There was already a substantial body of 
knowledge about foreign violence and this contributed to the humanitarian outbursts 
of the 1930s  
 
Kushner’s central thesis is that ‘the strength of liberalism and toleration rather than 
its weakness…explains the complex nature of democratic responses towards the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Kushner, Tony, “Pissing in the Wind’? The Search for Nuance in the Study of Holocaust 
Bystanders’ in Cesarani and Levine, (eds.) Bystanders; Kushner, ‘In Search of a 
Historiography’.  
26 Kushner, The Holocaust and the Liberal Imagination, p.18. 
27 Kushner, The Holocaust and the Liberal Imagination, p.273.	  
28 An idea that was considered by George Orwell. Orwell, Sonia and Angus, Ian, (eds.) The 
Collected Essays Journalism and Letters of George Orwell: Volume III, As I Please 1943-45 
(London: Penguin, 1970), p.419-20. 
29 Ibid., pp.18-20. 
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persecution of the Jews.’ He believes that when faced with the Holocaust, ‘truly an 
international event’, the inability of the British to accommodate ‘difference’ hindered 
responses. Kushner later stated that he had been ‘keen to show that liberalism was 
not the antithesis of anti-Semitism’.30 His contrast between the comparatively 
generous American response to the Holocaust and Britain’s relative lack of action are 
explained as resulting from the process of ‘Americanization [which] at least allowed 
for some ethnic diversity within society.’31 Kushner therefore uses what can be seen 
as more of a modern day phenomenon, in this case ‘multi-culturalism’, to explain a 
moment in history when such a concept was some distance from common 
understanding.32 In this sense his explanation seems anachronistic. In addition, 
Kushner emphasizes ‘Englishness’ after 1918 remaining a ‘near totally exclusive 
concept’ as another factor in British responses. This meant that unless ‘certain alien 
groups’ could assimilate successfully they were perceived a ‘constant danger to the 
well-being of society’.33 Viewing British responses in this light perhaps gives too 
much emphasis to the refugee question or put another way, fear of immigration. 
What this approach fails to take into account was that there were many ways in 
which the British government could and did respond to overseas crises and there 
were correspondingly many pressure points for outraged public opinion to probe. It 
also fails to accommodate the notion that Englishness could be projected outwards or 
bestowed on others to elicit sympathy. 
 
Reading the discourse on the Jews as a separate and distinct area of historiography it 
could be argued that Kushner’s identification of ‘ambivalence’ as a repetitive factor 
in responses to Jews is correct. He argues that ‘liberal ambivalence’ in its most basic 
form is characterized by ‘dislike of Jews at home and sympathy for the Jews 
abroad.’34 However, this thesis shows that the second part of that equation cannot be 
taken as read when the debate is considered in a wider context. The evidence of 
‘compassion’ or ‘indignation’ on behalf of a range of foreign victims between the 
wars is overwhelming. If, for example, we look at the outbreaks of violence against 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 ‘England, Liberalism and the Jews: Anglo-Jewish Historikerstreit’, The Jewish Quarterly, 
Autumn 1997, p.33. 
31 Kushner, The Holocaust and the Liberal Imagination, p.273.	  32	  Ibid.	  
33 Ibid.	  
34 Ibid., p.272.	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‘foreigners’ during the Nazi period such as the Abyssinian Crisis, the Spanish civil 
war and the Sino-Japanese conflict, it soon becomes clear that mass atrocity was not 
only known about, it was understood. Moreover, the ‘otherness’ of the victims was 
no barrier to compassionate action. It is apparent that these other cases evoked 
humanitarian concern on a different scale to that displayed on behalf of Jews. In the 
case of Jews, lack of compassion was particular. By taking a wider and longer view 
of British responses this thesis shows that there existed a hierarchy of compassion for 
foreign victims, which in many respects depended on how the British viewed 
themselves. ‘Others’, depending on political, social, economic and ideological 
circumstances in Britain itself could be recast as worthy of compassion. After 1914 
there was a particular resistance to expressions of compassion resulting in action for 
Jews. They simply could not be recast as worthy victims in the same way as others. 
There is evidence of a form of struggle in which contemporaries fought to be or to be 
seen as compassionate towards Jews. What is clear, however, is that the struggle was 
noticeably less intense when the British were faced with other foreign victims. In an 
additional twist, it appears that among those most likely to make a stand, especially 
on the Left wing of British politics, empathy for ordinary Germans who were 
perceived as labouring under the Nazi yoke, was more deep set and persistent than 
for the Jews.  
 
There is one more fundamental modification to the existing historiography suggested 
by the wide-ranging approach adopted in this thesis. Kushner situates his analysis 
within a comparative methodology. For him Britain and the United States provide 
useful contrasting models of liberal democracies perhaps because of their physical 
separation from main land Europe. In relation to the Continent this model if anything 
reinforces the notion of a British sonderweg, a notion that pervades previous research 
on this subject. It is argued here that Britain in the 1930s and ’40s was enthralled by 
Europe. Senior politicians such as Baldwin and Chamberlain may have been driven 
by a desire for greater isolationism, but they could not afford to take their eyes off 
the Continent. In an era when the ‘democratization’ of British foreign policy was 
perhaps at its most pronounced, domestic opinion strengthened this focus.35 The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 ‘Democratising British Foreign Policy: Rethinking the Peace Ballot, 1934-5’ Journal of 
British Studies (May 2010) 
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principal framework for foreign policy during the interwar period was 
unquestionably the League of Nations; Britain and France its two most powerful 
members; Germany, Italy and Spain the major sources of concern. This thesis shows 
that Britain, from the top down, saw itself intrinsically linked to European affairs. 
Britain was in Europe and reflected its tensions. Its response should therefore be seen 
in a Europe-wide context.  
 
With this in mind British attitudes and policies towards the persecuted Jews of 
Europe perhaps need to be integrated into a pan-European historiography. Frank 
Caestecker and Bob Moore in their compendium of European responses to the 1930s 
refugee crisis adopt a more Euro-centric approach.36 The work of historians such as 
Vicki Caron who charts the French response is also a useful point of comparison. She 
examines the effect of public opinion on governmental policies and shows that 
French compassion for Jewish refugees undulated throughout the pre-war decade, 
starting in 1933 when attitudes and policy were relative generous.37 As the crisis 
intensified a middle class ‘hue and cry’ underpinned a more restrictive French 
policy.38 There is a need for further research on whether a similar tightening of 
policy in Britain after the Anschluss was, likewise, facilitated by public opinion. 
Other perspectives might also be gained by, for example, comparison with 
Denmark’s immigration practices.39 Although this thesis does not specifically focus 
on refugees, by placing the British experience next to the European response to the 
Jewish refugee crisis we may gain some perspective on how British officials judged 
their own policies, especially in the light of popular conceptions of British 
generosity. Louise London’s work provides an excellent starting point for British 
policy. 
 
In her study of Whitehall and the Jews, London revisited government responses 
between 1933 and 1948. In a work that was balanced and rich in historical context 
she sought to explain why, although the chances of saving Jewish lives was weak, 	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‘the will to pursue such prospects was significantly weaker.’40 Although she spends 
little time exploring societal values in Britain, government responses were, for her, 
an ‘expression of the values of the society that produced it.’41 London’s assumption 
needs clarification. The tendency of the British to respond generously to man-made 
foreign crises needs to be taken into account in order to provide much needed 
perspective on what is, after all, a complex issue. This thesis goes some way to 
providing it.  
 
Dan Stone’s Responses to Nazism in Britain, which combines the history of ideas 
and cultural history, takes a more studied approach to selecting an appropriate time 
period for analysis. He deliberately rejects a teleological approach to the pre-war 
years because the ‘moral world of the writers of the 1930s had not yet been torn 
asunder by the death camps.’42 By pointing to the prevalence and sophistication of 
British debates about Nazism, he tentatively distances himself from Kushner. Indeed 
Stone contends that ‘the violence of the Nazi regime especially was fully adumbrated 
in its pre-1933 statements’,43 and moreover ‘debates over Nazism were at the heart of 
public discussion.’44 If then, it was well understood that Nazism ‘could lead only to 
war and catastrophe’ then it is a relatively short step to concede that the violence that 
was at the heart of that movement was also clearly perceived.  
 
In their attempts to explain why Britain did not react with expected moral force, 
contemporary observers and historians have debated whether it was caused by an 
English trait, a psychological stumbling block or the strong tradition of British 
liberalism. That foreign violence against foreign victims was fully comprehended in 
Britain is a major finding of my research. From the outbreak of war in 1914, through 
peacetime, to the close of hostilities in 1945, the British became more familiar than 
ever with distant atrocity. In most cases it is not hard to detect signs of intensive and 
pervasive empathetic response. Yet in the case of Jewish victims, things were 
different. Most foreign victims of violence and in some cases their oppressors could 	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be cast and then re-cast in the British imagination with a fair degree of alacrity and in 
such a way as to make them creditable objects of compassion. The image of Jews 
was somehow more intractable and less susceptible to sympathetic malleability. They 
were therefore subject to a hierarchy of compassion. 
 
Understanding Britain’s position in the world order is crucial to any study of British 
reactions to man-made humanitarian crises. It was, and remains, popular to consider 
the interwar years as years of decline for the British Empire.45 However, this is not 
how Britain was perceived at the time, at home and abroad. Richard Overy points out 
that pervading Britain in the interwar years was ‘the widespread contemporary belief 
that, together with the Empire, Britain was the hub of the Western world…in much 
the way that America is regarded, and regards itself, today.’46 The British felt at the 
time that their strength imposed on them a moral burden in an unstable world. 
English writer Margaret Storm Jameson summed up this feeling of obligation, 
especially for those who were frustrated by what they perceived as political drift in 
the 1930s. Of Britain, she wrote, 
 
[o]urs is the largest and most important political unit in the world. Our people 
occupy territory in every continent; our interests – more penetrating – cross 
the frontiers of every foreign State. More than any other State, more even 
than those which exceed us in actual or potential wealth, we can influence 
world thought. This power we have is recognised by other countries…it is the 
English on whom all wait.47 
 
America’s self-proclaimed isolationism reinforced Britain’s prominence.  
 
Expectations stemming from Britain’s lofty global status had a long heritage. 
Interwar Britons had fond memories of their nation’s involvement in good causes. 
This form of intervention had in many ways become part and parcel of the way they 
viewed themselves. Acting as the champion of small nations and the defender of the 	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oppressed was, for many, intricately connected to deeply embedded national 
characteristics. National identity, or in other words, the way the British or English, 
looked at themselves, is an important aspect of this thesis because it helped frame 
responses to foreign atrocity. Reactions to overseas violence were more than just 
political; they were also cultural.48 The quality of altruism for the weak and 
defenseless helped the British define who they were. When faced with an ever more 
dangerous world after the outbreak of World War One, many in Britain felt this all 
the more keenly. 
 
However, caution needs to be employed when examining the convergence of 
historical ‘events’ and perceptions of national identity. Anthony Nicholls has 
suggested that ‘national identity’ is of ‘legitimate interest to historians’ because such 
concepts were not only ‘widely disseminated’, but prominent in political-decision 
making in the first half of the twentieth century.49 Nonetheless, comments containing 
references to ‘Englishness’ and ‘Britishness’ were rarely, if ever, uttered with a clear 
idea of delineation between the two. Although, according to Peter Mandler ‘The 
years between the world wars were the heyday of the idea of the English national 
character’,50 reference to so-called Britishness, which before World War One was 
frequently used to highlight the homogeneity of the Empire, was often, after 1918 
evoked to denote a more narrow form of ‘English values’ and vice versa. The sources 
used in this thesis reflect this confusion. Despite the confusion over terminology, it 
was often the case that reference to national identity, whether British or English, 
referred to similar traits. It was common, especially when faced with an ever-
darkening world, for commentators of the Right or Left to conjure up a particular 
form of national character in order to separate Britons generally or Englishmen 
specifically out from other nationalities, especially Europeans.51 
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The very ‘stability’ which attached itself to ‘national identity’, its reference to long-
held attributes and beliefs made it attractive for commentators, but it is a shifting 
phenomenon. It has always been ‘fought over, fractured by varying class, political 
and cultural interpretations.’ What becomes apparent in any history of national 
identity is that ‘Englishness has to be made and re-made in and through history, 
within available practices and relationships, and existing symbols and ideas.’52 
Moreover, the very things that are deemed to be outside definitions of English 
national identity at any time often dictate its elasticity. Linda Colley, suggests that 
‘Englishness’ is defined ‘by the social or territorial boundaries drawn to distinguish 
the collective self and its implicit negation, the ‘other’ rather than being dependent 
on objective criteria such as language or race or cultural uniformity.’ In other words 
‘we usually decide who we are by reference to who and what we are not.’53 In a 
further twist, David Matless not only sees national identity ‘as a relative concept 
always constituted through definitions of Self and Other’ but also ‘always subject to 
internal differentiation.’54 Specifically for the interwar years, Peter Mandler has 
expressed his frustration at pinning down how the British saw themselves.55 The 
flexibility of interwar national identity is vital to the way in which it was used in 
relation to atrocity abroad. In the years after 1914, the bestowal of English qualities 
on ‘others’ was a major tool for eliciting a compassionate response. There is 
evidence that throughout the period that in regard to relationships with ‘foreigners’ 
certain aspects of their perceived characteristics were either brought to the fore or 
dismissed depending on the political or ideological stance of the commentator or 
their employer. These were then implicitly or explicitly juxtaposed against popular 
conceptions of what it was to be English or British, and these could be, as has just 
been shown, many and varied. The aim was to facilitate a discourse that could be 
sympathetic or antagonistic depending on the extent to which those being spoken 
about were endowed with one or other English or British quality. What was 
noticeable about the discourse relating to a diverse selection of victims, or even 
perpetrators, was the ease with which many of them could be shown to share traits 	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which the inhabitants of the United Kingdom projected onto themselves. Thus 
foreigners could move with surprising speed from being ‘outsiders’ to ‘insiders’ and 
become deserving of empathy. 
 
This happened again and again throughout the interwar period. The Armenians were 
the subject of widespread and long-standing humanitarian concern in Britain largely 
because of their adherence to Christianity under tyrannical Muslim rule. This 
‘Christian’ label was eventually a millstone as they were conflated with atrocities 
committed by ‘Christian’ Greeks. The Turks under Mustapha Kemal were quickly 
designated as the Englishmen of the Near East. The Abyssinians were on the edges 
of British imagination until Mussolini decided in the mid 1930s to make their 
country part of a new Roman Empire. The inhabitants of this small east African 
country were no longer ‘slave owning savages’. As Malcolm Muggeridge succinctly 
put it:  
 
The enlightenment, at any rate latterly, of Haile Selassie’s rule was stressed; 
his determination to abolish the slave trade in his dominion, admired, and 
Abyssinian’s Christianity discovered by many who had formerly assumed its 
non-existence.56 
 
The Spaniards before and even during the Civil War were a mishmash of stereotypes. 
They were first, ‘incompetent and lazy; second, cruel and violent; and, finally, highly 
individualistic’.57 Only after the inhabitants of the town of Guernica had suffered the 
blanket bombing that so many British feared, did perceptions alter. British 
commentators bestowed on the Basques in particular a plethora of characteristics 
common to the English. The most surprising recipients of this malleable process 
were the Chinese. As they fought off a vicious assault from Imperialist Japanese 
forces, the Chinese were no longer the ‘degenerate yellow peril’ of the popular 
imagination, but the inheritors of a stoic tradition, not unlike the British, which was 
mostly seen in their efforts to resist.  	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Nowhere, however, was this tendency more accentuated than in the case of the 
Germans. During the First World War they were constructed as the antithesis of 
everything Britain stood for. German ‘Kultur’ came to represent barbarism in its 
most extreme form and was persistently compared to British ‘civilizing’ values. 
Nevertheless, after the British committed atrocities of their own in India and Ireland, 
the Versailles settlement was almost immediately condemned as draconian and 
unjust. Norman Angell, writing in 1922 of the Paris Peace Conference, complained 
that the British Press were distorting German wartime atrocities and that it was 
‘necessary to tell with equal emphasis of the humane actions of the enemy, and of the 
atrocities committed even by the allies’ to get the ‘whole truth’.58 Rosa Maria Bracco 
in her history of middlebrow literature between the wars asserts that ‘[t]he debunking 
of the myth of German evil began immediately after the war…With each year war 
novels became more concerned with being ‘truthful’ about the question of the 
enemy’. She goes on to state that ‘[b]y the end of the Twenties the vast majority of 
novels about the Great War depicted English and German soldiers sharing in the 
same predicament’.59 Not the least of these many similarities was the overwhelming 
desire for peace. The myth of evil Germans was replaced by another myth that lasted 
well into the Second World War. This was the notion that all Germans, barring a few 
fanatics, were incapable of wickedness. The strength of this particular legend was 
based on British guilt and an increasing sympathy with the majority of German 
people who were labouring under the yoke of the Nazi aberration. Its durability is 
astonishing. 
 
However, flexibility simply did not apply to Jews. This cannot be reduced to blatant 
anti-Semitism. Instead, a complex interaction of forces meant that the image of Jews 
could not be remoulded as easily as others in the British imagination. This is 
connected to the way in which Jews were viewed in interwar Britain, something that 
has already been hotly debated. On this subject there seem to be two main schools of 
thought. On the one hand, there are those who believe the British prided themselves 	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on their tolerance and liberalism but that Jews were only accepted on condition that 
they assimilated into British society and became invisible. Others believe that 
English or British culture may indeed have contained elements of anti-Semitism, but 
that the country offered Jews opportunities they could not find elsewhere.60 This last 
approach ‘is implicitly comparative especially in relation to Europe and the Russian 
Empire.’61 These different approaches inform differing views about Britain’s 
response to the Holocaust. This thesis attempts to depart from that debate, although it 
must be stated that it is not specifically intended to establish the nature of anti-
Semitism in Britain between the wars. It adopts a comparative approach, but not 
between Britain and other nations, some obviously anti-Semitic. Instead it contrasts 
reactions in Britain over time to different victim groups. To a certain extent, it 
compares like with like and shows that the way that Jews were conceptualised by the 
British had a real effect on the potential for Jews to be reconstructed as victims. 
Therefore, for the purposes of this argument what is important is not what ‘Jews are 
actually supposed to be or what they do, but how they are constructed in language 
and culture.’62 
 
The treatment of Jews was ‘a topic that most exercised commentators from the very 
start of the Nazi regime’s existence.’63 Anti-Jewish measures on the Continent 
undoubtedly caused a degree of discomfort in most sections of British society. 
However, cutting across this was a persistent discourse about Jews, one that fed into 
debates about atrocities. Reactions to atrocity were born out of a British ‘tradition’ of 
compassion. Although Anglo-Jewish citizens had the same rights as other British 
citizens under law, they were subject to the vagaries of such issues as national 
identity, memory and the forces that contributed to the formation of public opinion at 
any one time. Stereotypical perceptions of Jews were part of this. There is now a 
consensus that anti-Semitism in interwar Britain was rife. It existed as what one 
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might term ‘background noise’. This was ‘was not confined to those of conservative 
tendencies’,64 but ‘part and parcel of the mainstream political spectrum in Britain.’65  
These presuppositions affected the way they could be portrayed or treated as victims. 
Kushner points out that ‘the popular image of Jewish power within the liberal world 
contrasted strongly with the representation of Jews as innocent and defenceless 
victims.’66 Evidence shows that such representations had a real effect on the very 
individuals who were most likely to respond to humanitarian causes. Activists were 
more likely to be moved by victims of atrocity in Spain, for example, than by the 
anti-Jewish measures carried out under Nazi rule. Furthermore, by examining a long 
time span, and taking into account the reactions to anti-Jewish atrocities committed 
by Poles just after World War One, it is possible to detect how deep-seated these 
assumptions were. In a country that prided itself on a history of humanitarian 
responses there was a continuum of resistance to compassion for Jews. Not only that, 
but the earlier bout of atrocities was re-written in British minds and confirmed that 
Jews had a tendency to ‘make a fuss’. Moreover, the association of Jews with 
atrocity brought out what might be termed a ‘specialist rhetoric’. Borrowing an 
argument from Richard Alston who writes about the constructed perception of 
Egyptians in the Roman Empire, the Jews were ‘objectified, classified and discussed’ 
at all levels of British society over time. They were ‘separated by this very act of 
analysis’ and as a result ‘disempowered by their objectification’, unlike other 
‘foreigners’ who were the beneficiaries of positive re-characterizations that brought 
them into line with recognized forms of British identity.67 Consequently, the impact 
of Jews speaking up for their own was compromised and more importantly there was 
a fatal inertia to the notion that Jews could be reconstructed as worthy victims. This 
is not to say that there were not many who gave generously of their commitment, 
time and money at specific moments and sometimes consistently. It is just that, for 
Jews, this form of compassionate activity was never dominant in the public mind. 
‘Ambivalence’, a mixture of sympathy and what might be called ‘distaste’ towards 
Jews certainly played a part in this process. But overall there was an on-going 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 Kushner, Tony, ‘The Impact of British Anti-Semitism 1918-1945’ in Cesarani, David, (ed.) 
The Making of Modern Anglo-Jewry (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990) p.197. 
65 Stone, Responses to Nazism in Britain, p.97. 
66 Kushner, The Holocaust and the Liberal Imagination, p.41. 
67 Alston, Richard, ‘Conquest by text: Juvenal and Plutarch on Egypt’ in Webster J., and 
Cooper N., (eds.) Roman Imperialism: Post-colonial Perspectives: Leicester Archaeology 
Monographs No. 3, 1996, p.102. 
	   24	  
stubbornness reinforcing this form of objectification that can only be fully 
comprehended when comparing the reaction to violence against Jews against those 
reactions elicited by brutality directed at other victim groups.  
 
This analysis will be undertaken using a linear model. Over the course of time British 
debates about atrocity reified and took on new forms. In this sense, part of this thesis 
will examine how the memory of earlier atrocities reacted on later ones. In other 
words they will be looked at from a position of ‘cause and effect’. Richard Evans 
points out that the ‘idea of a cause depends rather obviously on the concept of 
sequential time. Something that causes something else generally comes before it in 
time, not after’.68 For this argument, this simple but fundamental observation is 
complicated by the role of memory, which was subject to constant reinterpretation 
and consequently gave rise to what might be termed ‘myth’. Dan Todman in his 
study of popular myths that have attached themselves to the memory of the Great 
War, explains that ‘[m]yths simplify, reducing the complex events of the past to an 
easily understood set of symbols…Myths in themselves are not a bad thing they are a 
necessary part of human society and they can function for good or ill.’69 Myth and 
memory therefore intertwine to create new ‘truths’ about past events.  
 
The starting point for this argument will be the simple dictum posited by Paul 
Ricoeur that ‘to remember, we need others.’70 He argues that:  
 
[s]tarting with the role of the testimony of others in recalling memories, we 
then move step-by-step to memories that we have as members of a group; 
they require a shift in our viewpoint, which we are well able to perform. In 
this way, we gain access to events reconstructed for us by others. It is then by 
their place in an ensemble that others are defined.71 
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The memories that are developed within the community are therefore, to a significant 
degree, a construct. If this is true then memories are subject to manipulation or 
change. More often than not, as Maurice Halbwachs argued, ‘the past is not 
preserved but is reconstructed on the basis of the present.’72 To put it another way, 
political, social, economic, and ideological forces combine to give a warped view of 
previous events. However, into this picture we must weave another complication. 
Alon Confino has argued that a:  
 
characteristic feature of memory cultures is precisely their ability to give a 
sense of shared experience to groups with conflicting positions – they 
function, in other words, not so much to reflect as to overcome divisions 
within a community, insofar as they manage to represent, for a broad section 
of the population, a common destiny that overcomes symbolically real social 
and political conflicts in order to give the illusion of a community to people 
who in fact have very different interests.73 
 
One might say therefore that participation in the formation and perpetuation of 
collective memories becomes a means of belonging; a means of defining whom one 
is within the collective. The corollary of this is that it creates, not ‘one monolithic 
memory in a society’ but one that is ‘dominant’.74 As such, common ideas are much 
more difficult to dislodge from the public imagination. 
 
Neil Gregor shows that in post-World War Two Nuremberg ‘[a]s time went on, 
some…experiences were acknowledged in public while others were marginalized.’75 
A similar picture emerges in Britain with regard to memory of atrocity after World 
War One. For example, numerous scholars who focus on reactions to the Holocaust 
tell us something along the lines that the ‘peddling of alleged atrocities’, especially 
by the British government in the First World War, reinforced skepticism over news 
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of the Final Solution.’76 Although this contains some truth, it takes contemporaries 
too much at face value. Interwar objections to ‘atrocity mongering’ were coloured by 
the development of the collective memory relating to the allegedly shabby treatment 
Germany received at Versailles. In Britain, this version of the past was given 
prominence partly because the British committed atrocities of their own which in 
turn made moralizing about German wartime ‘frightfulness’ a touchy subject. The 
fact that Germany had committed atrocities was pushed to the background and 
became a ‘myth’.  
 
There are two further elements to this part of the argument. Firstly, the widespread 
belief that German atrocities in World War One had been ‘made up’ did not prevent 
immediate belief and indignation when the British were confronted with other 
atrocities such as those, for example, in Abyssinia or Spain. Secondly, there is a 
point concerning Jews. As has already been alluded to, real atrocities against Jews in 
Poland in 1919 were recreated as a myth. The Jewish ‘tendency’ to elaborate their 
own suffering was somehow conflated with the furor about ‘false’ German atrocities. 
Jews were therefore perhaps doubly unlucky. Firstly, to be the subject of a ‘memory’ 
that designated them as fitting with a pre-existing stereotype; that of having a 
propensity for emotionalism and exaggeration, especially concerning their own 
distress. Secondly, to be the victims of a group, the Germans, that had been recast 
since the First World War as the victim of British subterfuge. These combined to 
muddy the waters when the British reacted to Nazi oppression. One additional point 
to bear in mind is that of metonyms and their role in the public memory. During the 
Great War the atrocity discourse gave birth to the word ‘frightfulness’ as a metonym. 
It quickly became a symbol for German barbarism, characterizing everything that the 
British were fighting against. After the war the phrase lived on. It lost its anti-
German connotations after British brutality in India and Ireland but was regularly 
evoked throughout the 1930s, in a condemnatory sense, as a substitute for the word 
atrocity. It was designed to create a sense of outrage, being liberally applied to Italy’s 
behaviour in Abyssinia, atrocities against Republican Spain and Japanese bombing of 
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Chinese civilians. It is noticeably absent from public descriptions of German anti-
Jewish violence.  
 
So far then, it has been argued that British reactions to atrocity were at least partly 
formed by the interplay of how the British viewed themselves and others, and the 
role of memory in confronting foreign atrocities. At this point it is appropriate to 
analyze what constitutes a ‘compassionate response’ and how it can be evaluated. 
Public opinion plays a large part in this process. Government actions in a crisis are 
invariably accompanied by attempts to assess the ‘temperature’ of public opinion. 
Kushner calls attention to how ‘high-level decisions were not taken and cannot be 
understood without reference to public opinion, especially in the liberal democratic 
countries.’77 In a country like Britain ‘[s]tate and public informed one another, but 
did so in a complex and sophisticated relationship’.78 Certainly Buchanan is correct 
when he asserts ‘public opinion on foreign policy undoubtedly concerned politicians 
in the 1930s’.79 It was also crucial before that, as witnessed by the efforts of the 
government to galvanize public opinion behind the war effort between 1914 and 
1918. It also played a large role in the confrontation with foreign atrocity in 1922 
when the Coalition government was brought down. Therefore this thesis devotes a 
great deal of time to the formation of public opinion at specific moments between the 
wars and draws attention to government responses. Not that politicians had any 
accurate way of predicting or assessing how the majority voice might make itself 
heard. Nevertheless, the 1930s saw the advent of ‘new conceptions of how public 
opinion could be both measured and mobilized’. Public opinion was ‘conventionally 
regarded as being the public views of opinion-formers, who interpreted the 
sentiments of their voiceless fellow citizens.’80 In fact it would probably be more 
accurate to say that public opinion was more of a nebulous public morality to be 
deciphered by politicians and journalists. This chimes with the ideas of Walter 
Lippmann. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 Kushner, The Holocaust and the Liberal Imagination, p.17. 
78 Ibid., p.275. 
79 Buchanan, Britain and the Spanish Civil War, p.22. 
80 Ibid., pp.22-4. 
	   28	  
Writing in 1922, Lippmann a Jewish-American intellectual and eventual advisor to 
presidents, suggested with regard to responses to that which someone has not 
personally experienced, ‘we must note one common factor. It is the insertion 
between man and his environment of a pseudo-environment.’81 He was referring to a 
simplified man-made construction of what are invariably complex events. He argued, 
the ‘only feeling that anyone can have about an event he does not experience is the 
feeling aroused by his mental image of that event’,82 therefore the ‘way in which the 
world is imagined determines at any particular moment what men will do.’83 
Whereas information is received via this pseudo-environment, actions that occur as a 
response to that information happen in the ‘real world’. Furthermore, because ‘the 
world is vast, the situations that concern us are intricate, the messages are few’, there 
is a tendency ‘to pick out what our culture has already defined for us and we tend to 
perceive that which we have picked out in the form stereotyped for us by our 
culture.’84 In other words, he suggests, ‘we do not first see, and then define, we 
define first and then see.’85 Not only do politicians and the press attempt to interpret 
events in accordance with their own agendas but each individual is constantly 
engaging with a set of stereotypes fostered by the society that they live in. The media 
play a significant role here. As Stanley Cohen points out ‘[c]ommunication, and 
especially the mass communication of stereotypes, depends on the symbolic power 
of words and images.’86 These images are ‘processed images’ and moreover, ‘the 
images and the way they were reacted to were socially created.’87  Cohen adds that 
‘[a]lthough the rumours, themes and beliefs derive mainly from the mass media, they 
later encounter reinforcement or resistance in a group setting.’88 Such ideas are 
important to this argument. The construction of stereotypes and the fact that these 
become a principle means of engaging with the world, especially the world beyond 
the shores of Britain, means that, taking into account the many forces conspiring to 
give their slant to events, they can be made and re-made depending on the strength of 	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the underlying stereotype. Reports of violence overseas often evoked what Lyn Hunt 
has recently described as ‘feelings, convictions, and actions of multitudes of 
individuals who demand responses that accord with their inner sense of outrage.’89 
When analysing this form of response the man-made constructs that sit behind and 
influence reports of actual events need to be borne in mind. 
 
Interwar Britain was a time of political and social engagement. Poet and associate of 
the Bloomsbury group Stephen Spender commented that to ignore the issues facing 
British society in the 1930s was ‘in itself a political attitude.’90 This was underpinned 
by the fact that in Britain ‘open debate was possible where it was closed off in much 
of Europe by the 1930s’, Overy points out that:  
 
[t]he public displayed a sustained appetite for information about the 
European political extremes and debated the issues surrounding them in a 
cultural and organizational milieu often quite independent of the party 
political system or party allegiance.91 
 
‘Beyond the media’ but not independent of it,  
 
lay whole networks of voluntary organizations that channelled academic 
debate, government information, scientific developments and current crises to 
society at large. In the days before television and the internet the positive, 
voluntary pursuit of information was a social phenomenon of great 
importance. No doubt this practice drew on traditions of voluntarism that 
were embedded in British public life. In the inter-war years they flourished to 
a remarkable degree. Every public issue provoked the formation of 
committees, associations, or societies which in turn established a circle of 
branches and sub-committees to spread the word countrywide.92 
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Foreign affairs consumed ordinary Britons. They were discussed, debated and 
written about with an astonishing degree of intensity that reflected widespread desire 
for a better world, one that was fair, just, and overall peaceful. This is clearly 
illustrated in an account by Vera Brittain of the death of her friend Winifred Holtby 
in September 1935. Three days before she died Holtby told her husband about a 
questionnaire she had seen recently in the Daily Mail, asking readers to say what 
they wanted most if they only had two days to live. Brittain reported that ‘her own 
reply had been “A decided British foreign policy”’.93 The importance of foreign 
affairs in everyday British life cannot be underestimated. The interwar public was 
informed and involved. Moreover, public opinion was a dynamic phenomenon, 
something that political leaders could not ignore.  
 
In order to gauge its strength and effect different forms of evidence will be used. 
These include official and government papers, especially those that mention how the 
‘public mood’ is to be incorporated, sidelined or used in other ways to validate or 
otherwise specific courses of action to be taken by political leaders. The public 
utterances of politicians or political activists who represented some aspect of the 
recognized political spectrum in Britain will also be considered because they give a 
clue to the issues at the heart of what they perceive the dominant opinion to be. 
Conservative supporters, Labour organizations and Liberals all had much to say on 
atrocities abroad. The political divisions of the interwar years are often stressed in 
relation to attitudes towards foreign policy, for example over Spain or perhaps 
Munich. Nevertheless, what is perhaps surprising is how often a dominant or 
consensual view quickly becomes perceptible in relation to overseas crises. 
Organizations such the League of Nations Union helped facilitate this tendency. 
Inclusive of all main political parties, it ‘became the most powerful advocate within 
Britain of international co-operation and collective security’. By setting itself ‘above’ 
party politics, it became a crucible for political co-operation and galvanized a 
‘centrist approach’ around which mainstream opinion could gather.94 The role of 
Christian leaders also forms part of this examination because they had what might be 	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termed moral influence. After all, Tom Lawson points out that ‘we should not 
underestimate the role of the Church in the middle of the twentieth century.’95 But 
advocating a moral stand in international relations was not limited to religious 
leaders. For this project I have identified individuals who by force of reputation were 
considered qualified to speak intelligently about Britain’s responsibilities in world 
affairs. These could be politicians, novelists, journalists or social commentators.  
 
Public opinion will also be measured by reference to such things as election results, 
delegations to political leaders, petitions, and from the late 1930s, Mass Observation. 
These will be reinforced by more personal sources, for example, private diaries, 
personal papers and correspondence. The press is a particularly useful source, not 
least because those who wanted their opinion to be heard had to acknowledge its 
reach. Mark Hampton writes that ‘by the interwar period [the press] had become 
arguably the most important medium of political communication and cultural 
influence.’96 Mushrooming circulation gives an indication of its power. In 1918 ‘the 
total circulation of the national dailies stood at 3.1 million. By 1926 it had climbed to 
4.7 million and by 1939 it had risen to 10.6 million.’97 Increased circulation tended to 
benefit national rather than local newspapers. The relative decline of provincial titles 
meant ‘concentrated ownership of the most important medium of mass 
communications gave the interwar Press Barons an unprecedented power.’98 The 
Times deserves a mention here because as Stephen Koss pointed out ‘despite its 
decreased sales and meagre dividends, The Times retained its aura.’99 It was 
particularly influential within the political classes. This did not stop newspapers from 
claiming to be separate from the establishment. Positioning themselves as the ‘Fourth 
Estate’ enabled them to give the impression they were the bearers of objective truth. 
In fact as George Boyce shows the ‘paradox of the Fourth Estate, with its head in 
politics and its feet in commerce, can…only be understood if it is appreciated that the 
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whole idea of the Fourth Estate was a myth.’100 Most newspaper owners aspired to 
political influence. Boyce adds that:  
 
influence and power were achieved, not by their newspapers acting as a 
check or restraint on politicians, but, on the contrary, by their papers gaining 
for them access to the political elite whose decisions they intended to shape. 
Journalists…aspired to be part of the political system: more – they were part 
of it.101 
 
The press in the interwar years then was far from objective. Rather than acting as a 
guardian of democratic values, it was a channel of opinion.  
 
Nevertheless, newspaper proprietors were not free to express anything they wished. 
Like politicians they had to strike a balance between reflecting and providing a lead 
to the vox populi. They had to be in tune with the political, social and cultural 
currents moving through British society. John Hartley argues that ‘[p]art of the 
meaning of the news, and part of the ability of news to mean at all, is derived from 
the social structure in which it is uttered’.102 If a newspaper contravened the 
prevailing standards of its readership, it risked isolation from its intended audience. 
Hence, it is important not to overstress the power of the press to manipulate public 
opinion; it must also reflect the values of the society it serves.103  
 
Journalists are part of what might be termed an ‘interpretive community’.104 To this 
extent newspapers can be considered part of Lippmann’s ‘psuedo-environment.’ In 
order to give themselves validity within this structure journalists employ what Barbie 
Zelizer has called ‘the ideology of eyewitness authenticity’. She shows that ‘[i]n 
producing metaphors like “eyewitnessing,” “watch-dogs,” “being there,” practices of 
discovery, or “being on the spot,” reporters establish markers that not only set up 	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their presence but also uphold its ideological importance.’105 This is not the only role 
the press can play in shaping public understanding. Reporters also ‘assume the role 
of “pedagogical objects” – giving the discourse an authority that is based on [a] pre-
given historical event.’106 They use similar and often ‘iconic’ examples from the past 
in order to give their stories cultural resonance. To elucidate a little more,  
 
events will be selected for news reporting terms or their fit or consonance 
with pre-existing images – the news of the event will confirm earlier ideas. 
The more unclear the news item and the more uncertain or doubtful the 
newsman is in how to report it, the more likely it is to be reported in a general 
framework that has been already established.107 
 
Between the wars journalists and commentators in the press regularly reached for 
past examples of foreign atrocity to frame those in the present.108 However, this 
made such reporting susceptible to biases dictated by present circumstances. There 
seems to be direct correlations here between the way the press worked and the 
processes discussed above involving the formation of collective memory, national 
identity and public opinion. 
 
In order to chart the trajectory of these interweaving forces in interwar Britain, this 
thesis explores the development of the British atrocity discourse by using what is 
largely a chronological approach. Therefore the first chapter starts in 1914 when 
German forces committed atrocities against Belgian and French civilians at the start 
of World War One. It shows that this caused outrage across British society. The 
debate was not limited to sensationalist reports, it was a serious issue and care was 
taken to ensure reports of brutality were properly verified. German action was 
quickly merged with prevailing ideology. Germans were seen as barbarians and their 	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behaviour was regularly contrasted with British ‘civilized’ values. Atrocities became 
central to the meaning of the war. When war ended, indignation continued, partly 
fostered by politicians and the press. They were regularly invoked to justify the post-
war settlement. However, British atrocities in India and Ireland cut across the 
momentum that had built up behind vehement anti-Germanism. Debates about these 
atrocities were soaked with references to German ‘frightfulness’. The British became 
tainted with the accusations they had freely and recently employed against Germany. 
The equation between the German character and brutality became increasingly 
difficult to sustain, paving the way for the recasting of ‘ordinary Germans’ in British 
minds. The qualities Germans shared with Britons were emphasised whilst the 
atrocities were recreated eventually as a ‘myth’, with the help of what Horne and 
Kramer call a ‘pacifist reinterpretation’.109 As a consequence, Germany became the 
‘victim’ of Allied foul play. This incarnation proved to be an enduring one, lasting 
well into World War Two.  
 
Chapter two shows how atrocities against Armenians also animated British public 
morality during the Great War. Turkish authorities carried out systematic persecution 
of their Armenian minority leading to hundreds of thousands of innocent civilian 
deaths. Building on a strong Christian-based tradition of pro-Armenian support 
dating back to the nineteenth century and reinforced by the belief that Germans were 
also somehow culpable, British politicians, the press and the public became 
convinced that any post-war agreement with Turkey should include autonomy for 
this long-persecuted minority. The chapter shows that Armenians became the victims 
of changing British priorities and the ability to re-characterize former enemies with 
impunity. It plots the change in British attitudes when faced with the threat of war in 
the near East against a Turkish army that threatened the British position at Chanak. 
Firstly, Armenians were conflated with Greeks and implicated in atrocities against 
Turks thus calling into question their role as innocent victims. Secondly, Turks 
having suffered from negative characterizations for years were increasingly endowed 
with ‘English’ characteristics.  
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This flexibility was not something that was afforded to the Jewish minority in Poland 
in the immediate aftermath of World War One. The creation of Poland out of the old 
European empires was a key Allied war aim. Poles were seen as deserving the 
reinstatement of their country after years of German and Russian domination. It was 
inconvenient for the British government that having spent four years fighting against 
tyranny, Poland was the setting for outbreaks of vicious anti-Semitism. Chapter three 
reveals that British patronage of Poland in the face of a perceived Bolshevik threat 
from Russia and Germany proved stronger than a commitment to the ideals that were 
regularly trumpeted during the war. From the outset of violence, Jews were seen as 
untrustworthy, susceptible to exaggeration of their sufferings, and part and parcel of 
the Bolshevik ‘menace’. Anti-Jewish persecution caused discomfort in Britain but 
never achieved anything like the indignation caused by other contemporary violence. 
Whilst giving the appearance of support, British officials eventually worked to 
undermine Jewish claims. The effect was a legacy of scepticism, which reinforced 
popular beliefs about the Jewish character.  
 
Chapter Four follows the development of the atrocity discourse into the 1930s. The 
Abyssinian crisis in the middle years of the decade marked a crossroads in Britain’s 
response to overseas crises. The public had become increasingly convinced of the 
wisdom of connecting British foreign policy to the League of Nations. This was in no 
small part due to what can be termed ‘pressure from below.’ The 1930s, as has 
already been pointed out, were years of political engagement at all levels of society. 
Foreign affairs stood high on most agendas.110 Momentum behind advocacy of 
League principles built from the time of the Manchurian crisis when Japan had taken 
advantage of an atrophy of international leadership. By the time it became apparent 
that Fascist Italy was intent on extending its sphere of influence in northeast Africa, 
public support for ‘international justice’ reached a peak. The Abyssinians became a 
cause worth supporting and perhaps even fighting for within the guidelines of the 
League Covenant. Public opinion railed against the sight of a civilized European 
nation pounding virtually defenceless Abyssinians. Italian atrocities galvanized 
massive indignation. The British government, ideologically opposed to the concept 
of an internationalist League, moved on a subtle course of action to undermine its 	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precepts. They paid for their subterfuge with the loss of the Foreign Secretary 
Samuel Hoare. However, they achieved what they set out to do. The League was 
effectively disenfranchised as a serious concern. The whole episode showed both the 
power of British opinion when roused and its weakness in altering the course of a 
government convinced of its policy and electorally unassailable.  
 
The Spanish Civil War and the Sino-Japanese War are dealt with in Chapter Five. 
Historians have extensively explored British reactions to Spain in the 1930s. Jim 
Fryth, Enrique Moradiellos and Tom Buchanan have dealt respectively with popular, 
government and cultural responses in Britain to a civil war that for many reflected 
the ideological tensions in 1930s Europe.111 This chapter shows that, at least during 
the first twelve months of the conflict, the atrocities committed by Franco’s 
insurgents created a form of consensus in Britain that was in some ways more deeply 
reflective of what the British thought themselves to be than any of the political 
alignments expressed at the time. From being on the periphery, not just of Europe but 
also the British imagination, Spain moved to the centre of British thinking partly 
because of atrocity. Atrocities committed by Republican supporters were 
marginalised in Britain by overwhelming evidence of systematic butchery employed 
by the Fascists. The bombing of Guernica brought all but the most ardent advocates 
of Franco out in sympathy for the population of the Basque territories. Ideological 
connections between Basques and Britons were discovered, underpinning an 
outpouring of compassionate action on behalf of the victims. The balance of 
sympathy tipped inexorably away from the Francoists. Spain was ‘ceaselessly 
debated in Parliament, caused divisions within the parties; 2,500 volunteered and 
over 500 died; thousands more participated in political and humanitarian campaigns.’ 
Although the Cabinet ‘was forced to give it a high priority for almost three years’ by 
ceaseless public pressure, the British government remained entrenched in their policy 
of ‘non-intervention’.112 
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The outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War signalled the start of a nationwide campaign 
on behalf of Chinese victims. For campaigners, the Far Eastern conflict provided a 
‘second front’ along with Spain to attack the government. Guernica provided 
momentum for renewed public outrage over the bombing of Chinese civilians, a 
strategy liberally employed by Japanese forces. Mass protests were endorsed by 
leading public figures. The ‘foreignness’ of the victims did nothing to prevent 
indignation. The Chinese had for some time been cast as the ‘other’, but in a short 
space of time were reinvented as supporters found ways of bringing their suffering 
home to a receptive public. The government however, was now more adept at 
containing public opinion by making ‘right’ sounding public announcements whilst 
accommodating a political strategy more in line with the policy of ‘appeasement’.  
 
Chapter Six charts the trajectory of public and official responses to the persecution of 
Jews under Nazi rule. Between Hitler’s accession to power and knowledge of the so-
called Final Solution reaching the British public, at no time did public indignation 
reach the pitch achieved in the case of atrocities against non-Jewish victims from 
1914 onwards. This chapter shows that a number of factors combined to cut across 
compassion on behalf of persecuted Jews. Building on the myth that atrocities 
committed by Germans in the Great War were themselves a ‘myth’, pro-German 
sentiment was deeply entrenched in British society. There was strong resistance to 
the notion that ordinary Germans could be culpable in Nazi crimes or imbue 
themselves with Nazi aims. This was reinforced by a stubborn inability to recast 
Jews as victims. This had not changed since the end of the First World War. Many 
were certainly moved by their plight. However, some aspect of their ‘collective 
character’ was invariably raised during public debate about their suffering which 
broke potential momentum building behind widespread public support.  
 
In interwar Britain, atrocity was a consistent frame of reference. In 1934 the Daily 
Express, one of most successful of the interwar newspapers, issued a book entitled 
Covenants with Death. It had a black cover emblazoned with a red skull holding a 
‘treaty’ in its boney fingers. Inside were pictures of war that had been too appalling 
for publication during wartime. The purpose of the book was ‘to reveal the horror, 
suffering and essential bestiality of modern war’ with a view to showing the ‘peril of 
foreign entanglements.’ Thus, it clearly reflected the isolationist views of Lord 
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Beaverbrook, the proprietor. A sealed section at the back of the book was devoted to 
images that were ‘inescapably horrible’ showing the victims of atrocity. 
Nevertheless, they were deemed ‘essential to a full view of the World War in its 
phases of terror and bestiality.’113 The book was deliberately sensationalist and 
designed to be read by the masses. Unrelenting photographs were used to reinforce 
what was supposed to be a message of peace. Atrocity was understood and an 
essential part of the British discourse.  
 
This thesis builds on the findings of other historians who have grappled with the 
problem of understanding British reactions to the Holocaust. Chapter Six cannot be 
seen as separate or distinct from the others. If the reaction to anti-Jewish persecution 
and violence is examined on its own, the vital context for exploring British responses 
to atrocity remains hidden. This argument seeks to place British responses to the 
Jewish disaster in a wider and more encompassing context. Britons were confronted 
with atrocity, dealt with it and incorporated it into their national story. In fact, their 
very identity was in many ways caught up with protecting those who suffered. From 
the outbreak of the First World War, the British acted in accordance with this 
tradition. A disparate group of ‘foreign’ victims were the recipients of nationwide 
indignation, almost regardless of the way the government eventually was able to 
contain public protest. This thesis shows that when Jews were victims there was a 
break with this tradition. In other words it shows that the reaction to Jewish suffering 
was particular. It gives reasons why, in the British case, as Saul Friedlander states 
‘Nazi and related anti-Jewish policies could unfold to their most extreme levels 
without the interference of any major countervailing interests’.114
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Chapter One. 
A History of ‘Frightfulness’: German Atrocities and British Responses During 
and After World War One 
From the outbreak of war in August to the end of October 1914, German officers and 
troops systematically subjected Belgian and French civilians to acts of terror. The 
violence:  
appeared to be anything but accidental. Rounding up the inhabitants in the 
public square or church, separating men and boys from the women, children 
and the old, proceeding to collective executions and deportations, trailing the 
inhabitants for days on a forced march, or exposing them to fire as a human 
shield…reflected high military policy and not just vagaries of mood among 
the NCOs and junior officers.1 
News of the violence was quickly transmitted to Britain where it was incorporated 
into the national enlistment campaign. German atrocities became one of the main 
reasons why so many signed up. The strength of the response was in part because of 
the belief that atrocity was un-English, it was something the ‘Prussians’ did. In this 
sense, the popular response was framed by a sense of national identity: in other 
words, who the English thought themselves to be. On the basis of atrocity stories the 
conflict rapidly came to represent a fight between German barbarism and British 
civilization. This was encapsulated in the word ‘frightfulness’, a term with specific 
connotations. For the British, it neatly summed up German methods of dragooning 
subject peoples and was a metonym for the ideological differences between Britons 
and their enemies. During the war the perception of Germans as barbaric was largely 
unchallenged. In fact, to portray the Germans as anything less than brutal was 
considered at least unpatriotic and at most treasonable. 
After 1918 the response to German brutality was complicated by British involvement 
in atrocities in India and Ireland. British culpability meant it became increasingly 
difficult to suggest that atrocity was particular to the Germans. The massacre of 
Indian civilians at Amritsar ordered by a respected British General sparked a national 	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debate. After Amritsar the dichotomy between Britishness and German 
‘frightfulness’, so familiar from wartime, was no longer clear cut. Instead, methods 
of British rule were increasingly compared to German behaviour in Belgium in 1914. 
This blurring was exacerbated by the semi-official British policy of violent reprisals 
against the Republican movement in Ireland. The national discourse on Irish policy 
was suffused with comparisons between British and German ‘methods’ of coercing 
subject peoples. Talk of atrocity, which had tripped off British tongues so readily in 
the war, became loaded with pejorative meaning.  
This represented something of an intellectual and cultural sea change. In the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century many influential British thinkers believed the 
nation had a genius for gradual, peaceful change and was not subject to the same 
mode of violent upheaval so often witnessed on the continent.2 British atrocities in 
the post war period challenged this notion. As a result Britain’s moral standing was 
shaken. Wartime calls for retribution against perpetrators of atrocity were largely 
silenced. There is a clear link between British violence and subsequent vilification of 
the ‘harsh’ terms of the Versailles Treaty. In the two decades after the war the 
settlement with Germany was increasingly seen as the root of international turmoil. 
All shades of opinion came to see Versailles as unjust. German atrocities, which had 
fuelled Britain’s indignation, were subsumed by the discourse on British brutality. It 
became increasingly apparent that talk of German war crimes was hypocritical. The 
momentum behind calls for punishment stalled. In short, British brutalities were the 
seedbed for the rehabilitation of Germany, because they contributed to the idea that 
German atrocities were a myth. This had a direct impact on British reactions to news 
of atrocities from Germany and Eastern Europe in the 1930s and 1940s. Yet, the 
‘myth’ of German atrocities in the Great War was itself a myth. 
In 1914 German atrocities, not only ‘confounded Allied presuppositions of warfare 
in Europe’, but played on deeper British fears of national decline.3 The response was 
influenced by ‘deeper mentalities and traditions’ rooted in the anxieties generated by 
the German naval challenge, the second Moroccan crisis and fear of a German 	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assault on Britain. Before 1914, invasion stories had permeated popular culture.4 The 
Daily Mail, which enjoyed unrivalled popularity under the proprietorship of Lord 
Northcliffe,5 had consistently predicted the outbreak of war and boy’s literature 
reinforced growing insecurities.6 One contemporary suggested that ‘as 1914 neared 
the invasion stories came thick and fast’.7 Antwerp’s fall, which coincided with the 
arrival of Belgian refugees and their horror stories, heightened fear of German 
military behaviour.8 By late September atrocities became central to British 
understanding of the war. The ubiquity of their dissemination set the tone for popular 
involvement in the conflict. Wickham Steed, editor of The Times from 1919 to 1922, 
later commented, ‘the invasion of Belgium, the burning of Louvain, [and] the arrival 
in England of thousands of Belgian refugees fleeing from German “frightfulness”’ 
were among the things that ‘kept Britain breathless’ in the first months of the war.9  
Atrocity stories reinforced indignation and confirmed the justice of Britain’s cause. 
Norman Angell, the prominent pacifist campaigner, admitted ‘the issue of 
Belgium…gave the war a moral purpose’.10 This conviction was reinforced at the 
highest level. A speech by Prime Minister, Herbert Asquith, at the Guildhall on 4 
September 1914, set the tone for the military recruitment drive. He described the 
destruction of Louvain as ‘the greatest crime committed against civilisation and 
culture since the Thirty Years War’ and claimed ‘the Government and the people of 
the country’ were at the behest of their ‘national conscience and sense of honour.’11 
After the speech, The Times correspondent Michael MacDonagh witnessed 
‘hundreds of fine recruits’ enlisting.12 The south of England was particularly 	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susceptible to invasion fears. At a recruitment meeting in Chichester on 23 
September the speaker drew a harrowing comparison between the fate of Belgium 
and the potential of what might happen if Britain was invaded. The audience was told 
Belgium was now a ‘wreck’ and that  
it was known there were ships ready somewhere to make an attack and if the 
German troops were to land at Bognor they would see women and children 
flocking into Chichester, driven before these Uhlans, wounded men shot as 
they ran into the streets, women bayoneted and outraged.13  
Local newspapers reported these meetings as well attended and enthusiastic. The 
British public were genuinely indignant. Belief in German atrocities was largely 
unquestioned and their invocation at national and local recruitment meetings 
guaranteed success especially ‘when it appeared that the regular army might be 
defeated and Prussian barbarism unleashed on Britain.’14 
Apart from encouraging recruitment, one of the principal manifestations of British 
reactions to German atrocities was the wholehearted welcome given to Belgian 
refugees. MacDonagh commented in his diary on the arrival of ‘tens of thousands’ of 
Belgians who had been ‘torn from their homes’ by the Germans. They were, he said, 
‘very properly the guests of the nation.’15 Home Secretary, Reginald McKenna, set 
the tone for the treatment of Belgian refugees. They were to be ‘treated as friends, 
and no difficulty w[ould] be put in the way of their landing at any approved port, if 
they c[ould] satisfy the Aliens officer that they [were] in fact Belgians and not 
Germans or Austrians’.16 According to Herbert Samuel, President of the Local 
Government Board, following the Aliens Legislation rushed through Parliament in 
August 1914, between four and five thousand Belgian refugees per week were 
allowed into Britain.17 At the peak there were over a quarter of a million Belgians 
residing in the country.18 Peter Cahalan states ‘never before or since have as many 	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people as the Belgians entered England as refugees or immigrants in the short space 
of little more than a year.’19 Church leaders reinforced the outpouring of compassion. 
Dean of Durham, Hensley Henson, referred to the Belgians who had ‘been fighting 
our battle’ in his sermon on 19 September: 
Every instinct of gratitude and honour unites with every sentiment of 
compassion to urge us to do what we can do to assist their cruel 
necessity…We cannot bring back those who have been foully murdered, we 
cannot restore those fair cities, or blot out of mind those scenes of 
unimaginable cruelty amid which they perished…Let us give freely and 
liberally to the Belgian Relief Fund.20  
A campaign to raise funds in the Observer and West Sussex Recorder exceeded 
1,000 shillings by 23 December, a figure they ‘had not dared to expect’.21  For the 
majority the refugees were ‘concrete reminders of the righteousness of the Allied 
cause,’ and objects of considerable interest.22 One relief worker commented ‘[i]t is 
wonderful how “the refugee question” pervades the whole country. It is as good an 
opening subject for conversation as the weather once was, and like that is common to 
all classes.’23 The Pall Mall Gazette noted how ‘[r]eligious differences do not exist. 
A Protestant people are extending their arms of affection to a Catholic one, and the 
common enemy is Pagan.’24  
German atrocities in Belgium and France helped crystallise the image of the enemy 
as the antithesis of British civilised values. The serious and popular press widened 
the constructed ideological divide between Germans and Britons. On 22 August The 
Times acknowledged ‘that from the moment Germany began to mobilize there have 
been repeated examples of gross ruthlessness and often of barbarity on the part of 
German officers and men’.25 The Mail adopted sensationalist banner headlines, with 
reports detailing the use of women and children as shields and male citizens shot 	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without reason.26 The official nature of the evidence was emphasized in order to 
validate the atrocities. The leader advised that ‘[a]ccusations of atrocities’ should be 
treated with ‘cautious scepticism’ but that this was ‘no ordinary arraignment’,  
[i]t is the outcome of a committee of inquiry comprising the highest judicial 
and university authorities of Belgium, and it is concerned not with hearsay 
evidence but with incidents that in each case have been carefully investigated 
and that are attested by trustworthy eye-witnesses.27 
Punch, which had ‘iconic status’,28 published full-page satirical cartoons depicting 
stereotypical militaristic Germans and their dead or terrified Belgian civilian 
victims.29 
Throughout 1914-18 British civilians were bombarded with anti-German 
propaganda. Charles Masterman, head of the British War Propaganda Bureau, 
estimated in June 1915 that Wellington House circulated ‘some 2½ million copies of 
books, official publications, pamphlets, and speeches in 17 different languages’ 
concerning the ‘rights and wrongs of the war’.30 A government commission headed 
by Lord Bryce was appointed to examine evidence and report on German atrocities. 
Its content and official nature arguably fortified public ire. Nevertheless, it was not 
the overt propaganda operation portrayed by some commentators.31 Care was taken 
to reject certain witness statements as fantasy, but the remaining evidence, partly 
taken from the diaries of German soldiers, genuinely affronted Liberal 
commissioners.32 
For others the report did not go far enough in its condemnation of Germany. One 
correspondent to The Times was concerned that ‘Blue Books are apt to fade from 	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memory’ and suggested the creation of a national museum full of grisly reminders of 
German war-time conduct.33 In 1915 Professor J.H. Morgan, Home Office 
Commissioner with the British Expeditionary Force who collected evidence for the 
Bryce Commission, published his own version of events.34 Frustrated with the 
‘extreme moderation’ of the Bryce Report, he asserted ‘[t]his is not the time for 
mincing one’s words but for plain speech’.35 Morgan believed that German ‘lust for 
conquest and arrogance’ had made them ‘rotten to the core’. Furthermore, all were 
‘infected with a common spirit’.36 Under the heading ‘Methods of Inquiry’, Morgan 
outlined his techniques for ensuring witness statements obtained orally were verified. 
He explained the official nature of the inquiry to each ‘soldier or officer’, stating ‘he 
must be prepared to put his name to any testimony he might elect to give’. Each 
individual’s account was ‘cross-examined’ by Morgan then read aloud before 
obtaining his signature.37  
Lurid reports often contained legalistic justification. For example, in 1916 the Daily 
Chronicle published a translation of the Official Report of the French Commission. It 
emphasised the ‘duty’ only to record crimes ‘established beyond dispute’ and to omit 
‘acts of war properly so-called’ however ‘destructive or cruel they were’.38 The back 
cover was emblazoned with an advertisement for an easily affordable book called In 
the Trail of the German Army. It was accompanied by an illustration of an eagle 
representing the German Army with its feathers interspersed with rifles, and talons 
resting on the body of a semi-naked woman. Proceeds were to be ‘devoted to Funds 
for the Belgian Refugees’.39 Gendered representations of German atrocities provided 
a suitable framework for public understanding of international affairs. Images 
depicting a vision of the brutalisation of women and children ‘privileged a set of 
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familial and sexual concerns’.40 They conjured up fears relating to the domestic 
environment and combined with legalistic language that ‘verified’ atrocities and 
reinforced belief in German ‘frightfulness’.  As Dan Todman states ‘[l]urid 
descriptions of rape and murder brought pornographic titillation onto the breakfast 
tables of respectable Britain; horror sold papers as well as encouraging young men to 
fight.’41  
In order to protect Britain’s self-proclaimed civilised status, many expressed concern 
that British behaviour did not imitate that attributed to the enemy. In September 
1914, jurist, E.D.W. Fry wrote to The Times warning against ‘retaliation’. He drew 
attention to the British ‘claim’ of defending ‘civilization’ against ‘militarism’ and 
urged ‘self control in the repression of any desire to “get even” with our adversaries 
by adopting their practices.’42 Fervent protests were printed in The Times at the 
prospect that the British should embark on a programme of reprisals for Zeppelin 
raids on England. According to Lord Alverstone, former Lord Chief Justice, they 
would involve Britain and the Empire ‘being party to a line of conduct condemned 
by every right-thinking man of every civilized nation’.43 In 1917 Sir Edward Clark, 
former Solicitor General, wrote concerning ‘our bombardment of an unfortified 
German town’ stating, ‘the more indignant we are at these outrages the greater will 
be our shame and disgrace if we imitate them’.44 Jurist and professor, A.V. Dicey 
agreed. Although the Germans had ‘made themselves outlaws…this is no reason for 
our sinking to the German level of barbarity’.45 British culture and German ‘Kultur’ 
were persistently contrasted for the duration of the war. For most the protection of 
intrinsically humane indigenous qualities was central to the meaning of the war. 
When war-weariness set in, the National War Aims Committee invoked German 
‘frighfulness’ in order to ‘reanimate the war culture of the early years and stiffen 
national resolve.’46  
After the armistice on 11 November 1918 the Coalition government called a general 
election for the following month. Atrocities were a central theme. The Times 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Gullace, ‘Sexual Violence and Family Honour’, p.716. 
41 Todman, The Great War, p.14. 
42 Times, 14 September 1914, p.9. 
43 Ibid., 20 October 1915, p.9. 
44 Times, 1 May 1917, p.7. 
45 Ibid., 4 May 1917, p.9. 
46 Horne and Kramer, German Atrocities, p.320.
	   47	  
summed up the election pointing to the ‘almost universal determination’ that 
Germany should pay the cost of the war and that the Kaiser should be brought to 
trial. This was considered ‘the outstanding feature of the campaign’.47 The second 
point of Lloyd George’s ‘six-point manifesto’, which was attached to the final list of 
Coalition candidates, promised ‘[p]unishment for those responsible for atrocities.’48 
The desire for revenge did not last. British atrocities in India and Ireland meant that 
characterisations of German brutality became difficult to sustain. Although German 
‘frightfulness’ had been heavily linked to the war’s meaning, officially condoned 
British violence quickly undermined the sense of British moral superiority at home 
and abroad. The massacre of unarmed civilians at Amritsar and the reprisals against 
Irish Republicans prompted controversy. The ‘frightfulness’ that had achieved 
metonymic status during the war represented state sponsored violence against 
defenceless civilians. Soon it was being applied to British actions. This would have 
direct ramifications for the trial of war criminals and the way in which German 
atrocities were remembered.  
 
On 13 April 1919, at Jallianwala Bagh in Amritsar, British Indian Army soldiers 
commanded by Brigadier-General Reginald Dyer opened fire without warning on a 
crowd of unarmed locals. According to official figures 379 people were killed and 
over 1,200 wounded.49 The crowd had been peacefully protesting against the 
implementation of the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms and the Anarchical and 
Revolutionary Crimes Act of 1919.50 Although recent protests had left twelve 
Indians and five Europeans dead, there had been a period of relative calm. To 
aggravate matters, in the street where a British woman missionary had been attacked, 
Dyer ordered that Indians wishing to pass should do so on all fours. Six people 
arrested on suspicion of the crime were flogged. The General stated that his actions 	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were designed to create a ‘necessary moral and widespread effect’ in order to prevent 
revolution.51 For Dyer ‘[t]here could be no question of undue severity’.52 In Britain 
his actions caused a political storm. Public opinion divided between those who 
condemned the shootings and those who supported the General. 
A Committee was convened under former Scottish Solicitor General William Hunter, 
to investigate unrest throughout the Punjab, in which the events at Amritsar played a 
part. It was divided along racial lines and this cleavage was reflected in the differing 
intensity of criticism levelled at Dyer in the respective conclusions of the Majority 
and Minority Reports.53 The Majority Report criticized Dyer for failing on two 
counts. Firstly, he had overstepped his responsibilities and secondly, his ‘excessive’ 
methods were likely to ‘produce the opposite result to that desired’.54 The Minority 
Report went further. It suggested, Dyer’s actions were ‘compared to the acts of 
“frightfulness” committed by some of the German military commanders during the 
war in Belgium and France’.55 The Indian members of the Committee attempted to 
undermine Dyer’s evidence by claiming, ‘the plea of military necessity is the plea 
that has always been advanced in justification of the Prussian atrocities.’56 Thus 
within a short time after the end of the war, German atrocities were established as a 
recognised frame of reference for British violence. However, the report stopped short 
of suggesting that ‘Prussianism’ was part of the values and methods of their imperial 
rulers. Therefore, the actions were condemned as ‘inhuman and un-British’.57 During 
the national debate, on the other hand, allusions to ‘Prussian’ methods were 
uncomfortably frequent.  
The Labour Party, concerned that similar methods would be used to suppress 
working-class protests, denounced the ‘cruel and barbarous actions’ of British 
officers in the Punjab. Delegates at its conference in Scarborough ‘rose in their 
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places as a tribute to ‘India’s martyred dead’’.58 Most opponents of Dyer sought to 
preserve their belief in Britain’s liberal heritage. The New Statesman reaffirmed 
‘[t]he strength of the British Raj in India is derived not from its sword but from 
India’s consciousness of the advantages of the British connection’. Indians, it stated, 
should have ‘faith in the British sense of justice and fairplay [sic] and in Britain’s 
freedom from racialism’.59 Those on the moderate Right were equally concerned 
with protecting Britain’s reputation. The Times was keen, from the moment  the 
Hunter Report was made public, to ‘efface’ the ‘bitter memories’.60 The extent of 
discomfort is evident in the Oxford Union debate on 10 June 1920, which narrowly 
endorsed official condemnation of Dyer.61 British opinion was divided. 
The Times attempted to set the tone for the Parliamentary debate on 8 July 1920, 
suggesting public opinion no longer favoured despotic imperial rule. Instead they 
were said to favour ‘a British commonwealth founded on the willing cooperation of 
free peoples.’ Not only was this evidence of ‘our national repute for genius in 
government’ but ‘events like those at Amritsar’ obscured ‘our national purpose and 
betray the ideals which inspire it.’62 The Amritsar massacre was portrayed as an 
anomaly. Nevertheless, a letter from Conservative M.P. and Naval Commander 
Carlyon Bellairs suggested recourse to extreme violence was sometimes acceptable.  
He believed that ‘[i]n every great achievement, as in Dyer’s case, there is dust and 
dirt’, but ‘[w]hen a handful of whites are faced by hundreds of thousands of fanatical 
natives, one cannot apply one’s John Stuart Mill.’63 The extent of disagreement was 
evident in Parliamentary debate. Opponents of Dyer characterised his advocates as 
Prussians, whereas Dyer’s supporters vented their anger at so-called Jewish 
influence. Both sides laid claim to genuine Englishness. ‘Prussian frightfulness’ was 
central to the Amritsar debate.  The massacre of innocent people in India forced the 
British to examine themselves. By particularising Dyer’s action, events at Amritsar 
could be portrayed as an aberration. Such methods were seen as inherently un-
English. 	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Opening the debate, Edwin Montagu, Secretary of State for India, stated:  
If an officer justifies his conduct, no matter how gallant his record is…by 
saying that there was no undue question of severity, that if his means had 
been greater the casualties would have been greater, and that the motive was 
to teach a moral lesson to the whole of the Punjab, I say without 
hesitation…that is the doctrine of terrorism…you are indulging in 
frightfulness.64 
The Secretary of State, fully aware of the significance attached to the word 
‘frightfulness’, thus accused a serving British general of adopting the same tactics as 
those attributed to Britain’s recently defeated enemy. He asked the House to choose 
between imperial rule based on ‘terrorism, racial humiliation, and frightfulness’ or 
‘partnership’.65 He deliberately used language commonly employed during the war to 
describe German barbarity and contrasted it with Liberal doctrine as a form of 
Englishness.  
 
To associate a British general with ‘frightfulness’ was a provocation. Supporters of 
Dyer were incensed. Because German atrocities had been so intrinsically connected 
to British war aims they had become a means of justifying why so many young men 
had lost their lives. Legal advocate and Unionist Leader, Edward Carson, applied the 
British ‘sense of fair-play’ differently, believing that ‘to break a man under the 
circumstance of this case is un-English’.66 Thus, Englishness was used to verify the 
moral basis of both arguments. Winston Churchill found a compromise that 
eventually soothed the febrile atmosphere. He described the massacre at Amritsar as 
‘an episode which appears to me to be without precedent or parallel in the modern 
history of the British Empire…It is an extraordinary event, an event which stands in 
singular and sinister isolation’.67 Having particularised Dyer’s actions, Churchill 
distanced British methods from ‘frightfulness’, which was ‘not a remedy known to 
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the British pharmacopoeia’. He suggested it was more connected to the ‘bloody and 
devastating terrorism’ employed by Bolsheviks.68  
British politicians had been caught out by their own wartime rhetoric. The tension 
between condemnation of German behaviour in Belgium and the unnerving evidence 
that the British were now guilty of similar crimes was made worse for the supporters 
of Dyer, for whom Montagu’s Jewishness was an issue now central to the debate. 
Montagu had always considered himself more able than most to identify with the 
peoples of India. On a tour of India in 1917 he had stated ‘[p]erhaps there is some 
truth in the allegation that I am Oriental. Certainly that social relationship which 
English people seem to find so difficult comes quite easy to me’69. His ‘oriental’ 
identity was about to be turned against him. Montagu’s ‘Jewish’ attributes were 
contrasted with English ‘self-restraint’ in an increasingly desperate defence of 
national character. A month earlier, the Morning Post attempted to divert the 
attention from Dyer to Montagu. The newspaper represented a significant and vocal 
pro-Dyer lobby and sought to protect British values by arguing ‘it is not General 
Dyer who is on trial’70 but Montagu. It condemned Montagu’s ‘[o]riental’ oration on 
the basis that is was ‘imbued with racial bitterness’ and ‘solely inspired…with the 
fanatic motive of proving that an alien race is as good as the English’.71 
 
T.J. Bennett, wrote to The Times claiming the debate, was ‘not free…from the racial 
prejudice which worked mischief in France during the anti-Dreyfuss controversy’.72 
The Manchester Guardian praised Montagu for his courage in the face of ‘anti-
Semites’.73 Rejection of ‘Prussianism’ was, for them, ‘a political issue of the first 
magnitude’. Reactionary methods of control, if officially endorsed, would create a 
dangerous precedent. They believed Dyer’s supporters did not ‘intend to stop at 
India’ but advocated ‘the principle of undiluted violence…to be of general 
application’. Ireland was alleged as the next target and after that ‘British workmen on 
strike…The Prussians at Visé, at Louvain, at Aerschot and a score of other places 	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took the same view.’74 However, a significant minority in the House connected the 
alleged fallacy over Dyer’s actions with Montagu’s Jewishness and vilified Montagu 
in distinctly anti-Jewish tones. The Times seemed to agree arguing Montagu was 
guilty of:  
bad advocacy in two ways. It was too passionate, and the malcontents were 
irritated by its sharp logical dilemmas. Secondly, the English mind does not 
work in that way. We are the most daring political generalizers in the world, 
but it is our wont in politics, as in science, to proceed inductively from the 
particular to the general, not from the general to the particular…East and 
West, be they produced ever so far, will never meet, and Mr Montagu, 
patriotic and sincere English Liberal as he is, is also a Jew, and in excitement 
has the mental idiom of the East’75 
This passage is significant for a number of reasons. Firstly, The Times was highly 
influential for the political classes and recognised for its moderation and balance. 
Secondly, it cast the blame for anti-Semitic Parliamentary uproar on Montagu. He 
was ‘too passionate’. Thirdly, he was accused of expressing the Dyer issue too 
starkly. Hence ‘the malcontents’ were ‘irritated’ by his ‘sharp logical dilemmas’. 
Finally, he was charged with generalizing the issue of ‘frightfulness’. The Times 
wanted it contained and forgotten. Therefore, Montagu was portrayed as lacking a 
form of pragmatism, which was seen as peculiar to the English mind.76 In short, The 
Times saw Montagu as over-emotional and therefore un-English. Montagu could 
adhere to Liberal values, but would always be betrayed by ‘the mental idiom of the 
East’. Sir William Sutherland reported to the Prime Minister that Montagu became 
‘more racial and more Yiddish in screaming tone and gesture.’ Liberal J.L. Maffey 
condemned Montagu’s ‘windy and unconvincing rhodomontades’.77 Austen 
Chamberlain stated privately to his sister with perhaps more candour that the 
‘feeling’ in the Commons was of ‘[a] Jew, a foreigner, rounding on an Englishman & 	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throwing him to the wolves…A Jew may be a loyal Englishman & passionately 
patriotic, but he is intellectually apart from us & will never be purely and simply 
English.’78 
For the Morning Post the defence of Dyer, seen as an English patriot and defender of 
Empire, was indissolubly linked with the identity of Montagu and his supposed alien 
nature. The serialisation of the forged Protocols of the Elders of Zion by the Morning 
Post was at least partially influenced by the Amritsar debate. The first instalment was 
accompanied by the comment that ‘[o]nly last week the House of Commons 
witnessed a startling exhibition of that racial dementia which would pit East against 
West in desperate opposition. That is the spirit that must be exorcised if we are again 
to have peace in the world’.79 On 10 July the Morning Post launched a national 
appeal for General Dyer. The response was immediate and substantial.80  
 
The House of Lords finally voted against the recommendations of the Commons, 
which were to relieve Dyer of his command and for him to be placed on half pay.81 
The Times probably adopted the prevailing view when it stated ‘[t]he debate itself 
added nothing of importance to public knowledge, though it served to revive a 
controversy far better relegated to oblivion’.82 After more than a year of public 
wrangling this was an episode the British wished to forget. National self-confidence 
was dented and Britain’s moral standing on the world stage had been dealt a severe 
blow. The bitterness of the debate was testimony to its sensitivity. Direct comparison 
between German and British barbarism meant ideological contrasts constructed 
during wartime were no longer clear-cut. The Commons exchange coincided directly 
with the Spa Conference at which the issue of German war criminals was to be 	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discussed. The Dyer debate and the growing crisis in Ireland effectively submerged 
the issue. War crimes received only cursory attention in the press. The whole episode 
has been called ‘a thinly coded discussion of Ireland’ which at the time was moving 
towards open revolt.83 Hamar Greenwood, Chief Secretary to Ireland, stated in 
conversation with other cabinet members that ‘the Dyer debate has not helped us to 
govern [in Ireland] by soldiers’.84 The repercussions from Amritsar helped create 
uncertainty at the heart of government which dispelled ideas of martial law in Ireland 
and paved the way for reprisals. 
When war broke out Ireland was the ‘overseas’ crisis that had preoccupied the 
British public.85 The prospect of armed opposition to Home Rule had been averted 
by Britain’s declaration of war. The 1916 Easter Rising demonstrated that political 
tension and violence remained intrinsically linked. After the war inadequately 
commanded quasi-military forces were used to implement a semi-official reprisals 
policy. Violent methods employed by armed and organised Irish republicans were 
echoed and exceeded by Crown forces. According to D.G. Boyce, ‘the Irish question, 
after the Great War, excited almost continuous public interest in Great Britain’.86 
Officially sanctioned terrorism divided public opinion. On balance, sympathy tended 
to go to the Irish, partly as underdogs and partly because the representatives of law 
and order could not be seen to sully themselves with terroristic methods. C.K. 
Peatling states, ‘English opinion about Ireland was manufactured in England for 
home consumption, had nothing to do with Ireland, and everything to do with 
England’.87 One reason for this was that violence in Ireland acquired a fresh 
conceptual framework. Wartime rhetoric surrounding German atrocities meant new 
and forceful allusions were created for government inspired brutality. As with India, 
Ireland became a debate about Englishness. Wartime constructions of national 
identity based on civilization versus German barbarism became virtually impossible 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 Sayer, ‘British Reaction’, p. 153. 
84 Middlemas, Keith, (ed.) Thomas Jones Whitehall Diary, Vol.III, Ireland 1918-1925 (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1971) p.33. 
85 Angell, After All, p.179. 
86 Boyce, D.G., Englishmen and Irish Troubles: British Public Opinion and the Making of Irish Policy 
1918–22 (London: Jonathan Cape, 1972) p.13. 
87 Peatling, C.K., British Opinion and Irish Self-Government 1865–1925: From Unionism to Liberal 
Commonwealth (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2001) p.8. 
	   55	  
to sustain. German atrocities were pushed to the sidelines of the debate, allowing 
room for a new interpretation of the war.  
In early 1920 the British government reinforced security forces in Ireland.88 Threat-
induced resignations and low numbers of recruits to the Royal Irish Constabulary had 
forced the government to reappraise its strategy for keeping order. These new 
additions to the Irish police were not without precedent. Relieving the army of 
responsibilities had long been a consideration for British military chiefs.89 This was 
especially pertinent in 1920 given the unprecedented size of the Empire and public 
desire for domestic reconstruction. Nevertheless, hasty recruitment, made obvious by 
patchy uniform provision, hence their nickname the ‘Black and Tans’, demonstrated 
the hand-to-mouth strategies of a British government anxious to locate almost any 
solution to the plethora of post-war challenges.90 As to the men themselves, Winston 
Churchill suggested they had been selected ‘from a great press of applicants on 
account of their intelligence, their characters and their records in the war’.91 In reality 
the majority were unemployed recently demobilised junior officers and NCOs. As 
much as trench warfare had contributed to their un-preparedness for guerrilla tactics, 
it had also created a body of men used to extreme violence. In an influential article 
published in 1921, government advisor on Indian and Irish affairs Lionel Curtis 
argued that trench warfare had left ‘a mass of combatants who are afterwards fitted 
for little but fighting’ but ‘not easily amenable to discipline’.92 
1920 was the year in which guerrilla warfare took hold in Ireland. Shootings, 
ambushes, midnight raids, kidnappings, hostage taking, torture, curfews and arson 
characterised the conflict.93 Several towns and villages were raided and sacked by 
Black and Tans.94 In Tralee after an attack on three policemen, government forces 
embarked on ‘a carnival of shooting and shouting’, which lasted till dawn; they 	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burned the County Hall and displayed a notice: ‘TAKE NOTICE. Warning! Unless 
two Tralee police in Sinn Fein custody are returned, reprisals of a nature not yet 
heard in Ireland will take place in Tralee.’95 It is unfeasible that violence by British 
forces was not known and authorized by people in the highest echelons of 
government. It was not so much the individual acts of these forces which aroused 
indignation in England, where questions were regularly asked in Parliament, as it 
was the impression of aggressive, unruly groups encouraged by the authorities to 
intimidate, pillage and shoot, but protected from the consequences. The government 
never officially adopted a policy of reprisals although, as 1920 progressed, denial 
became increasingly difficult for Greenwood. 
By September 1920 levels of violence had spiralled. In response to the murder of 
Head Constable Burke and his brother in Balbriggan, government forces arrived in 
the town en masse, killed two men, set fire to three public houses, nineteen private 
houses and a factory. British newspaper correspondents were based close by. Over 
the next few days the press gave considerable coverage to these events. On 21 
September the Westminster Gazette described ‘terrible scenes of destruction in 
Balbriggan’ caused by the ‘Black and Tans’.96 The following day the Manchester 
Guardian published an editorial entitled ‘An Irish Louvain’. It reflected widespread 
fears that the ‘latest bout of murder and counter-murder in Ireland is the most 
damaging of all to our reputation abroad’.97 
On 28 September the same paper called on the government to declare whether they 
were ‘fully adopting a policy of ‘frightfulness’.98 Shocking photographs of the 
damage in Balbriggan were published. The commentary stated: 
They look quite like Bapaume after the Germans had fired it…what use is it 
to tell us, as Sir Hamar Greenwood does, in extenuation of this savagery, that 
somebody else of the same nationality as these poor burnt-out people 
murdered a policeman or a hundred policemen? That is exactly what the 
German commanders in Belgium said when they put a dozen innocent people 	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against a wall and shot them because somebody else not in uniform had 
sniped a German soldier.99 
The resonance with German atrocities could not be starker. Asquith took up the 
theme in Parliament, labelling ‘the affair at Balbriggan…an act of “frightfulness.”’100  
The Times, increasingly antagonistic towards the Coalition government whilst 
attempting to maintain ostensibly ‘balanced’ coverage, was forced towards a more 
critical response. It ‘found a residuum of truth which seemed to support the charge 
that the forces of the crown are no longer acting in accordance with the standards of 
civilised government.’101 However, it saw a gap between the government’s 
culpability and the Irish Police who had ‘with some encouragement, arrogated to 
themselves a free hand in inflicting indiscriminate and illegal punishments’ but 
warned ‘there is no argument that could justify any Government in resigning the 
execution of justice to the whim or passion of its subordinates.’102 As with the 
Amritsar debate there was a desire to find a guilty party in such a way that cherished 
British values could be protected. The scale of atrocity made this tactic increasingly 
difficult to sustain. On 27 September The Times intensified pressure on the 
government suggesting they either disavow ‘secret adoption of the barbarous method 
of vicarious punishment’ or ‘as a result of their own silence, stand under 
suspicion’.103 It was argued that ‘judgement may, by default, go irrevocably against 
[the Prime Minister] and against the good name of England.’104 By 30 September all 
caution was dropped. Under an editorial entitled ‘A National Disgrace’ The Times 
claimed ‘[t]he name of England is being sullied throughout the Empire and 
throughout the world by this savagery’.105 Significantly it drew attention to a letter 
from Annan Bryce, ‘brother of Viscount Bryce’, which warned that unless reprisals 
ceased ‘the people of England…[would] be permanently debarred from raising their 
voice in future against the lawless employment of force’.106 On the same day the 
Daily Mail, which according to Hugh Martin, Daily News correspondent in Ireland, 	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was ‘a paper that few would accuse of being strongly anti-British or pro-Irish’,107 
although progressively more anti-government, detailed nine days of reprisals. On 21 
October, The Times printed a letter from T.P. Gilmartin, Archbishop of Tuam on ‘the 
sack of Tuam’ by Black and Tans as evidence of ‘frightfulness’.108 On 25 October 
T.P. O’Connor, Irish Nationalist M.P., moved a motion on the ‘continuance…of 
frightfulness’. The Times Parliamentary correspondent called it a ‘sad and 
inconclusive debate.’109 
The British press united to condemn the policy of reprisals. On 28 October the Daily 
News printed a cartoon entitled ‘The Target’. It showed John Bull, representing 
‘English People’ tied to a stake denoting the ‘Irish Policy of Frightfulness’. A brick 
labelled ‘Foreign Criticism’ was striking his face.110 Fear of international 
condemnation forced a reappraisal of Germany’s wartime stance over Belgium. The 
New Statesman condemned English statesmen who had denounced the German 
practice of taking civilian hostages and threatening to shoot them. British leaders 
knew ‘very well’ that Germans ‘would undoubtedly be shot from windows and from 
behind walls by Belgians in civilian clothes’, adding that ‘[t]his indeed, according to 
the Germans, was what happened at Louvain. It is the sort of thing that happens in 
every invaded country.’111 Germany’s account of the war in Belgium was gaining 
purchase in Britain as a direct result of British actions in Ireland. Conversely, 
‘British’ values, so lauded during the war, were being eroded. Charles Masterman, 
Liberal politician and journalist, used Disraeli’s contempt for Gladstone’s 
denunciation of Bulgarian atrocities as a model for government callousness.112 For 
Masterman, the Irish policy not only represented ‘the denial of everything that 
Liberalism has ever stood for – it represents the denial, by the most powerful of the 
victors of the world-struggle against Imperial domination, of the very principle for 
which five million men have died.’113 Masterman still believed the meaning of the 
war was a fight against tyranny. Government policy in Ireland represented the 
betrayal of wartime principles. 	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On 20 October, Arthur Henderson, Labour’s Chief Whip, proposed a vote of censure 
citing the ‘lack of discipline in the armed forces’ in Ireland.114 Although the motion 
was defeated, Greenwood was forced to refute comparisons between Balbriggan and 
Louvain. Lieutenant-Commander Kenworthy believed unless there was public 
protest the British would share Germany’s guilt. Furthermore, he invoked the 
memory of the war dead to substantiate his argument. ‘If we do not condemn it…The 
Prussian spirit will have entered into us. The Prussian spirit will at last be 
triumphant, and the 800,000, the flower of our race, who lie buried in a score of 
battle-fronts will really have died in vain.’115  
The extent to which ‘The Troubles’ in Ireland seeped into remembrance is evident in 
the build-up to Armistice Day in 1920, the day the remains of the Unknown Warrior 
were to be interred in Westminster Abbey and the stone Cenotaph unveiled.116 
National preparations for this symbol of ubiquitous suffering and sacrifice were 
caught up in the Irish debate. The Manchester Guardian suggested that only chance 
‘caused this special unknown soldier to be buried in Westminster Abbey on 
Armistice Day instead of being killed that day as a Sinn Feiner by old comrades now 
become “Black and Tans”’.117 Mass mourning for the war dead was tinged with 
irony because of the ‘reprisals’. Moreover, there was a perception that Britain, 
having gone to war to defeat ‘frightfulness’ was now adopting German methods. 
Pressure on the government was exacerbated by the death of Terence McSwinney, 
the Lord Mayor of Cork, in Brixton Prison after a hunger-strike. McSwinney’s 
funeral procession was marked by public respect in London. The Manchester 
Guardian compared ‘the invincible English decency of London’s citizens’ with the 
‘shabby scramble for the Lord Mayor’s body’ in Ireland. It speculated that when an 
Englishman goes to Ireland, 
something seems to happen…perhaps some old Junker, loose from Potsdam, 
throws him into Holyhead Harbour, after stealing his clothes, and goes across 
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the Irish Sea to make Zaberns, Louvains, and Aerschotts in his name, instead 
of the decent, illogical, workable compromises that he would have made.118 
Whilst the paper suggested that English behaviour in Ireland was an aberration, 
debates on ‘frightfulness’ cast a shadow over the armistice anniversary. 
On 2 November, The Times published a letter from Lord Monteagle who had 
recently written for the Contemporary Review condemning government action as 
futile and degrading, and suggesting that Ireland should be made a Dominion.119 He 
highlighted the plight of innocent individuals ‘singled out for this policy of 
frightfulness.’120 The following day T.P. O’Connor asked a private notice question in 
Parliament on ‘whether there had not been a renewal within the last two days of the 
policy of reprisals at Littleton, Thurles, Tralee, Ballybunion, and Ballyduff’ and 
asked for assurances ‘that the Government would take immediate and adequate steps 
to put down this policy of frightfulness’. Greenwood assured him ‘there is no 
Government policy of reprisals’ but merely ‘legitimate acts of self-protection by 
police and soldiers’.121 However on 8 November Lloyd George ‘described the state 
of Ireland as one of war’ adding this justified ‘reprisals in certain forms and under 
certain conditions.’122 A ‘student of politics’ reporting on events at Westminster 
stated:  
Either reprisals are mere “frightfulness” (in which case the Government have 
underestimated the weight of moral censure that they will provoke), or, if 
they are limited by rules, these rules should be made public and approved.123 
Ex-Unionist M.P. Horace Plunkett, in a feature article, pointed out the ‘weakness of 
the Government’ which was ‘that they have no moral sanction behind their policy. It 
is this which makes it impossible for them to discipline the agents of their 
frightfulness.’ He believed those opposing the violence ‘should press for an open 
impartial inquiry’ which he maintained would have ‘a much clearer obligation on the 
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part of Britain than was Lord Bryce’s inquiry into the Belgian atrocities.’124 Protests 
against ‘reprisals’ started to spill over to the public. On 21 November, Republican 
supporter and Archbishop of Melbourne Daniel Mannix, declared to four thousand 
people in Bolton ‘that the world had never seen worse frightfulness than was to be 
seen in Ireland to-day’. He called on the British to leave Ireland.125 
On the same day fourteen men connected to British Intelligence were murdered. In 
the afternoon Black and Tans opened fire on crowds converging for a Gaelic football 
match at Croke Park, killing twelve and injuring dozens more. Concern over the 
adverse effects on public opinion at home and abroad dominated the exchanges in a 
full-scale Parliamentary debate instigated by Asquith on 24 November. His motion 
echoed Campbell-Bannerman’s 1901 speech, which had characterised British 
methods of waging war in South Africa as ‘methods of Barbarism’.126 Asquith 
alluded to ‘methods of terrorism and reprisals’ that impacted on ‘the lives and 
property of the innocent’ and therefore were ‘contrary to civilised usage’.127 The 
motion was defeated. 
 
Another significant development that troubled the government was the formation of 
The Peace With Ireland Council on 29 October. Its membership was predominantly 
English and, according to Boyce, ‘therefore more effective’.128 It attracted high-
profile politicians who decided in May 1921 to form a committee of enquiry on the 
lines of the 1915 Bryce Commission.129 Bryce was asked to head the commission but 
declined.130 Several eminent individuals agreed to serve, but the project was 
eventually curtailed.131 Having had appeals for an independent enquiry turned down, 
the Labour Party set up its own commission to investigate atrocities. The report, 	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published on 18 January 1921, was accompanied by a nationwide campaign. At a 
rally in the Free Trade Hall Arthur Greenwood declared ‘Manchester under German 
rule would be like Cork or Dublin under British rule today.’132 The rally reflected 
Left-wing fears that ‘frightfulness’ could be used against British workers. Reprisals 
were therefore described as a ‘class weapon’.133 Reinforced by the campaign, the 
report had considerable impact, perhaps because it successfully marginalized the 
perpetrators by suggesting, ‘not more than one percent. of the R.I.C., are men of 
really bad character’.134  
Increasing disquiet amongst Conservatives as well as a broad-based protest from 
church leaders presaged the ending of hostilities. By this time the report of an 
American commission was, according to Masterman, ‘being circulated’ globally 
‘literally in the same millions of copies as we once circulated the report of the Bryce 
Commission’ on German atrocities.135 When the policy of reprisals was finally 
exchanged for a diplomatic solution, the charge of ‘frightfulness’ hung over the 
government and the British people like an ominous cloud. Continuous reference to 
the ‘Prussian’ model meant that it now overshadowed discussion. Boyce states, 
‘[r]eprisals hit Englishmen’s sense of justice and fair play; they also wounded their 
pride – the pride of Englishmen in their country and its reputation. And this was a 
sentiment common to all sections of British opinion’.136 In the light of worldwide 
criticism the ‘rights of small nations’, a cornerstone of British involvement in the 
war, became a millstone. Consequently, Britain lost considerable credibility as a 
moral force. In 1921 E.N. Bennett published an English translation of the German 
White Book, which was a thinly veiled criticism of ‘British reprisals’ in Ireland.137 It 
virtually exonerated Germany from any wrongdoing. In a foreword to Hugh Martin’s 
1921 book Ireland in Insurrection Phillip Gibbs outlined the damage being done to 
England’s international reputation:  
To every country in the world went day by day lurid details of English 
reprisals, cruelties, blackguardism. Not only in America was this stirring 	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public opinion against us, but in Australia, Canada, South Africa, France, 
Italy, and other countries, our own relatives, and warmest friends, were 
disturbed and distressed and filled with a sense of amazement and indignation 
that England, the champion of small peoples, the friend of liberty, pledged to 
self-determination of the peoples, should adopt a Prussian policy in Ireland 
after a war in which, after all, hundreds of thousands of Irishmen had fought 
for the Empire.138 
Not only had Britain’s ability to influence opinion abroad been impaired, but the 
issue of German war crimes had been relativised. General Crozier, Commandant of 
the Auxiliary forces in Ireland resigned and revealed tales of ‘murder, arson, looting 
and other forms of terrorism…practised by the Crown Forces during the six months 
he held his Irish command’.139  
 
British concern with the prosecution of German war crimes was also eroded by 
awareness of how far their own behaviour in Ireland had fallen. On the same day as 
Crozier’s allegations were discussed in Parliament the Daily News detailed the war 
crimes trial at Leipzig at which a German NCO named Heinen was ‘accused of 
persistent cruelty to British prisoners in April, 1916, at Herne Camp, Westphalia’. 
The worst accusation was that he struck a prisoner on the head ‘with a 
broomstick’.140 Not only had British atrocities in Ireland sidelined the German war 
crimes trials as a point of public interest but Irish violence appeared even worse than 
German war crimes.  
In February 1921, the Allied list of Germans to be charged and prosecuted at Leipzig 
had been cut from nine hundred to forty-five. Thirteen of these were either dead or 
untraceable.141 The number of British cases was eventually cut from seven to four. In 
the face of sporadic Parliamentary questioning officials paid mere lip service to the 
continuing importance of prosecuting war criminals.142 When eventually the 
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sentences were announced, charges that they were ‘light’ were offset by satisfaction 
that guilty verdicts were achieved at all.143  
Claude Mullins, part of the British legal team at Leipzig, wrote a defence of British 
conduct regarding the trials in response to criticism from the Northcliffe Press and 
Punch that the proceedings were farcical.144  Mullins suggested that if ‘the public 
opinion of 1919 had its way’ the trials would have created a sense of shame in 
‘future generations.’ However, he believed that ‘public yearning for revenge’ had 
been converted ‘into a real demonstration of the majesty of right and of the power of 
law.’145 For Mullins public anger had been replaced by something more civilised. It 
was a way of demonstrating enlightened English values and possibly one reason 
why, he believed, their efforts had earned ‘the gratitude of British public opinion’.146 
He nevertheless insisted ‘only Germany made a system of atrocities’.147 Thus, by 
implication, he suggested this particular form of state terrorism went unpunished. 
Despite some criticism, by the end of 1921 most in Britain seem to have lost their 
enthusiasm for legal retribution against individual offenders. ‘British opinion was by 
and large satisfied’ with the outcome of the Leipzig trials.148 The moral indignation 
that originally fed the vengeful mood of the public in 1918 had dissipated. Violence 
in Ireland and India had dealt a serious blow to British self-belief. Accusations that 
the British were as guilty as Germans in their treatment of subject people sapped 
resentment.  
During wartime, Germans were constructed as the ideological ‘other’. Their 
values were, because of atrocity, held to be the antithesis of Britishness. 
Naturally, the defeat of ‘Prussianism’ formed part of the positive interpretation 
of the war after it had ended. However, the use of so-called ‘German methods’ 
by British authorities in India and Ireland created tension in the post-war 
narrative. Either they became associated with the betrayal of British values or 
conversely, (depending on political viewpoint) the ‘required’ means of 
controlling subject populations. In the latter case German methods had to be 	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recast as necessary or inevitable. Either way, the clear ideological divide that 
had existed during the war had been muddied. The notion of German atrocities 
appeared progressively less in the public discourse. This had a direct affect on 
the reaction to the Leipzig war trials. Attacks on the wartime purity of British 
identity watered down anti-German indignation. The dissipation of negative 
characterisations of Germany’s war conduct gave way in the mid 1920s to a 
widespread acceptance of pre-war history in which the narrative had a 
pronounced pro-German bias.149 This dovetailed with the growth of the 
pacifist critique of the war and atrocity tales. In just ten years from the end of 
the First World War, for the British, real German atrocities became a myth.
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Chapter Two. 
 The Armenians: The End of a Long Tradition of Compassion 
 
On 30 October 1914 Britain and France broke off diplomatic relations with Turkey, 
signaling the latter’s entry into World War One on the side of the Axis Powers. The 
Armenians were a minority group under Ottoman rule. Over the course of the war 
Armenians were massacred on an enormous scale. Those in eastern Anatolia were 
killed or ‘deported to the deserts of modern-day Iraq or Syria’. Along the way,  
they were subject to massive and repeated depredations – rape, kidnap, 
mutilation, outright killing, and death from exposure, starvation, and thirst – at 
the hands of Ottoman Gendarmes, Turkish and Kurdish irregulars, and local 
tribes people. The Ottoman army was also involved in massacres.1  
Those deported from Cilicia and western Anatolia were also marched south. Harsh 
conditions led to mass death.  
The systematic persecution was fully comprehended in Britain. The Armenians’ plight 
helped define Britain’s wartime cause. Building on a strong Christian-based pro-
Armenian tradition, news of mass violence quickly translated into indignation. 
Alleged German ‘complicity’ reinforced this tendency.2 The government used the 
strong public reaction to reinforce commitment to the war effort. Although senior 
figures ensured that concrete promises relating to a pro-Armenian post-war settlement 
were largely rhetorical, Armenian sympathy was officially endorsed and crossed 
political boundaries. The church was especially active in galvanizing support. Most 
believed Armenians should never again be placed under Turkish rule.  
At the end of the war public desire for swift demobilization together with French and 
American reticence to commit resources for the protection of Christian minorities 
meant Armenians remained vulnerable. The rise of Turkish Nationalism under 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Bloxham, Donald, The Great Game of Genocide: Imperialism, Nationalism, and the Destruction of the 
Ottoman Armenians (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) p.1; See also Dadrian, Vahakn N., The 
History of the Armenian Genocide: Ethnic Conflict from the Balkans to Anatolia to the Caucasus 
(Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2007). 
2 Bloxham, Great Game of Genocide, p.129. 
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Mustafa Kemal exacerbated their plight.3 The Prime Minister, David Lloyd George 
encouraged the Greeks to step in where the Allies had kept order. This was supported 
in Britain, despite Greek forces committing atrocities on their arrival. Although the 
Treaty of Sèvres created an Armenian state in 1920, none of the Western powers were 
willing to commit resources to ensure its survival. It was overpowered by Turks and 
Soviet Russians. Although pro-Armenian sympathy remained strong in the postwar 
period, the Greco-Turkish war reduced its effectiveness. Armenians were conflated 
with Greeks and implicated in atrocities, undermining their status as victims. 
Furthermore, Lloyd George’s advocacy of the Greeks became a liability partly 
because of charges of hypocrisy with regard to the Irish reprisals policy.  
There had always been a pro-Turkish tradition in Britain, especially among 
Conservatives. After a wartime hiatus, sympathy for Turkey started to gain ground 
when it became clear that the terms of Sèvres were only sustainable through the 
deployment of Allied troops. Nevertheless, in mid-1922, as evidence of further 
atrocities against Armenians grew, public opinion once more briefly became anti-
Turk. Lloyd George though was increasingly vilified in the press, especially by papers 
owned by Lord Northcliffe. The fate of the Armenians also became intertwined with 
British domestic politics. As the Prime Minister’s position became less tenable, he 
chose the protection of Christian minorities as a central plank of his fight back. 
However, when Kemal’s forces approached British forces stationed at Chanak in a 
designated neutral zone on the western edge of Asia Minor and military confrontation 
became a real possibility, pro-Turkish sentiment was resurgent.  
As the threat of conflict loomed, both sides disputed the memory and meaning of the 
Great War. The Prime Minister thought that more resolute action would have 
prevented the conflict. Whereas many were starting to believe that the belligerents had 
inadvertently slid into war. This had a direct impact on the outcome of the Chanak 
crisis. The Prime Minister and Churchill emphasized the defence of wartime gains, the 
protection of war graves at Gallipoli and ‘little Belgium.’ Their critics believed lives 
had been sacrificed to prevent further war. Although Lloyd George reflected wartime 
sentiment more accurately, the latter interpretation gained greater credence.  
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The Chanak crisis is normally portrayed as the victory of common sense over 
sentimentalism. Opponents of pro-Greek policy certainly claimed to be objective, 
neutral, or even enlightened. However, this required the image of the ‘barbarous Turk’ 
being recast, in many cases by subverting nineteenth century pro-Armenian rhetoric. 
This process helped distance Kemal’s movement from state-sponsored violence. The 
latter part of the crisis was marked by attempts to bestow ‘English’ characteristics on 
the ‘new’ Turk. Opponents of the Prime Minister, of which there were many, 
developed myopia over Turkish atrocities. It was regularly suggested that because 
Greeks had also committed atrocities it was unfair to take sides. In fact, this played 
into Turkish hands because by the summer of 1922 the Greek army was a beaten 
force. Therefore, opponents of Lloyd George were able to portray themselves as 
adhering to the English tradition of ‘fair play’ whilst knowing that a ‘neutral’ stance 
would reinforce Turkish claims. However, this had another consequence. Britain’s 
traditional support for persecuted Christian minorities, specifically the Armenians, 
had to be forgotten.  
This chapter therefore traces how the atrocity discourse was linked to the contested 
memory of the Great War. It shows that a pacifist reinterpretation of the conflict 
started earlier than has previously been thought. It also shows that a foreign minority, 
which had benefitted from a long tradition of compassion, could be quickly recast 
according to flexible notions of British national identity. The longer-term ramification 
of this process was that Armenian suffering was sidelined in public memory. Instead 
of becoming a point of reference for those wishing to invoke public indignation, the 
mass murder of Armenians was supplanted by the notion that a once barbarous 
regime, in this case ‘the Turk’ could be reformed and made into a solid ally. This was 
later applied to the Germans who during the 1930s and 40s, despite their slide into 
barbarism, were often seen as ‘redeemable’.4 In order to understand the context for the 
Chanak crisis, it is necessary to examine firstly, British responses to the Armenian 
massacres from 1915 onwards and secondly, how this was supplanted by pro-Turkish 
feeling over the period leading to October 1922. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 See, for example, Gilbert Murray letter to The Times, 20 January 1942, p.5 and Laski, H.J., The 
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In Britain, reports of Armenian massacres gathered pace in early 1915. In July 
Viscount Bryce, the Earl of Cromer and Randall Davidson, the Archbishop of 
Canterbury, joined in condemnation of Turkish brutality. The Marquess of Crewe, on 
behalf of the government, confirmed ‘[w]holesale massacre and deportation had been 
carried out’ and that on 24 May the Allies had made representations ‘in regard to 
outrages’.5 Individual members of the Ottoman government ‘would be held personally 
responsible’. Because the government was keen to associate German and Turkish 
barbarity he pointed out that the atrocities ‘had not been challenged by German 
officials’.6 The Times had already suggested the atrocities were the ‘more tragic 
counterpart’ to the plight of the Belgians.7 The Archbishop of Canterbury hoped 
something would be done to show Britain’s ‘sympathy’ and ‘the desire to ameliorate 
the condition’ of the Armenians.8  
A Commons debate was held on 16 November. Liberal M.P. and pro-Armenian 
activist, Aneurin Williams stated, ‘it is no exaggeration to say’ that the substance of 
the Lords’ deliberations ‘sent a wave of horror…over this country…The great 
majority of reading and thinking people realized…for the first time that the greatest 
massacres in history had been taking place during the last five months.’9 T.P. 
O’Connor pointed to the ‘one great analogy between the Germans in Belgium and the 
Turks in Armenia, and that is the system and policy which underlie what might be 
regarded by superficial observers as mere sporadic or individual blood-lust’.10 Lord 
Robert Cecil, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, asserted ‘the greatest 
possible protection for the Armenians is our victory in this war.’11 The systematized 
nature of slaughter was acknowledged and believed, however the government, fearful 
of ‘Moslem feeling’, was less than forthcoming on the subject of rescue schemes.12 
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News of mass murder was greeted in the context of a long and on-going sympathy for 
the Armenians.13 Wartime efforts to galvanize public support built on this tradition, 
which had included public meetings, relief groups and relief work.14 The Armenian 
Refugees’ Relief Fund and the Armenian Red Cross and Refugee Fund had been 
inaugurated in January 1915, before mass murder became public knowledge. This was 
followed by The Armenian Refugees (Lord Mayor’s) Fund, which was heralded on 15 
October at a Mansion House meeting.15 Speakers included the Lord Mayor, Bryce, 
Cardinal Bourne, Archbishop of Westminster, the Bishop of Oxford, Sir Edwin Pears, 
Sir J. Compton-Rickett, Liberal M.P and T.P. O’Connor.16 Lord Robert Cecil and A.J. 
Balfour also expressed sympathy with the cause. This effectively gave the campaign 
semi-official government endorsement.17 The Bishop of Oxford showed that pro-
Armenian action had its roots in a shared sense of guilt dating back nearly forty years. 
‘Englishmen’, he believed, ‘had a very special measure of responsibility and a very 
special obligation’, because they had barred the way for Russia, when negotiating the 
Treaty of San Stephano, after the Russo-Turkish War in 1878, to fulfil ‘its mission as 
the liberator of the Christian populations of Turkey’.18 Akaby Nassibian states British 
churches ‘closely co-operated with the Fund and many clergymen took a very active 
part in organizing collections.’19 Support also came from the Left. Labour Party 
leader, Arthur Henderson ‘expressed the determination of the British workers, deeply 
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shocked by Turkish savagery, to see that never again should a Christian people be 
bound by the odious Ottoman shackles.’20 
At the instigation of Bryce, the historian Arnold Toynbee compiled a report on the 
Turkish atrocities.21 Known as the ‘Blue Book’, it represented Britain’s official view 
and was welcomed in Parliament by Lord Robert Cecil.22 The evidence was submitted 
to H.A.L. Fisher and Professor Gilbert Murray who regarded the evidence as ‘entirely 
convincing.’23 Its publication met with approval across the political spectrum. The 
New Statesman in a ‘Blue Book Supplement’ called it ‘conclusive evidence of 
massacres and cruelties perpetrated by the Turks which can vie with the greatest 
crimes of human savagery.’24 The Times editorialized on the ‘Martyrdom of the 
Armenians’.25 The ‘authentic’ evidence told of ‘the tragic destruction of an 
inoffensive and intelligent race’, adding, ‘the volume should be studied as a whole in 
order that the methods of Germany’s ally may be understood.’26 Viscount Grey 
approved Toynbee’s view. He believed it should be published for the ‘immediate 
information of public opinion’ and as ‘a mine of information for historians in the 
future.’27 In accordance with the government’s view, Toynbee later laid out his belief 
that ‘Armenians were not massacred spontaneously by the local Moslems the 
initiative came entirely from the central Government at Constantinople, which 
planned the systematic extermination of the Armenian Race’.28 As such the Turkish 
government was guilty of ‘frightfulness’. For most, the events were construed within a 
wider framework of anti-German propaganda.29 However, Toynbee believed, it was 
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‘on the whole, unlikely that the German authorities initiated the crime. The Turks do 
not need tempters’.30 
The government manipulated pro-Armenian humanitarianism. Endorsement of 
atrocity charges was linked to the intensifying campaign to ‘influence American entry 
into the war’.31 Although British officials exerted influence on friendly Muslim tribes 
to provide support for Armenian victims, warnings of retribution ‘substituted for an 
overall policy of assistance to the victims.’32 Senior government figures made 
rhetorical pledges guaranteeing Armenian autonomy after the war. Lloyd George in 
his first speech as Prime Minister stated his belief in the ‘doctrine that the Turk is 
incapable of governing any other race justly’ because of ‘his misrule and his 
massacres’.33 On 6 November 1917 Foreign Secretary, Balfour announced in the 
Commons that Britain would ‘liberate those peoples whose progress had been 
impeded by the Ottomans.’34 On 20 December 1917, Lloyd George, stated in 
Parliament that ‘Armenia, the land soaked with the blood of innocents, and massacred 
by the people who were bound to protect them’ should ‘never be restored to the 
blasting tyranny of the Turk.’35 These turned out to be empty promises.  
Nevertheless, throughout the war public opinion was unanimously favourable towards 
Armenian victims. On 16 May 1917, Lord Robert Cecil remembered when 
‘progressive forces believed Turks should be thrown out of Europe ‘bag and baggage’ 
and ‘it was only we benighted Tories who ever said anything for the Turks. We are all 
agreed that there is nothing to be said for the Turks now’.36 13 June, 1917 was 
designated ‘Armenia Day’. The British public was invited to do ‘something to help’. 
The Times displayed an advert covering virtually a whole page headed by a Gladstone 
quote that ‘[t]o serve Armenia is to serve civilisation’. It was accompanied by quotes 
from the late Lord Salisbury, Bryce, Viscount Grey, Lord Robert Cecil and former 
Labour Party Chairman Ramsey MacDonald. Ex-Prime Minister, H.H. Asquith was 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Toynbee, Arnold J., Armenian Atrocities: The Murder of a Nation (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 
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32 Ibid., p.138. 
33 Lloyd George Papers (LGP), New Government Speech at Carnarvon 3 February 1917. Gladstone’s 
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quoted: ‘In our own country…the incredible suffering of this nation has aroused 
profound sympathy and…raised large sums for [Armenian] relief and their 
repatriation in the future.’37 The sympathy of the British press, public and officials 
was virtually ‘universal’, as was disdain for the Turks.38 However, Lloyd George’s 
statement of war aims on 5 January 1918 softened the official position towards 
Turkey. He stated, ‘[w]e are not fighting…to deprive Turkey of…the rich and 
renowned lands of Asia-Minor and Thrace, which are predominantly Turkish in 
race.’39 The Bolshevik Revolution and America’s entry into the war probably 
influenced this new position.40 
Conflict between the Allies and Turkey ceased on 30 October 1918 with the signing 
of the Mudros Armistice. When examining Armenian claims for autonomy, the 
British government used the ‘general principle’ that ‘we must not allow the misdeeds 
of the Turks to diminish the patrimony of the Armenians.’41 Parliament was almost 
unanimously behind Lord Robert Cecil’s statement that ‘we recognise the tremendous 
claims that the Armenians have from every point of view on the assistance and 
protection of this country.’42 However, the Armistice ‘aroused discontent’ in 
Parliament ‘since it provided neither for the immediate withdrawal of Turkish forces 
from Kars and Ardahan in Transcaucasia, nor for a supervised demobilization in 
Turkish Armenia.’43 Nevertheless, the coalition government exploited Turkish 
wartime atrocities during the December election campaign.44 They also promised 
swift demobilization of wartime troops. This had a dramatic impact on policy in the 
Near East. Arslanian states ‘British intervention was virtually terminated in the 
summer of 1919 because of the accelerated demobilization of troops, increasing 
criticism at home and the need to concentrate dwindling resources in areas considered 
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39 Times, 7 January 1918, p.7. 
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more crucial.’45 In March 1920 Bryce expressed frustration after failing to secure 
British protection for threatened Armenians. Furthermore, he stated, the ‘French say 
they have not the troops and money to occupy it, so want the Turks back. The Turks 
meanwhile are starting fresh massacres’, whilst the American President, Wilson, ‘had 
led the Armenians to believe he would secure justice for them, and now America 
stands aloof.’46 
Lloyd George sought to plug with Greek forces the gap left by Allied withdrawal. In 
May 1919 France, Britain and America authorized the landing of Greek troops at 
Smyrna to impose autonomy in the city and its hinterland. The news received only 
cursory attention in the press. Lloyd George believed the Turks ‘are a decadent race. 
The Greeks on the other hand are our friends, and they are a rising people.’47 The 
newspapers agreed with the Prime Minister that the Greeks were a civilizing force in 
contrast to a beaten barbaric former enemy. The Times emphasized the validity of 
Greek claims to ex-Ottoman territory.48 The Daily Mail suggested they were there ‘to 
protect the interests of the Greek nationals’, and quell ‘anti-Allied Bolshevist 
agitation’.49 Elefthérios Venizélos, the Greek Prime Minister, was portrayed as the 
hope of democracy and aligned with British values.50 That Greek troops marred their 
arrival by committing atrocities against Turkish prisoners and the local population 
was known by the British government but not reported in the press.51 Positive 
characterizations of Greeks helped sooth British consciences after their forces 
withdrew from eastern Anatolia.  
Pro-Armenian pressure continued to garner considerable support in Britain. A 
‘crowded meeting’ was held in London in early March 1920 under the chairmanship 
of Bryce detailing ‘Turkey’s attempts at Extermination’.52 Lloyd George responded 
by making a Commons statement on ‘the need of taking very strong action to protect 	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the minorities.’53 On 11 March the Allies formally occupied Constantinople, and 
General Sir Charles Harington took command of 8,000 British troops at Chanak on 
the western edge of Asia Minor near the Dardanelles.54 This was part of a designated 
Allied ‘neutral zone’. When the Treaty of Sèvres, negotiated at San Remo in April 
1920, created an Armenian state, it was acclaimed in the press. The Times declared 
that ‘Common sense has prevailed at San Remo’.55  
The Daily Mail concluded that Turkish ‘expulation [sic] from Europe’ was ‘a well-
merited punishment’ because the ‘massacres committed during the war were the last 
straw’ on top of ‘500 years’ of ‘Turkish bloodlust and intolerance’. Turkish retention 
of Constantinople and some of Thrace were now ‘dependent – and justly – on her 
good behaviour towards the comparatively small population which is still retained in 
her charge.’56 For majority British opinion the Armenian massacres justified the terms 
of Sèvres.57 Yet none of the Western powers were willing to enforce the treaty. The 
withdrawal of Allied troops left the fledgling state vulnerable to Turkish nationalists 
and Soviet expansionism. Lloyd George stated, although there was ‘no lack of 
sympathy from England’, the assumption of greater liabilities was a ‘physical 
impossibility’.58 Greek atrocities however, gave ‘impetus’ to the Nationalist 
movement of Mustapha Kemal Pasha, a former General in the Ottoman Army and 
hero of the Gallipoli campaign, who was gaining support in Anatolia.59  
British military authorities had started to accept Armenia’s probable demise in 
February 1920. A memorandum outlined the difficulties of maintaining Armenian 
Erzerum stating, ‘[t]he area now reported on by General Milne [is] being peopled 
almost entirely by Turks and Kurds. This is of course due to the Armenian massacres 
and is regrettable; but it is none the less a practical factor which cannot be ignored.’60 
By this stage a political division was resurfacing in Britain. Lloyd George commented 
‘[t]he military are against the Greeks…They favour the Turks. The military are 	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confirmed Tories. It is the Tory policy to support the Turks.’61 The increasing strength 
of the Kemalist movement and Soviet manoeuvring meant the ‘Armenian state had 
disappeared under the hooves of the occupying Russian and Turkish cavalry in 
December [1920]’.62 Pro-Armenians continued to question government commitment 
to ‘expressions and statements and promises made over and over again by its 
representatives to protect the Armenians from further butchery.’63  
A debate raged in the Foreign Office about the ratification of the Treaty. Curzon was 
in favour of a pro-Turkish modification supported by Horace Rumbold, the new 
Turkish Ambassador.64 In February 1921 he invited the Turkish government, 
Nationalists and Greeks to London to discuss a possible compromise over Sèvres. No 
settlement was reached. The Greeks, quietly encouraged by Lloyd George, decided to 
push for a complete victory over Nationalist forces by advancing further into 
Anatolia. The Daily Mail wrote ‘Mustapha Kemal cannot be permitted to defy the 
Allies. The Greeks are ready to undertake the work of dealing with him if they are 
given a free hand.’65 The Spectator complained that Nationalist demands for the 
expulsion of Greek forces meant the treaty would be ‘re-written at the dictation of a 
defeated enemy.’66 The New Statesman, in line with broad Left Wing opinion believed 
the Allies should ‘take definite action at the earliest possible moment for the 
constitution of a free Armenia under the direct supervision of the League of 
Nations.’67 
The Manchester Guardian sent Arnold Toynbee, one of the principle pro-Armenian 
and anti-Turk protagonists, to cover the Greco-Turkish war. The sense of indignation, 
which drove him to compile the Blue Book, had dissipated. He wrote, since the war 
‘our moral position is very different. What the Germans have done in Belgium and the 
English in Ireland rather chokes one when one’s tempted to take a high line.’ He was 
affected by the ‘Prussian’ behaviour of British troops stationed in the Near East.68 	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Moreover, having witnessed first-hand evidence of Greek atrocities, he sent a regular 
flow of dispatches defending Turkish actions and emphasizing Greek atrocities.69 By 
mid-1921 he was converted to a fully pro-Turk viewpoint.70 Toynbee used family 
connections to get his accounts circulated to influential government figures.71 They 
were all the more effective because of his previous support of Greece and Armenia. 
Samuel Hoare wrote to Lady Mary Murray, ‘I had already heard of the massacres 
from other sources, and knowing your son-in-law personally and his sympathetic 
views about Greece I attach all the greater importance to the disclosure that he and 
Mrs Toynbee make.’72 Charles Roberts, based at the National Liberal Club informed 
Toynbee of a ‘great confirmation of opinion against going into new help to Greeks.’73 
Sending Toynbee to the Near East created a bigger impact than C.P. Scott, editor of 
the Manchester Guardian anticipated. He was against Toynbee’s correspondence 
being used ‘as just propaganda, in as much as the Turks had done the same things on a 
much larger scale and more deliberately.’74 However, an editorial on 16 July stated 
‘[i]f the Greeks are no better than the Turks, our interest in transferring to the Greeks 
areas which have hitherto been Turkish must proportionately diminish’.75 A letter to 
Toynbee dated 4 December 1921 suggested his reports placed ‘the Armenian question 
in a different light.’76 The Armenian issue was becoming conflated with the Greco-
Turkish war, and Armenians were being identified with Greeks. When commenting 
on the Greek atrocities in Yalova, Rosalind Toynbee stated ‘all the Christian 
population, Greeks and Armenians alike, had somehow become semi-human. They 
had ghastly bestial faces as though they had been drinking blood’.77 Rumbold 
informed the Foreign Office that ‘grave excesses’ had been committed against the 
Turkish population, sometimes involving Greek regular troops.78 
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In May 1921 an Allied team was dispatched to investigate Greek atrocities. Two 
teams concentrated enquiries in Yalova and Guemlec, and the Ismid Peninsula. The 
former concluded that Turkish villages were systematically burned and looted ‘by 
Greek and Armenian bands’ abetted by the Greek regular army, although ‘[a]cts of 
violence and barbarism as well as massacres on a large scale’ were committed by 
‘Kemalist bands, or by soldiers of the regular army’. In Ismid the enquiry team 
believed both sides committed ‘crimes’, but ‘those on the part of the Turks have been 
more considerable and ferocious than those on the part of the Greeks.’79 The extent to 
which western policy of support for Greece influenced the conclusions is unclear. 
However, it is significant that an investigation into Greek atrocities exposed Turkish 
violence. 
From September 1921 Greek forces were in retreat. After another aborted Allied 
attempt at conciliation between Turks and Greeks in March 1922, pro-Armenians 
berated the government in Parliament for their failure to honour wartime ‘promises’. 
Lord Robert Cecil, who had left the Cabinet in 1919 criticized the government for 
failing to ‘discharge an obligation of honour which we undertook during the War on 
behalf of the Armenians.’80 Asquith could ‘never be a party to any policy which has in 
intention or in effect the re-establishment of Turkish rule over large bodies of 
Christian populations’.81 Prompted by Rumbold’s warning that the ‘Turks appear to 
be working on a deliberate plan to get rid of minorities’82 and perhaps sensing public 
opinion was moving towards a pro-Turk position, Lloyd George had officials compile 
a dossier containing a ‘mass of documentary evidence’ detailing the massacres and ill-
treatment of Armenian and Greek Christians by Turkish forces between 1919 and 
1922.83 It stated that ‘[d]uring November and December [1921] reports of increasing 
persecutions continued to reach His Majesty’s High Commission in growing numbers, 
but it was not until the following year that the first really large scale massacres 
occurred.’84 In May, Conservative Leader and Lord Privy Seal, Austen Chamberlain 
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confirmed further atrocities by Kemal supporters including the slaughter of ‘10,000 
Greeks followed by the seizure of their widows and daughters for transfer to Turkish 
harems and the starvation to death of their children’.85 Curzon believed it was 
‘inconceivable that Europe should agree to hand back to Turkish rule, without the 
most stringent guarantees’.86 The Archbishop of Canterbury referred ‘to the plight of 
the Christian minorities’ stating ‘our sense of Christian fellowship gave us a special 
responsibility’ towards the sufferers. He also believed it ‘humiliating’ that ‘we were 
not able to fulfill the promises extended to them’ during the war.87 The Times wrote of 
the ‘Turk’s Insane Savagery’ and editorialized that the latest reports bore ‘painful 
resemblance’ to wartime Armenian massacres and could not ‘but arouse concern even 
at a time when the immeasurable sufferings of Eastern Europe would seem almost to 
have exhausted the powers of human sympathy.’88  
Pro-Turkish opposition had grown since the war. According to Lloyd George’s 
secretary, Frances Stevenson, the Tories were beginning to use the phrase ‘the Turk is 
a gentleman’ from around March 1921.89 Growing support for Turkey was 
increasingly evident in Parliament. Objections to government support for Greece 
included lack of consultation with Turkish authorities, government hypocrisy over 
‘massacres’ in Ireland, the expense of maintaining a ‘British Army of occupation’, 
‘unease amongst the Indian Mahommedans’ and the threat of Turkey ‘being driven 
into the arms of Russia’.90 Nevertheless, government-inspired indignation had some 
impact. Churchill later commented that in June 1922 ‘public opinion…turned sternly 
against the Turks.’91  
Government influence, however, was increasingly fragile. The security of Lloyd 
George’s position had decreased since the landslide election of 1918. He had been 
embroiled in an ‘honours scandal’ that ‘rocked the government to its foundations’ 
and, not unconnectedly, he was increasingly criticized for running the government 
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autocratically.92 Distrust of the Prime Minister, especially over state-sponsored 
violence in Ireland meant a vocal section of the press saw his support for Near East 
Christians as merely another political ploy. The publication of Arnold Toynbee’s The 
Western Question in Greece and Turkey in August 1922 further undermined pro-
Greek and pro-Armenian opinion. Despite supplementing the ‘Blue Book’ with anti-
Turkish publications,93 he was now indignant about his work being exploited as ‘war-
propaganda’.94 He argued, the ‘combination of maximum actual effect with minimum 
consciousness and interest had made the Western factor in the Near and Middle East 
on the whole an anarchic and destructive force’.95 This was a direct attack on Lloyd 
George’s patronage of the Greeks. He believed when ‘judging Greek and Turkish 
atrocities, Westerners have no right to be self-righteous. They can only commit one 
greater error of judgment, and that is to suppose that the Turks are more unrighteous 
than the Greeks’.96 Reviewers were shamed by British support for Greek forces.97 The 
Birmingham Post built on Toynbee’s argument:  
Greece and Turkey were influenced psychologically by the Western thought 
which made Greece a “spoiled child” and Turkey a “whipping-boy.” Over-
kindness always does more harm than unjust severity. The Turk became 
sullen, hostile, reckless. But at least he kept his soul. The Greek suffered and 
suffers from “spiritual pauperisation”.98 
Toynbee’s view dovetailed with an increasingly isolationist tendency in post war 
Britain.99 He provided an intellectual and moral basis for anti-government rhetoric. 
His position as eye-witness and his reputation for Near East expertise reinforced the 
impact of his argument. The New Statesman wrote ‘Professor Toynbee went out to 
Anatolia with a bias in favour of the Greeks; but he soon saw enough to convince him 	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that the Greeks were every whit as barbarous as their opponents’ adding ‘[t]o let the 
Greeks and the Turks alone is the beginning of wisdom for European 
statesmanship.’100 C.P. Scott wrote to Toynbee, ‘I confess that my first inclination is 
to dissent rather violently from the view you express, but I have far too great a respect 
for your opinion on any question relating to the Near East to be in a hurry to set up my 
own against it.’101 The resonance of Toynbee’s view’s can be seen from The Times 
comment that ‘“The Western Question in Turkey and Greece,” [sic] which, appearing 
in the very midst of the Greco-Turkish crisis has played no small part in shaping 
public opinion in this country regarding the rights and wrongs of that complex 
problem’.102 
In mid-July the Greeks, fearing the Allies would soon desert them in their attempt to 
retain at least some of the territory of the former Ottoman Empire, threatened to 
march on Constantinople. In Rumbold’s absence his deputy Nevile Henderson and 
Harington resolved ‘to confront the Greeks with the maximum of force.’103 This was 
in contrast to the conciliatory approach the latter took to the Turks over the next three 
months. Kemal launched a major attack on 26 August. In September with the Greek 
forces in retreat, the Kemalist forces approached Smyrna and the edge of the neutral 
zone, increasing chances of a military engagement with British forces. This became 
headline news in Britain in September and October. The Prime Minister favoured a 
show of force in order to secure the freedom of the Straits and to protect Christian 
minorities. As the prospect of British involvement in the Near East conflict loomed, 
public opinion, led by the press, diverged further from the government line. British 
support for the Armenian cause was a casualty of this process. 
In a clear contradiction of its previous anti-Turk editorial policy the Daily Mail 
subverted Lord Salisbury’s quote about the Armenians, suggesting ‘Lloyd George has 
put his money on the wrong horse’.104 The Express followed suit.105 The Morning 	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Post, smarting from the government’s compromise in Ireland, drew attention to the 
Prime Minister’s ‘Gladstonian fervour which breaks out in indignation against 
atrocities, regardless of political considerations. He is too well accustomed to the 
ignoring of the atrocities at home to be credited with overpowering moral sentiments 
on that point.’106 The New Statesman believed the Turks had learned their lessons of 
brutality from Britain’s example of ‘“civilised” methods of dragooning subject-
peoples’.107 It distanced itself from the ‘old Liberal tradition which taught that the 
Turk was the enemy of Christianity, of civilisation and of humanity’, suggesting the 
‘Turk has, undoubtedly, given his critics in the course of his career plenty of 
justification for an honest dislike of him. But an honest dislike can be carried too far; 
it can become a violent prejudice.’108 Drawing attention to Greek atrocities, it played 
off one liberal tradition against another. Compassion for oppressed minorities was 
undermined by drawing attention to the idea of ‘fair play’.109 It cited the pernicious 
role of the West, emphasizing the principles of ‘nationalism’ and ‘self-determination’ 
stating that the Greeks ‘must evacuate Turkish territory’ and what was keeping them 
there was ‘the false sentiment of the idealists.’110 Toynbee’s ideas relating to Western 
interference permeated these views. The Pall Mall Gazette believed Toynbee had 
helped ‘counteract the prejudices which exist in the minds of the public who do not 
realize that, given the chance, all peoples of the Near East are brutal according to their 
own standards.’111  
Against an increasing tide of anti-government invective The Times reminded its 
readers, ‘[t]he pretence that the Kemalist Turk is a humane and civilized soldier 
wholly different from the Turk of the Armenian massacres deceives nobody.’ Adding, 
‘the combination of the crude barbarism of the Turks with the degenerate barbarism of 
the Soviets is significant.’ The paper hoped ‘practical steps’ would be taken for the 
‘immediate safety’ of Near Eastern populations. The paper raised the spectre of 	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discontent in India. A Kemal victory would ‘move the imagination’ of ‘Mahomedan 
fanatics in Irak and India, and when their imagination is fired they become 
troublesome and even dangerous.’112 Two days later, The Times announced the 
victory of Kemal’s forces at Smyrna.113 Henry Morgenthau, the wartime American 
Ambassador to Constantinople and active in disseminating knowledge of the 
Armenian genocide, was said to ‘entirely back the case being made by The Times.’ He 
warned a ‘revived Turkey may lead to another conflagration, unless the danger is 
recognized and dealt with firmly’, while expressing ‘confidence that the British public 
would…support the British Government in any positive policy it might adopt to 
localize the danger and prevent it from spreading into Europe.’114 The Times coverage 
was soon to undergo a dramatic change of emphasis. 
Other parts of the right wing press repeated Turkish assertions of Greek and Armenian 
insurgency in Smyrna. A Daily Mail editorial claimed Turkish discipline had been 
maintained. A report from George Ward Price, who had changed his view since 1918 
when reporting on Turkish treatment of British prisoners of war,115 rallied against 
Greek atrocities. It was ‘certain’ that Greek troops ‘have been burning villages – if not 
committing worse outrages – on the line of their retreat’. Kemal’s troops, however, 
‘showed none of the arrogance of conquerors’ and ‘even when a young Greek on the 
quay wildly let off a revolver’ wounding a Turkish officer ‘the Turks made no 
reprisals and their officers shouted to the crowd that they had nothing to fear’.116 
Ward Price was rewarded for his partisan reports by an interview with Kemal and 
Nur-ed-Din, his principle commander, who stated ‘[t]he moderation we have shown in 
the hour of victory proves that the Turks need lessons in self-restraint from no one – 
and this in spite of the severe provocation caused by Greek atrocities.’117 Turks were 
now being portrayed as disciplined and civilized in a brutalized environment. 
After taking control of Smyrna, Kemal’s army ‘sealed off the Armenian quarter and 
began systematically butchering its 25,000 inhabitants. Then they set fire to it, to 
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incinerate any survivors.’118 This event caused temporary difficulties for those 
opposed to the use of humanitarian arguments on behalf of threatened minorities.119 
Initial reports in British newspapers suggested the Turks were responsible. The 
Morning Post stated ‘the fire was started yesterday by Turkish regular troops in order 
to hide the massacres which had taken place’.120 The Daily Express was equally 
certain and ran a headline, ‘Smyrna Fired by the Turks. Greek and Armenian Quarters 
Destroyed in a Terrible Vengeance’.121 The following day the front page reported, 
‘[t]errible atrocities have been committed by the Turks, and thousands of people have 
been massacred’122 Significantly The Times blamed ‘irregulars’, while the Turkish 
authorities were portrayed as fair-minded and out of sympathy ‘with the incendiaries 
or looters, whether Turk or non-Turk, who were shot at sight.’123 
Ward Price, stationed at Smyrna, telegraphed his reports to London from the British 
ship the Iron Duke. His account gave prominence to the explanation of the ‘Town 
Commandant’ who blamed the fire on the Armenians who had barricaded themselves 
in a church ‘with supplies of arms’. He reassuringly pointed out that twenty-two had 
been arrested.124 The traditional view of Armenians as victims was supplanted by an 
image of desperate, dangerous criminals. Ward Price’s ‘eye-witness’ status and the 
report’s specificity lent gravitas to the account. Two days later, Ward Price suggested, 
that the arrival of Turkish irregular troops was ‘as harmless and uneventful as a parade 
of the Ancient Order of Oddfellows at home.’125 Killing and looting was almost 
entirely the work of thieves and the lowest classes, out for plunder.126 
Conversely the Greeks’ ‘[g]uilty conscience made double cowards of them all’ 
because, not only did they ‘desert the blackened streets and cower in their houses’, but 
they remembered atrocities committed by Greeks in 1919.127 The Mail concluded ‘the 	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city was destroyed by enraged Greeks.’128 A private letter to Lloyd George from the 
father of a Paymaster Lieutenant stationed off Smyrna, who had ‘never been in favour 
of a pro Greek policy,’129 suggested British forces on the spot were ‘bitter against 
Ward Price’ because ‘reliable witnesses’ had confirmed ‘that the Turks systematically 
fired the city’.130 Despite this counter evidence, the reports submitted by Ward Price, 
had a significant effect. After their publication few questioned that Armenians or 
Greeks were responsible.  
The Daily Express then changed its view. An editorial on 27 September stated, ‘[i]t 
has been sedulously suggested and commonly accepted that the Turks fired Smyrna. 
We do not believe it. It is far more probable that this conflagration was the work of 
the Greeks.’131 The New Statesman agreed and used non-attributable ‘eye-witness’ 
testimony to verify their position. That Lloyd George had ‘implied that Smyrna was 
burnt by the Turks’ was weighed against ‘the first-hand stories of English and 
American eye-witnesses [which] all suggest that the town was not fired by the Turks 
but by the Greeks’.132 Turks and Greeks, it asserted, were as bad as each other and 
therefore the ‘“atrocity” cry’ was ‘the most irrelevant, of political arguments’.133 This 
did not stop the periodical speculating in line with Toynbee that ‘if Turkey was freed 
from the pressure of Europe’ the rise of ‘abler men’ would enable it to ‘turn over a 
new leaf and surprise us by a policy of tolerance and liberal administration.’134  
Evidence about the Smyrna fire was contradictory. However, over a short period, the 
idea of Turkish responsibility was rejected. For most, either Greeks or Armenians 
started the fire or apportioning blame was pointless. Growing acceptance of the 
Turkish Nationalists as a civilizing force was reinforced by biased ‘eye-witness’ 
reports. Evidence claiming Kemalist responsibility only appeared after the crisis was 
over.135 Toynbee wrote to his wife in 1923 that on Smyrna ‘the account, when 
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balanced, lies against the Turks…there was a general orgy of incendiarism and looting 
by the Turkish soldiers and populace.’136 
The British Cabinet met on 15 September to decide how Kemal’s forces should be 
kept out of the Allied zone. Churchill supported by Lloyd George advocated the 
immediate dispatch of reinforcements. He believed ‘Liberal opinion would be a great 
deal influenced by the recent atrocities and Conservative opinion would not be willing 
to see the British Flag trampled on.’137 Curzon and Chamberlain dissented, but the 
Cabinet authorized Churchill to contact the Dominions inviting co-operation. He 
emphasized the defence of wartime gains and the importance of protecting Gallipoli 
war graves. Only New Zealand agreed to send troops. On 17 September Rumbold 
telegraphed Curzon, ‘[t]here seems no doubt that Turks deliberately massacred many 
Armenians’ in Smyrna. He believed trusting purely to diplomatic action would be 
‘futile and dangerous.’138 Lloyd George had little faith in ‘verbal protests’ and thought 
a show of force would prevent ‘war, pillage, outrage and murder’ spreading ‘from 
Asia into Europe.’139 Despite warnings from his officials in late September that 
Britain would ‘not stand for a fresh war’, Lloyd George believed the public would 
‘willingly support our action regarding the Straits by force of arms if need be’.140 
Churchill was given control of an inner war Cabinet to direct immediate policy. 
British Foreign Secretary Lord Curzon traveled to Paris on 19 September to find 
common ground with the French who were in favour of allowing Kemal to take 
control of the neutral zone including Constantinople and Eastern Thrace. The resulting 
‘Allied Note’ warned Kemal not to advance into the neutral zone, but suggested a 
conference would accede to his territorial demands.141 Pro-Armenians were outraged. 
Noel Buxton wrote, ‘[i]t is absurd to assume…that because the Greek Army has 
suddenly given way, the Near Eastern Settlement must be arranged along the lines of 
the Turkish demands.’142 On 20 September French and Italian troops were ordered out 
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of the area by their respective governments. Britain was left to defend the Allied zone 
alone.  
Significant sections of the press now launched an anti-war tirade. The Daily Express 
made false allusions to the outbreak of the Great War by suggesting that Serbia was 
mobilizing, warning its readers not to pass ‘light-heartedly to other matters’ as had 
apparently happened ‘a little over eight years ago’ when Britain had allegedly drifted 
into war.143 The Daily Mail raged ‘Stop This New War’, asking why the government 
were ‘so eager for a deadly war in the East, which may end by setting half the world 
aflame once more?’ It castigated the Prime Minister for thinking he could ‘rouse the 
nation as Mr. Gladstone did in the seventies of last century about Bulgaria; but Mr. 
Lloyd George is no Gladstone and he cannot save himself by arranging this wanton 
war.’ It suggested ‘the “Stop the War” movement was steadily growing’ throughout 
the country.144 The Morning Post wrote ‘[n]obody wishes to fight the Turks, not even 
the non-conformist conscience.’145 This view was supported across the political 
spectrum. The New Statesman mocked the idea that ‘the Turk’ was ‘a beast of prey’ 
and thought the ‘British people…have not the slightest inclination to spend blood or 
money on fighting the Turks.146 
The T.U.C. sent a delegation of thirty to Downing Street on 21 September. Ben Tillet, 
Labour M.P. and Trade Union leader hoped the Cabinet was ‘not so ridiculous, so 
mad or stupid’ as to contemplate war, and added ‘things may drift as other wars have 
drifted’.147 He warned the Prime Minister ‘we are here to tell you the plain God’s truth 
– we should be opposed to war and would organise opposition against any form of 
war.’ T.U.C. woman’s representative and non-conformist Margaret Bondfield asserted 
‘women’s opinion in the country’ was ‘unable to accept…a holy war’ and thought ‘a 
new war would be the beating of the dead, because they died to prevent any more 
war.’148 The ideas that nations had drifted into war and the dead had given their lives 	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to end war were increasingly popular interpretations of the conflict. All delegates 
peppered their protests with appeals to the interests of ‘humanity’.  
Lloyd George, apparently unmoved, read out a message from General Maurice, 
stationed in the Near East, who was ‘certainly no supporter of the Government’ 
warning that British evacuation would create ‘a sequel which would make the fires of 
Smyrna pale.’ The Premier added ‘I recommend that to those who put forward the 
interests of humanity.’149 Union leader, J.H. Thomas thought the League of Nations 
should occupy the Allied zone. Lloyd George was in favour, ‘provided it is really 
done.’ In other words the League should be more than a ‘moral force’. He finished by 
quoting Labour party policy as stated in 1918 condemning ‘the systematically violent 
domination of the Turkish Government [over] any subject people’ and supporting the 
idea that ‘the Dardenelles should be permanently and effectively neutralised’.150 The 
two sides agreed that no publicity should be given to the meeting. The Times 
commented its ‘secrecy’ was the cause of ‘keen resentment’ from all sides.151 The 
meeting was followed by protests from the National Union of Railwaymen, the 
Miners Federation of Great Britain and the British Communist Party.152 
There was some justification for Left wing representatives evoking the fear of war. 
Influential public figures shared the sentiment. The diary of writer and academic, C.S. 
Lewis is largely devoid of any mention of political events. However, in response to 
the crisis, Lewis complained: 
[t]his whole day has been overshadowed by the news in the evening papers. 
Our negotiations with the Turks have broken down and I cannot for the life of 
me see how a war can be avoided. Miss Featherstone has heard from some big 
wig that such a war wd. involve taking on all Islam and that conscription 
would be applied at once.153 
He was possibly reacting to fears, unjustifiably stoked by The Times, that ‘the Turkish 
question had achieved the almost impossible task of bringing together on a common 	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platform the two sections into which the non-co-operation movement had divided the 
politically-minded people of India’.154 This was reinforced by Sir Ignatuis Valentine 
Chirol, retired diplomat and former foreign editor of The Times, who warned ‘the 
greatest danger for the British Raj was the complete loss of confidence in British 
promises and pledges’.155 The New Statesman lamented the loss of national honour, 
arguing that Britain’s position in Asia ‘rested on moral rather than material 
strength’.156 The combination of lost prestige and Muslim unrest was a potent mixture.  
While many feared the impact of Britain’s damaged reputation, A.A. Milne, the noted 
author and playwright, expressed his bitterness over the Prime Minister’s indignation 
about Turkey when there were more pressing social matters at home. In an article for 
the Daily News he wrote: 
The Prestige of England! The Honour of England! Here surely is the biggest 
joke of all. Every day an English child dies of hunger. Is the honour of 
England touched? Ah no! Every day an English soldier, broken in the last war, 
begs of us. Is the honour of England touched? Ah, never for that! But there are 
some Turks yet to be killed, and England blushes for very shame. Not a penny 
more for Education, not a penny more for Housing, or England’s finance 
would collapse; but how easy to find money for more shells – for England’s 
honour.157 
E.M. Forster, congratulated Milne on his ‘brilliant article’ and suggested that 
government action was ‘the viler because the sentiment it tries to pervert is a noble 
one’.158 Lloyd George was seen to be subverting not just the memory of the war but 
Englishness itself.  
From the beginning of September there was an increasing tendency to bestow English 
characteristics on the Turks. The image of ‘the Turk’ was transformed accordingly. 
Conservative M.P. General Sir Charles Townsend, after visiting Kemal and having his 
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‘pro-Turkish sympathies…strengthened’ wrote to The Times.159 He reported Kemal’s 
‘salient features’ were ‘piercing blue eyes, fair hair, a diminutive close-cropped 
moustache’. He wore ‘plain clothes’ which were ‘knickerbockers breeches…well cut 
and rather in the English style.’ Kemal’s supporters were united and his orders were 
‘obeyed implicitly, his rule is an iron one beneath a velvet glove.’160 This was the 
antithesis of the traditional British caricature of the Turk.161 The overall impression 
was of bringing order out of chaos. From the nineteenth century the British had 
adopted a ‘civilisational’ model of rule as justification for dominating allegedly 
backward peoples. It was believed that indigenous populations were well served by 
good colonial administration that would educate and Christianize them.162  Townsend 
sought to bestow similar motives on Kemal. The Times took up this theme and offered 
a ‘contrast in character’ between Harington and Kemal. Harington was a hero of the 
Great War and ‘a typical British officer, with all his good points, honest and sincere’. 
Furthermore, he was ‘a cheering reminder of the best traditions of British diplomacy 
and a model for the further conduct of negotiations till peace is attained.’163 Kemal 
was a ‘Turk of new type’, ‘a man of simple tastes’ who had ‘reached his position by 
sheer force of character and merit shown in times of adversity.’ As a soldier he 
possessed ‘a first-hand acquaintance with British military policy and with the 
characteristics of the British soldier.’164 Townsend’s letter was reproduced in the 
Daily Mail. In an editorial the allusion to British values was projected onto the ‘The 
New Turkish Army’. The Turkish Army was contrasted favourably with the 
‘demoralised’ Ottoman forces of the recent war. They had ‘been reborn under the 
stress of patriotic resolve directed by sound discipline.’165 
On 21 September the Daily Mail published two feature articles. Firstly, Toynbee 
wrote on ‘How the Greeks Massacred the Turks’. Atrocities in the Near East, he 
claimed, were common sense in the context of war. ‘War in the Near East’ he wrote, 	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‘is never war pure and simple. It is war plus atrocities.’ The Turks had a worse 
reputation because ‘Greeks and Armenians had been’ in their power. Now, the ‘actors 
exchanged parts.’166 Secondly, Arthur Weigall wrote on ‘What the Plain Man Thinks 
of Turkey.’ ‘Let us admit’ he wrote ‘what we all feel, even though we may have 
qualms in case we are “shaking hands with murder”’. He believed the British should 
‘trust our instinct and be sportsmen’. He argued that the public believed the Turk ‘a 
pretty tough customer’ who had ‘a nasty way of letting things slide in administrative 
matters’. Presumably this referred to persistent Turkish refusals to reform their 
policies towards minorities. The Turk had a passion for ‘smiting the men of the more 
craven races’ but ‘on the other hand,’ Weigall argued, ‘match him in arms against foes 
worthy of him and he will prove himself to be a clean fighter and a gentleman, as the 
Anzacs will tell you to a man’. It was not the fault of the Turks that they ‘went to war 
with us’ because Britain had done ‘every conceivable thing to irritate him’ and 
allowed German propaganda to prevail. Furthermore, Britain had given Turkey a 
dishonourable peace by taking ‘infinitely more’ than they should have. Weigall 
endowed the Turks with ascribed characteristics of Englishness: 
He has a way with him that has earned him the name of the Englishman of the 
Near East – a sort of dignity and force of character and courage of his 
convictions. And, moreover, he has been very badly treated, yet in the face of 
the greatest difficulties, he has reasserted himself and played the patriot in a 
manner that is really very fine, not to say thrilling…Let us be frank with 
ourselves. We cannot help admiring him; and, that being so, we should trust 
our instinct and say openly what we are all saying in secret, “Well done!”167 
What started as an apologia for Turkish misrule ended as a panegyric.  
The Times now gave precedence to anti-government letters. Frederick Harrison 
thought the distribution of ex-Ottoman territories to ‘Serbians, Bulgars, Greeks, and 
Armenians’ was a ‘policy of medieval Crusades.’ He believed ‘religious sympathies’ 
should not be allowed ‘to intrude on good political sense and practical 
statesmanship.’168 Retired officer T.S.B. Williams believed ‘the Turk has been, 	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generally, a tolerant ruler of minorities.’169 Major-General Hehir was ‘convinced’ the 
Turk was ‘not as bad as he is painted.’170 Having supported the government line in 
early September, The Times was now aligning itself to the growing mood of 
opposition. It disingenuously suggested ‘a policy of firmness which is free from 
provocation’171 and stated the Allied aim was ‘to persuade the Turks to accept in a 
pacific mood the generous terms offered to them in the Allied collective note.’172 A 
Trafalgar Square demonstration was arranged for 24 September. The Archbishops of 
Canterbury and York issued a bland call to prayer over the ‘anxiety and suspense in 
the life of Europe and Asia’. The National Free Church Council passed a resolution 
calling for ‘the safety of the Christian populations’ in the Near East, but ‘without 
resort to force.’173 Lloyd George summoned press representatives telling them that the 
Turkish army could not be restrained from committing atrocities in the past, therefore 
‘hundreds of thousands of Armenians and Greeks’ would be susceptible to ‘a 
repetition of those terrible incidents.174 It had little effect. General Seeley noted as he 
passed through London ‘I saw placarded in every street the legend “Stop the New 
War”’.175 On 25 September a further thousand British troops arrived at Chanak.176 
Rumbold was apparently receiving information about the shifting mood in Britain. On 
26 September he wrote to Sir Lancelot Oliphant that he and Harington ‘feel the last 
thing our country wants is to have another war and that the average man does not care 
a straw whether Eastern Thrace and Adrianople belong to the Greeks or Turks’.177 In 
direct contrast to his attitude to the Greeks, Harington telegraphed Lord Cavan to ask 
‘[w]hy not start at once and give Turkey Constantinople and Maritza…and so end it 
all.’178 The situation in the Near East was growing tense. Kemal’s forces were 
regularly encroaching into the Allied zone. Harington telegraphed the Cabinet, ‘in 
Constantinople…the air is full of electricity’ and announced he was ‘sending all 
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British army wives away’.179 The tenor of his reports led the ‘General Staff with 
Naval and Air Staffs’ to surmise that the position at Chanak ‘was such that the 
defensive position…would be seriously endangered if [the Turks] commenced an 
offensive by a sudden movement, and that without serious menace to the safety of 
[British] troops, the position could not be allowed to continue any longer.’180 
Therefore, on 29 September the Cabinet decided Kemal had had long enough to reply 
to the Allied note. Harington was ordered to inform the Nationalists that unless they 
withdrew their forces from the neutral zone around Chanak, ‘all the forces at [his] 
disposal – naval, military, aerial – will open fire’.181 Before the ultimatum was 
delivered the Turks agreed to meet Allied representatives at Mudania. An agreement 
was reached on 11 October.182 Greek authorities were to return to Greece, Turkish 
forces to withdraw fifteen kilometers from the coast and the Allies were to hold their 
positions until a formal peace treaty was signed. 
There were still some who believed the government had acted properly. Brigadier-
General H.C. Surtees, although ‘distrustful of the Prime Minister’s Near Eastern 
Policy’ expressed his ‘admiration of the manner in which the Government have so far 
handled the menace to the Chanak district.’ He believed it was ‘to the glory of this 
country’ that Britain had stood alone.183 Sir Arthur Evans, who had ‘50 years 
experience of the Near East’, believed Greek soldiers were ‘implicated’ in atrocity but 
added, ‘all that has been done on that side can still only be regarded as a very partial 
retaliation for massacres going back nine years, and on such a scale as history hardly 
records.’ He pointed out ‘the policy of extermination, or at best “elimination” of 
subject populations begun during the war, has now triumphed throughout…Asia 
Minor.’184  
Nevertheless, the tide of opinion was against government action. On 7 October The 
Times published a letter from Andrew Bonar Law, who had been absent from 
government deliberations owing to ill-health. His letter received positive coverage 
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throughout the press.185 He argued, ‘[w]e cannot alone act as policeman of the world’ 
because the ‘financial and social condition of this country makes that impossible’186 
and threatened that Britain would follow America into isolationism. Bonar Law 
artfully repudiated Britain’s traditional commitment to the protection of minorities, in 
particular the Armenians. Instead, he advocated withdrawal from world affairs. 
Churchill, perhaps sensing the mood within his own party and public opinion 
telegraphed the Dominion Prime Ministers, ‘Bonar Law in a timely letter today 
expresses a very general view’.187 C.P. Scott, editor of the Manchester Guardian, 
agreed that it was ‘impossible for us to act as permanent policeman to keep the Turks 
in order’.188 Lloyd George’s political allies were deserting him. The Times 
deliberately hailed the letter as a ‘manifesto’ thus reinforcing its political magnitude. 
It provided a rallying point for all who wished to express their condemnation of the 
Prime Minister. Lloyd George’s seemingly unassailable status as the Premier who 
won the war was almost completely undermined. The New Statesman, for example, 
proclaimed the British were ‘not the sentimental people we were ten years ago and we 
are not inclined to regard dead British soldiers as sufficient justification for any 
expenditure.’ The Turks were ‘a very “small nation” after all’ and now the 
requirement was ‘an exhibition of British honesty and common-sense.’ It concluded 
that perhaps ‘the inoculation of 1914-18 left an impression after all’ on the British 
public.189 Right wing tabloids continued their vicious invective. The Liberal Daily 
News quoted J.L. Garvin of the Right Wing Observer that Lloyd George ‘not only 
backed a wrong horse, he backed a dead one.’190 The Times quoted The Spectator, 
which argued for remaking the government on the basis of ‘Safety First’.191  
On 10 October the Cabinet decided to call an election. It was to be fought as a 
Coalition. Lloyd George returned to his constituency to defend his handling of the 
crisis and his premiership in an ‘Appeal to the Nation’.192 Like his opponents, he used 
the Great War as a major point of reference, seeing parallels between the 	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confrontation with Turkish Nationalists and the events of 1914. He believed ‘that 
language less correct, that language more direct, language more emphatic, might have 
stopped it…it was the greatest, the most calamitous diplomatic failure that the world 
has ever seen.’ He drew parallels with British defence of ‘civilization’ in 1914 with 
‘regard to Belgium’ and highlighted the slaughter of ‘a million and half Armenians – 
men, women, and children’ since Gladstone. He maintained that preventing ‘Turks 
from crossing into Europe and committing atrocities upon the Christian population’ 
was ‘in accordance with the highest interests and traditions of this land’, and added 
‘[y]ou can, if you like, say that we threatened, but meant it, but’ it was because ‘the 
Turks knew that we meant it, that you have peace now.’ On the prospect of being 
driven into the political wilderness, he stated that he was proud that the final weeks of 
his Premiership had been used to ‘invoke the might’ of the British Empire to ‘protect 
from indescribable horror men, women and children’ under threat.193 Lloyd George’s 
rhetoric should be treated with caution, he wrote to Curzon in October suggesting ‘the 
best we could hope to achieve…was to secure some protection for the Xtian 
minorities.’194 The Times was unmoved. An editorial on the same day saw ‘a new kind 
of Turk’ who had ‘a passionate desire for enlightenment, for rational and persistent 
constructive effort’. Nevertheless, it was admitted the ‘new Turkish Government will 
be neither willing, or able, to use Greeks and Armenians in the central administration 
to the same extent as before.’195 The Daily Express saw his speech as ‘deplorable.’196 
Lord Robert Cecil stated the move against the Prime Minister ‘was not a sectional 
feeling it was the spontaneous demonstration of the opinion of the Conservative forces 
of this country.’197 It was not limited to Tory opinion. The New Statesman wrote ‘as a 
national spokesman [Lloyd George] fails. He does not seem even to understand the 
English point of view’.198 
On 19 October Conservative backbenchers met at the Carlton Club. Having been 
galvanized by Samuel Hoare, Bonar Law led a revolt against the Coalition. Stanley 
Baldwin, President of the Board of Trade, fearing a Conservative split, called the 	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Prime Minister ‘a dynamic force…a very terrible thing.’199 The Conservative Party 
decided to fight the next election as a separate party.  That afternoon Lloyd George 
resigned. Bonar Law was installed as Prime Minister and called an election for 15 
November. The Archbishop of Canterbury wrote to the new Premier warning about 
the ‘sense of unutterable shame’ if it was ‘announced that we are ignoring the solemn 
pledges given and leaving great Christian populations to the unrestricted sword of a 
merciless foe.’200 Bonar Law’s draft reply suggested the Christian population had 
either already been massacred, were working in labour gangs, therefore ‘not likely to 
survive very long’ or were ‘Islamized women and children’. He rejected the idea that 
the new treaty with Turkey would provide for minorities, and blamed Britain’s allies 
‘who apparently do not feel so strongly on the subject of the minorities as we do 
ourselves. Nor is the subject one…on which public opinion as a whole, even in this 
country - stirred as it has been by pro-Turkish and even pro-Islamic propaganda – has 
yet been deeply moved.’201 This reply was not sent. His actual reply suggested he had 
not had time to consider the issue because he was too busy ‘undertaking’ his ‘new 
responsibilities’.202  
Bonar Law hoped to unite his party behind the idea that Britain’s ideals did not differ 
from the French who throughout the crisis had been unyieldingly pro-Turk.203 He 
believed the ‘nations first need’ was ‘in every walk of life, to get on with its own work 
with the minimum of interference at home and disturbance abroad.’204 The 
Conservatives won the election with a clear majority. When it came to negotiating 
with the Turks at the Lausanne Conference it was admitted Britain ‘had to make 
concessions in regard to minorities…unless we were prepared to fight and the Turks 
knew we were not ready.’205 Instead the Turkish case was persistently made in 
Britain. For example, J. Ellis Barker reinforced the identification of England with 
Turkey. He thought the best way to ‘visualise’ Costantinople was by ‘imagining the 
Thames to be the Bosphorus’ and the natural objections that ‘Englishmen’ would have 
to  	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foreign warships passing along the docks, the city and the Embankment, being 
able to destroy at any moment the business sections, the Houses of Parliament, 
Westminster Abbey and the Royal graves and Buckingham Palace.206  
P. Hehir, writing in The Nineteenth Century and After believed there were ‘numerous 
reasons’ for ‘concord and co-operation’ with the Turks. Turkey should be Britain’s 
ally because during the Great War ‘fighting with us was against their natural 
inclinations.’207 After months of tough negotiation at Lausanne, at which the issue of 
minority protection in Turkey nearly led to the collapse of negotiations, the 
conference ended without a signed agreement. Bonar Law intervened. Under his 
orders the Treaty, which gave the Turks a significant diplomatic victory, was signed. 
Churchill lamented in 1929 ‘In the Treaty of Lausanne, which registered the final 
peace between Turkey and the Great Powers, history will search in vain for the word 
Armenia’.208
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Chapter Three. 
The Re-emergence of Poland: A Legacy of Mistrust 
 
Between 22 and 24 November 1918 the Jewish community at Lemberg suffered ‘the 
most prolonged and extensive carnage against civilians since 1906.’1 Having defeated 
Ukrainian forces in a battle for the Galician town Polish troops, abetted by civilians, 
engaged in two days of murder, rape, looting and burning in the Jewish quarter. News 
of the violence was quickly transmitted to Britain where sensitivity to the use of 
terroristic methods to control civilians peaked around the election of December 1918 
when the call to ‘Hang the Kaiser’ was a major theme. German ‘frightfulness’ had just 
been defeated. Victory over Germany had confirmed Britain’s international reputation 
and self-perception as defender of small nations and protector of minorities. This 
chapter explores the myriad forces that dictated British reactions to reports of brutal 
anti-Semitism in Poland. In particular two distinct but connected war aims were at 
variance: firstly, the re-establishment of Poland as a separate democratic state which 
was seen as possessing ‘small nation’ status and, secondly, the banishment of 
repression as a method of control. To accommodate the former, the British felt 
compelled to give the latter considerable latitude.  
Although drained by the unprecedented conflict, Britain remained the world’s foremost 
power. It’s position at the heart of the world’s largest empire meant it could exert 
widespread influence. Kenneth Campbell states ‘[n]o international order can long exist 
without the most powerful state within that order defending and preserving it.’2 Apart 
from an increasingly isolationist America, Britain was best placed to fulfil that role. Its 
‘civilising mission’ had, after all, provided the moral and ethical justification for many 
of the territorial acquisitions now contributing to its primacy. Moral indignation at 
German atrocities against ‘little Belgium’ was a principle reason why so many Britons 
fought. Both inside and outside the United Kingdom many justifiably hoped Britain’s 
widely acclaimed moral standing would be applied to help shape the post-war world. 
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The collapse of empires in Germany, Austria-Hungary and Russia meant the once 
subordinate nations of Eastern Europe claimed independence. Among these was 
Poland, which benefitted from Great Power patronage. It was widely held in Britain 
that Poland deserved independence after years of occupation. Nevertheless, the 
realisation of Polish statehood was accompanied by considerable anxiety. On one side 
of Poland stood Bolshevik Russia; on the other, a defeated Germany that, to many, 
looked like it might go the same way. Within Poland, old systems of law and order 
crumbled and were replaced by rudimentary Polish authorities. The situation was 
particularly volatile in disputed border areas. In particular, Jewish communities became 
vulnerable to a combination of anti-Semitism and resurgent Polish nationalism.  
The Foreign Office was confronted with a melange of new states and potentially 
violent, internecine conflicts in Eastern Europe. Diplomats and officials faced a host of 
unfamiliar practical and ideological dilemmas. Poland, however, had particular 
importance as a physical and ideological barrier to Bolshevism. Jewish communities in 
Poland became the victim of these unprecedented considerations. Firstly, in order to 
maintain Polish territorial integrity, perceived to be in Britain’s interest, it was 
considered necessary to protect the nascent state from public criticism. To this end, the 
Poles were treated with paternalistic indulgence in Britain, even with respect to anti-
Jewish violence. Poland was given the attributes of a fledgling British-style democracy 
and also benefited from Britain’s traditional support for the underdog. Secondly, the 
Jews themselves were often portrayed in stereotypical terms as part of the ideological 
problem facing Eastern Europe. Thanks to the identification of Jews with Bolshevism 
they were deemed unworthy of sympathy and blamed for bringing persecution onto 
their own heads. Apart from within the Anglo-Jewish community public indignation 
about their ill-treatment was largely absent.  
The Foreign Office feared public sympathy for the Jewish plight, but this had more to 
do with false ideas regarding the strength of Jewish influence than actual 
manifestations of broad-based compassion. However, some officials did show 
persistent discomfort concerning the outbreaks of anti-Jewish violence. They exerted 
some influence but were eventually marginalised. The British press, instead of acting 
as a critical counterweight to government policy, reinforced anti-Jewish prejudice. The 
churches showed little or no independent opposition to anti-Jewish attitudes. British 
representatives of the International Red Cross had become so entwined within the 
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nation-state framework that their capacity for neutral humanitarianism in the case of 
Jews was undermined.3  
In influential quarters, Polish Jews were imagined as the carriers of subversive creeds 
and Britain’s relative inaction in the face of anti-Jewish violence reinforced the notion 
that Eastern European Jews were largely friendless. It left them vulnerable to the 
phantasms of anti-Semites over the following twenty-five years. Outright 
condemnation and action, in accordance with a much-lauded British ethical tradition, 
may have provided a more secure context in which Poles and Jews could work out their 
relationships. However, it was the events in Eastern Europe in 1918-1920 that helped 
initiate what is now widely accepted as one of the most anti-Semitic periods in British 
history.  
This chapter reveals that British wartime notions of international justice did not apply 
to eastern European Jews. Whereas Belgian and French civilians had been cast as 
‘worthy’ victims with relative ease throughout the war, Polish Jews in the immediate 
post-war period were somehow seen as irrevocably ‘other’. This was particularly the 
case for Foreign Office personnel whose job it was to untangle the sometimes chaotic 
conditions created by the redrawing of European boundaries in the interests of ‘self-
determination’. What this affair also shows is that the difficulty of recasting Jews in the 
British imagination was not new to the Nazi period. Negative ideas of Jewishness were 
somehow too ingrained to facilitate any meaningful shift in British minds. It provides a 
necessary contrast to the way reputations of other ‘others’, such as the Chinese or 
‘ordinary Germans’, were malleable enough to change and therefore elicit empathy. 
This crucial episode also provides the seedbed for the anti-Semitism of scepticism that 
coloured the perception of Nazi persecution and violence in the 1930s and 1940s.  
On 5 January 1918 Lloyd George announced British and Allied war aims included the 
re-establishment of an independent Poland.4 It was to comprise ‘genuinely Polish 
elements who desire to form part of it’ and deemed ‘an urgent necessity for the stability 
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of Western Europe.’5 Foreign Secretary, Arthur Balfour, reiterated that Poland should 
recover ‘those provinces ravished from her by Germany at the time of partition, or 
since’.6 The British portrayed themselves as righting a historical wrong and their 
gesture fell squarely within the context of responses to German ‘frightfulness’. 
However, this wording placed approximately three million Jews who lived on 
potentially Polish territory in an ambiguous position. They would have to demonstrate 
their Polish credentials to be accepted by the Allies as part of the project. 
Before the end of the First World War Sir Stuart Samuel, President of the Board of 
Deputies of British Jews and Claude Montefiore, President of the Anglo-Jewish 
Association, who between them represented British Jews, wrote to Balfour on the 
‘uneasiness’ among the ‘large Jewish communities’ in Eastern Europe regarding the 
attitude of the British and Allied governments ‘in regard to their long standing claims 
for civil and political emancipation.’7 They claimed the war aims statement did not 
cater for Jews in the same way as Poles, Serbs and Czechs, despite suffering greater 
injustices.8  
They further suggested the Balfour Declaration was of limited use to Jews who wished 
to ‘remain in their native lands’ and expressed alarm at ‘the interpretation given…by 
the Anti-Semites of Poland and Rumania’ who regarded it ‘as an invitation to solve the 
Jewish question by emigration’.9 As well as being motivated by humanitarianism they 
were also ideologically opposed to Zionism.10 Jews, they believed, should work within 
the national framework towards greater tolerance for Jewish cultural and religious 
practices.11 These principles dictated their approach to the Jewish question in Eastern 
Europe. Samuel and Montefiore therefore asked for a ‘supplementary Declaration’ 
assuring Jews of ‘religious, civil and political emancipation on a footing of equality 	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with their fellow citizens.’12 They were frustrated that Allied rhetoric concerning ‘the 
essential ends for which this country is striving in the present war’ did not seem to 
apply to East European Jewry.13 Balfour expressed his ‘closest sympathy’ with the 
emancipation of East European Jews but did not comply with their wishes.14 The 
principal Anglo-Jewish advocates of the cause of East European Jews were divided and 
lacking political weight. Lucien Woolf, long regarded as the community’s expert 
lobbyist in this field, was now even regarded by the Foreign Office as little more than a 
nuisance.15  
By contrast, Polish influence in government circles was significant. In October 1917 
the Polish National Committee (PNC) had been recognised by the government as 
officially representing Polish views even though English Jews and British-based Poles 
believed they were anti-Semitic. The Council of the Polish Committee in Great Britain, 
which claimed long-standing British connections in contrast to the PNC ‘new-comers’, 
complained to The Times about the ‘privileged position’ given to the PNC who were 
‘violently anti-Semitic’.16 Yet the latter successfully presented themselves as the 
‘government in exile and the true spokespeople of the Polish nation.’17 Although wary 
of Roman Dmowski,18 a self-proclaimed anti-Semite, Foreign Office personnel were of 
the opinion that members of his party were the only ones possessing ‘political 
experience and capacity’.19 
Recognition by the British government led to a number of openings for the PNC in 
Britain. The PNC was allowed to take a lead in presenting to the business community 
the opportunities that would present themselves after liberation;20 they played a role 	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within the War Office ‘in connection with the Daily Review of the Foreign Press’;21 
they were also given the responsibility for the day-to-day implementation of the Aliens 
Restriction Order for Poles. Their methods led to charges of a two-tier system. Those 
who were ‘Poles by race’ were exempted from entry restrictions into the United 
Kingdom, whilst Polish Jews remained enemy aliens.22 Just as news of the Lemberg 
pogrom reached Britain, Balfour announced Poland would have a seat at the Paris 
Peace Conference and Dmowski would be among those who officially represented 
their interests.23 In Foreign Office circles political experience was given precedence 
over ideological considerations. By contrast, a request by the Anglo-Jewish delegation 
to be included in preparations for Versailles was refused by Balfour on the grounds of 
‘lack of space’.24 Poland’s recognition by the victorious powers gave their delegates 
official status denied to the Jewish contingent. The Jews had to rely on nebulous calls 
for a just post-war settlement.  
In early November 1918 the Anglo-Jewish leadership forwarded telegrams to Balfour 
alleging PNC inspired outbreaks of violence against Jews in Poland and Galicia. Chaim 
Weizman, leader of the world Zionist movement, called for immediate public protests 
in the United States, and American Jewish representatives prepared to ‘communicate 
with the President’.25 The British government reacted sharply. On 15 November the 
Foreign Office issued a ‘public warning’ to Poland that appealed to wartime values. 
‘The victory of freedom just attained,’ it stated, ‘will be of little avail if the world is to 
see the will of force, so recently vanquished, re-incarnated in other forms no less 
repugnant to the principles of liberty.’26 The Foreign Office unequivocally warned that 
continued disorder would force Western democracies ‘to wait in patience and enforced 
inactivity’ and thus be prevented from ‘promot[ing] their reconstruction’.27 Jews were 
encouraged by Balfour’s action, possibly feeling their faith in British ‘values’ 	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vindicated.28 However, while the British government were publicly proclaiming their 
firm stance on the issue of persecuted minorities, the continuing de facto recognition of 
the PNC gave little incentive for Polish politicians to rein in violent anti-Semitic 
forces. 
The Polish Information Committee, representing a broad political spectrum,29 thought 
‘reports of pogroms’ were ‘invented’ or ‘exaggerated by German agents’ to serve 
Poland’s ‘enemies’. Anti-Jewish movements, they argued, were ‘not the work of the 
Polish people’.30 It was an ominous development that defence of the emerging Polish 
state required the denial or marginalisation of claims of anti-Jewish violence. Although 
E.H. Carr of the Foreign Office was initially unconvinced about pogrom reports the 
events at Lemberg occasioned a rethink.31 This was particularly due to the influence of 
Lewis Namier who wrote of one account that it was ‘obviously genuine.’ A colleague 
called ‘for the immediate dispatch of a commission of enquiry.’32 
The government were already planning to send a ‘semi-official, semi-diplomatic 
intelligence mission’ to Poland under Colonel Wade.33 The object was to ‘form a 
provisional link between the de facto authorities in Poland and H.M.G.’34 He was 
instructed also to ‘ascertain the truth of the allegations now being made against the 
Poles by the Jewish Societies.’35 Calls for military intervention were rejected in favour 
of this fact-finding mission. As will be seen, however, the reactionary views of the 
personnel in the mission subsequently influenced British responses.  
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In the wake of the Balfour Declaration British officials gave increased weight to 
Zionist representations. After the Lemberg pogrom Weizman requested an interview 
with the Foreign Secretary. His approach was more confrontational than that of official 
Anglo-Jewry. He bluntly reiterated his intention ‘to give the widest possible 
publication’ to the pogrom and promised ‘[m]ass Meetings all over this country, 
possibly in France and Italy, and certainly in America.’36 His threat met with some 
success. He persuaded Sir George Clerk of the Foreign Office to facilitate a fact-
finding mission to Poland by Israel Cohen.37 Clerk did not want to ‘discourage any 
attempt of the Zionists to furnish us with such information’ on the basis that he go as 
‘special Commissioner of the “Times”, an idea which had apparently already 
commended itself to that Journal.’38 Lord Hardinge  agreed ‘[i]f the “Times” can be 
satisfied as to the veracity of Mr. Cohen’s reports it would be better that his mission 
should have no official character.’ This view however, seems to have been expressed 
on the proviso that ‘the “Times” makes it quite clear that their Commissioner is a Jew 
and a Zionist.’39 Balfour acceded to this advice.40 
Meanwhile moderate Poles attempted to diffuse the tension suggesting problems 
between Poles and Jews had been distorted. August Zaleski, whom Wolf thought to be 
liberal minded, telegraphed the Anglo-Jewish leadership stating that the violence was 
mostly the work of recently released ‘criminals’, that the Polish authorities had re-
established order, appointed a committee of enquiry and was going to pay damages to 
those affected. Consideration was also being given to an ‘International Commission of 
Enquiry.’41 The ‘Zaleski-oriented’ Polish Information Committee claimed relations 
between the Poles and the Jews were ‘good’.42 However, tension was still evident. 
Count Wladyslaw Sobanski of the PNC deprecated reports of anti-Jewish violence in a 
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letter to Lord Swaythling of the Board of Deputies.43 He suggested that Jewish protests 
had provoked ‘a not unjustifiable indignation’ in Polish circles and they were proof of 
an attempt to discredit Poles ‘on the eve of the Peace Conference.’44 The London 
Polish press echoed these views.45 Zionist bureaus in Stockholm and Berne had 
embellished the figures of those affected by violence. These were seized upon as 
representing the views of all Jews. Sensitivity to Jewish protests, combined with Polish 
fears of the erosion of Western support, led English-based Poles and their supporters to 
sanitise reports of violence. The exaggerations of the Zionist bureaus were countered 
by equally misleading Polish remonstrations. However, in Britain the reputation for 
distorting the truth tended to fall on Jews. Sobanski complained that ‘anti-Jewish 
disorders’ had received undue attention in the press.46 However, from the beginning the 
press had scant sympathy for the Jewish cause.  
The Times provided most coverage of violence in Eastern Europe. Its first major article 
cast doubt on the veracity of reports.47 The ‘massacres’ of ‘Belgians by Germans’, 
‘Armenians by Turks’ and ‘Jewish Bolshevists upon non-Bolshevist Jews, as in 
Russia’48 were invoked to demonstrate how anti-Jewish violence in Poland differed 
from other recent atrocities that had roused widespread indignation. Whereas these 
were recognised as state-sanctioned, violence in Poland was characterised as 
spontaneous and to some degree excusable. The notion that the eruption of violence 
was ‘unofficial’ and a response to Jewish ‘provocation’ was henceforth widely adopted 
by British commentators. Not only was the proportion of Jews in Poland stated to be 
‘far higher than any people can digest’, but the paper warned of the Jewish ‘tendencies’ 
which it said often brought ‘the Jewish name into disrepute.’49 The implication was that 
large numbers of Jews living in extreme poverty made them susceptible to Bolshevism 
and therefore anti-Semitism was a natural consequence.50 Leading Jews were exhorted 
to take a ‘strong stand’ against alleged troublesome Jewish elements. British and Polish 	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Jews were bifurcated and the ‘Jews of Lemberg’ were cast as ‘the antithesis of our 
British Jews’.51 They were implicated in ‘questions of usury, food profiteering, and 
betrayal of Poles’.52 The Times reinforced fears that Poland was ‘a corridor by which 
Bolshevism may creep into the very centre of Europe’53 by reporting that Bolsheviks, 
facilitated by Germans, were sending Jewish agents into Poland. On this basis the Jews 
were a ‘great provocation to the Lemberg populace’.54 It was suggested that during the 
war even ‘in London itself, under provocation, shops have been wrecked.’55 In other 
words if the English had been incited to violence presumably the Polish response was 
explicable.  
Poles by contrast were cast as gallant. The battle for Lemberg was portrayed as a heroic 
tale of an unorganised ‘army’ of youthful Poles who fought bravely against the 
invading Ruthenians initially using little but their fists.56 The Warsaw correspondent 
suggested everything had now returned to normal and Lemberg was like ‘any European 
city on a Sunday.’57 Pogrom stories were therefore ‘[m]uch exaggerated’ and an 
‘[e]ffort to discredit Poles.’58 Atrocity stories were apparently designed ‘to prejudice 
the new Polish régime in the world’s eyes, for purposes which the Germans and 
Bolshevists know best.’59 With Lemberg’s Jews firmly established as in league with 
Britain’s (and Poland’s) ideological enemies, The Times adopted a seemingly balanced 
and disinterested stance calling for ‘improvement’ in Polish-Jewish relations, but this 
depended ‘on the disappearance of this frantic anti-Polish propaganda…abroad’ which 
would otherwise ‘embitter the population.’60 Those wishing to protest against Polish 
violence were, by implication, siding with allegedly malevolent Jewish forces. The 
Times set the tone for British press coverage.  	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Lucien Wolf was encouraged by a report in the Daily Telegraph on 4 January 1919 
claiming Poles were engaged in ‘a savage war of extermination against the Jews’ 
which was viewed with ‘indifference’ by Polish intelligentsia who were accused of 
using all means to ‘conceal’ and ‘deny’ them.61 However the general trend of the 
Telegraph and The Times was to emphasise the threat to Poland from the ‘moral 
disease’ of Bolshevism, which was manifested in the ‘awfulness’ of Bolshevik 
atrocities.62 Both continued to stress the dangers for Poland of a joint attack from 
Germany and Russia. The Englishwoman agreed and the Liberal New Statesman 
suggested Britain had ‘the duty to protect Poland’ from Bolsheviks and portrayed the 
Jews as in league with Germany to keep Poles subjugated.63 The Liberal Contemporary 
Review published an article eulogising Dmowski as ‘the most adroit [Party Leader] in 
Poland’ who would not compromise for ‘Teuton or for Israelite’. Such ‘convictions’, it 
stated, were rare but they were ‘Dmowski’s strength.’64 Pogrom reports ‘spread by 
Jewish international agencies’ were ‘exaggerated’ but alleged Jewish ‘control’ of a 
disproportionate amount of trade and the separateness of the Orthodox community 
meant ‘the outbreaks’ were ‘not surprising.’65 There was an increasing tendency in 
some publications to pick out certain ‘undesirable’ aspects of Jewish communities and 
to give the impression they could be universally applied.66 In this atmosphere a visit to 
Poland by Joseph Prag, a member of the Board of Deputies, was refused because the 
Foreign Office, acting on a tip from the new Polish Premier Ignacy Paderewski, 
believed he would spread Bolshevik propaganda.67 Colonel Wade’s fact-finding 
mission had reached Poland in late December. They quickly associated themselves 
with Paderewski.68 
Wade’s reports dovetailed with some of the anti-Jewish prejudices being vented in the 
press. Nevertheless, they were taken seriously and acted upon by the government. On 
14 January 1919 he telegraphed that Poland needed help ‘within five weeks’ or it 
would be ‘surrounded and crushed and [the] last barrier between Bolsheviks and 	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Western Europe’ would ‘dis-appear.’ He advised ‘sending material and advance guard 
of General HALLER’s army.’69 Wade and his American counterpart Major Foster 
arranged ‘unrestricted passage to the Polish troops’ into German occupied territory.70 
This was to dramatically effect the war with Russia and the treatment of Jews in Polish 
territory. The Prime Minister read Wade’s reports and further promptings led the 
government to send 12,000 rifles and 5 million rounds of ammunition to assist the 
Poles.71 
On 16 January Wade turned his attention to Lemberg. Rather than clarifying the facts 
concerning the anti-Jewish violence, Wade’s report, written in Warsaw, stressed a state 
of confusion and hinted at Jewish culpability. General ‘confusion and pre-occupation 
with pursuit of [the] enemy’ provided a muddied context for violence and robbery in 
the Jewish quarter. Seventy-two Jewish deaths had occurred in ‘incessant street 
fighting’ in which ‘Jewish armed Police appear to have fought on the side of 
Ukrainians.’ Jewish deaths were thus portrayed as legitimate casualties of war. He 
reassured Whitehall that an impartial judge was investigating and that Paderewski had 
‘urged toleration for Jews’.72 Britain’s representative in Poland, working within the 
official pro-Polish paradigm and perhaps under pressure of time relied more on the 
testimony of Polish officialdom than that of Jewish victims. Wade formulated a picture 
that coincided with the views of the British press. Furthermore, by disconnecting the 
outbreak from those who gave orders, the possibility of achieving justice was 
undermined. The pogrom lost the status of a deliberate atrocity executed by an 
identifiable set of perpetrators. Nobody was prosecuted.  
A later communiqué provides insight into the ideology that underpinned the tenor and 
content of Wade’s reports. His chief concern for German Poland was ‘the relentless ill-
will of the German Nation, German Jews, and Socialists.’  He suggested, Jews ‘fear a 
loss of opportunities for trade and profit-making’ in a united Poland. Furthermore 
Bolshevik propaganda among the Polish working classes in German Poland was ‘being 
conducted by Jews.’  Poles by contrast ‘behaved with exemplary patience and self-
control’. He believed the German press especially responsible for disseminating 	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pogrom ‘propaganda’ in order to show Poles as an ‘uncontrolled and intolerant people, 
to whom the care of alien minorities can never be entrusted’.73 Wade’s ultimate fear 
was that a territorial and ideological amalgamation of Germany and Russia would 
create a powerful and aggressive force that would destabilise Europe unfavourably for 
Britain. The subversive presence of Jews linked both dangers. Only ‘the strong national 
sentiment of the Poles’ stood in the way ‘for the present...between Russian nihilism 
and Western civilisation.’74 
To what extent did Wade’s reports chime with the views of Whitehall? Not everyone at 
the Foreign Office was convinced of his strident pro-Polish attitude. Namier, 
sometimes with the support of his supervisor, Sir James Headlam-Morley, continually 
lobbied against the acceptance of Wade’s reports as the basis for conducting policy and 
bemoaned the want of ‘someone with actual knowledge of the Galician question’.75 
However, he accepted it was difficult to criticise ‘the man…on the spot.’76 Namier’s 
single-minded focus on the subject eroded his status within Foreign Office circles. 
Polish leaders became concerned about his influence and he was prevented from taking 
over from Sir Esme Howard in Paris.77 Anti-Jewish violence also created nervousness 
among the junior ranks. E.H. Carr, for example, in response to an appeal on behalf of 
the Jewish Committee of Help for the Victims of Pogroms in Lemberg, expressed his 
confusion. ‘It is hard to say which is cause’, he wrote, ‘and which effect’.78  
Nevertheless, more senior officials were convinced of the need to support Poland in the 
face of a Bolshevik threat from Russia and Germany. For Howard, Carr’s superior, 
‘German propaganda’ had adversely affected public opinion against Poland believing 
‘it is too often taken for granted that the Poles are to blame.’ He shared Wade’s fear of 
the danger of Germany and Russia becoming ‘conterminous’ and urged action ‘rapidly 
to establish an independent Poland.’79 Eyre Crowe had suggested it was in the nature of 
Jews to gravitate towards ‘revolutionary and terroristic movements,’ whereas, Balfour 
was sceptical of the connection linking Jews to both Bolshevism and imperialism.80 	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However, he questioned the loyalty of newly minted Jewish citizens and deemed it 
‘feeble compared with their loyalty to their religion and their race.’81 He acknowledged 
the extensive role of persecution in Jewish history, but suggested it had produced 
‘undesirable’ self-protecting qualities.82 In a nod to anti-Semitism which attached itself 
to Zionism he implied that the civil qualities that bound a community ‘to the land it 
inhabits by something deeper even than custom’ were missing from Jews who choose 
not to live in Palestine.83  
It was perhaps inevitable that these views coloured Balfour’s approach to Poland’s 
Jewish minority and, consequently, a significant proportion of his more senior 
subordinates. The majority view in the Foreign Office appears to have been a suspicion 
of East European Jews. When this was added to the overarching belief in the nation-
state idea and its ramifications for Poland in the face of Bolshevist ‘threats’ from 
Russia and Germany, it created a set of assumptions that worked against Jewish 
appeals for support. Hence when Cohen wrote to The Times in early February detailing 
his perception of the excesses they were dismissed by Lord Robert Cecil, the outgoing 
Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs as ‘exaggerated’.84 This was partially 
based on ‘information given…by Colonel Wade’.85 Keen to promote their view to the 
British public and control potential indignation, Howard suggested that a statement 
emanating from the Polish Ministry of Interior that Jews had the same rights as Poles 
be placed in The Times.86 For their part, the press continued to suggest that Polish Jews 
were the authors of their own persecution, being responsible for the privations of the 
rest of the population.87 The timing of these manoeuvres was crucial because the 
British Government were, at this moment, giving serious consideration to granting 
official recognition to Poland. On 6 February Wade telegraphed Balfour directly to 
push for endorsement of the new state.88 Carr, apparently convinced that recognition of 
the Polish government under Paderewski would bring much needed stability urged it 	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‘at once.’89 Highly sensitive to the possibility of public clamour in reaction to the 
violence, Britain moved quickly to recognise Poland.90  
Official recognition, far from providing stability heralded fresh outbreaks of violence. 
Robberies, beatings and intimidation were regularly reported in the Anglo-Jewish 
press. According to Rowland Kenney, Red Cross Commissioner and one of Wade’s 
team in Warsaw, a ‘Pogrom atmosphere’ still prevailed.91 The Foreign Office received 
irrefutable evidence that Poles were being advised to wear a Polish flag in public ‘to 
avoid the unpleasant consequence of being mistaken for something other than a Pole.’92 
On 5 April in Pinsk, over thirty Jews, members of the local Food Distribution 
Committee, were summarily executed by order of Major George Luczynski, the Polish 
commander, on suspicion that they were Bolsheviks. Richard Kimens, British Vice-
Consul in Warsaw and a member of Wade’s commission, submitted favourable reports 
of the Polish action. Nevertheless, Foreign Office officials questioned the consistency 
and veracity of the evidence. Howard suggested the ‘regrettable incident’ was the result 
of ‘nerves.’ He thought it possible ‘that there was some Bolshevik plot’ and suggested 
‘some interallied [sic] officers…go to Pinsk & clear up the matter’.93 Balfour endorsed 
this approach, believing it ‘in the interests of Polish Government itself.’94 A subsequent 
report concluded the mass execution was ‘justified’ because Jewish ‘behaviour gave 
grounds for grave suspicion’ and there was the ‘probability of a Bolshevik rising and 
the destruction of the Polish garrison.’95 H.J. Paton suggested ‘the meeting may have 
been perfectly innocent’ but there were ‘grounds for suspicion’. In any case he was 
confident that Major Muczynski [sic] was justified in his action’,96 and concluded 
‘there is nothing more to be done.’97 Foreign Office personnel and their representatives 
in Poland clung to the hope that violence was non-systematic and that the recently 
endorsed Polish government would control their more extreme elements. In the 
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meantime methods of control condemned in the war as ‘frightfulness’ were tolerated on 
the basis that the Jews were an inherent threat.98 
Although the Jewish Chronicle published an account of the Pinsk massacre, it barely 
registered in the mainstream press.99 Why then did the Anglo-Jewish community not 
try to exploit the issue to raise British indignation? Firstly, information on the Pinsk 
shootings was initially sketchy and therefore it was impossible to construct a concrete 
case. Secondly, the prevailing attitude within official Anglo-Jewry played a role. 
Wolf’s views carried considerable weight within the community. He was at the Peace 
Conference when confirmation of the shootings became available. He discussed them 
with an outraged Cyrus Adler of the American Jewish delegation. On 23 April he was 
granted an interview with Paderewski. Wolf’s explanation provides an insight as to the 
parameters within which he felt constrained to work. The Polish Premier was, for Wolf, 
‘a man of moderate views, and is a great contrast to Dmowski with whom, at the 
present moment, he is not on good terms.’100 He believed that more extreme action 
over ‘the Jewish Question’ might destabilise Paderewski’s position and ‘open the door 
for anti-Semitic extremists like Dmovski to seize power.’101 Wolf sought to exploit 
Polish divisions by fostering closer relationships with those whom he considered 
moderate.102 He therefore shunned public protests.  
When Samuel Daishes of the Board of Deputies proposed a mass protest meeting over 
the Pinsk murders Wolf acted to avert it. He used Foreign Office contacts to urge that 
Paderewski write ‘deploring the massacre and assuring…there will be a vigorous 
investigation and stern punishment of the guilty’. This, he believed, would ‘pacify our 
London friends and avert the holding of an indignation meeting which would only 
embitter Polish-Jewish relations and jeopardise my negotiations with Paderewski.’103 
Despite a letter from Zaleski maintaining a Polish commission of investigation had 	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already concluded ‘that illegalities had been committed’,104 Paderewski’s letter to Wolf 
was not so forthcoming. ‘In the case of Pinsk’ he wrote, ‘Bolshevick [sic] attacks’ on 
the Polish Army ‘rendered it necessary to act with special severity’.105 His reply can be 
interpreted as evidence of the need to pacify strong reactionary elements in Polish 
politics. Wolf however believed the Paris negotiations were at a crucial stage and 
therefore apparently could not ‘afford at this moment to have any open rupture with the 
Poles or to antagonise Paderewski.’106 Within his own paradigm Wolf had a point 
because work was just getting started on the New States Committee in Paris that was to 
‘consider what guarantees have to be found for the protection of Jews and other 
minorities’.107 
British Zionists felt no such restraint. A public protest had been arranged at the 
Queen’s Hall in London on 9 April. It was chaired by Lord Parmoor and attended by 
Lord Bryce, the central figure in the discourse on German war atrocities.108 The event 
was more connected to Cohen’s report than events at Pinsk. As well as confirming 
Wade’s figures for Jewish dead at Lemberg, his report, published in April, listed 131 
towns and villages allegedly affected by varying levels of violence and looting between 
2 November 1918 and 28 January 1919.109 Cohen made no secret of the fact that the 
figures of those affected by the violence had initially been exaggerated by Zionist 
bureaus. Yet he was equally certain of a deliberate Polish attempt ‘to discredit the 
stories of the pogroms’ and of complicity by ‘their friends in Western Europe’.110 
Cohen confirmed pogroms ‘could manifestly not have been organised by any central 
authority’.111 He also highlighted the bravery of individual Poles.112 The Morning Post 
responded with an editorial entitled ‘Apocryphal Pogroms.’113 It was suggested that 
‘Mr. Cohen’s account of the alleged pogroms…does not bear the test of even a cursory 
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examination…the true object of the meeting was to discredit Poland and to help 
Germany.’114 
Fresh reports of Polish atrocities arrived at the Foreign Office. It was reported that 
Polish victories at Lida and Vilna were accompanied by the deaths of fifty-four Jewish 
civilians.115 Homes and synagogues were looted with hundreds taken prisoner. The 
Anglo-Jewish leadership decided to change their approach, eschewing reticence for 
pro-active protest. This came about for four reasons. Firstly, negotiations surrounding 
the Minorities Treaty were virtually complete releasing Wolf from fears of offending 
influential Polish negotiators.116 Secondly, Wolf and other Jewish leaders were 
genuinely shocked at the apparent escalation of violence in the Eastern European war 
zone.117 Thirdly, Anglo-Jewry were stung into action ‘by foreign criticism of its 
‘supineness’.118 Finally, Wolf was increasingly concerned about a victory of the White 
Russian forces believing it would ‘be followed by huge butcheries of Jews if we do not 
make an example of the Poles in good time.’119 Poland was perceived as the key to 
violence elsewhere because the British refusal to recognise either Soviet Russia or the 
Ukraine as valid states limited both the flow of information from stricken areas and the 
practicality of intervention.  
Anglo-Jewish leaders tried to coordinate a response with American and French Jewish 
representatives. They also bombarded officials with telegrams and encouraged Foreign 
Office contacts to confront their Polish counterparts. Protests spilled over into the 
press. Israel Cohen and Henry Brailsford wrote to The Times, which also reported a 
huge pogrom protest by New York Jews.120 The paper acknowledged the Poles had 
treated the Jews ‘abominably’ but undermined the idea that Jews were victims by 
suggesting ‘they are numerically very strong…and even stronger in ability and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114 Ibid. 
115 On 10 May 1919 the Jewish deputies of the Polish Diet wrote to Paderewski giving 
details of these and many more instances of pogroms. Marshall Correspondence Peace 
Conference, Paris, 1919 (1) Boxes 5-6. 
116 Wolf, Diary, 22 May 1919. Sir Eyre Crowe wrote to Harding stating that Headleam-
Morley had swallowed Wolf’s bait ‘hook, line and sinker.’  FO608/51/114/1/20, 30 May 
1919. 
117 Wolf, Diary, 19 May 1919. 
118 Fink, Defending, p.222. 
119 Wolf, Diary, 22 May 1919. 
120 Brailsford was criticised by Captain B. Crewdson, Chief of the British Mission, 
Warsaw. FO608/67/145, Crewdson to FO, 7 July 1919. 
	   116	  
energy’.121 Jewish leaders also primed sympathetic MPs to ask questions in the 
Commons. When questioned on the ‘massacre’ at Pinsk, Cecil Harmsworth, the Under-
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs replied that the victims had ‘been implicated in a 
plot to seize, disarm, and kill a small Polish outpost stationed on the Polish eastern 
frontier.’122 Harmsworth failed to mention Foreign Office doubts about the action of 
Polish troops and sidestepped a subsequent request to have the relevant reports 
published. 
Reports from Vilna, provided by Wolf, were causing the Foreign Office to doubt 
official communiqués. Paton believed ‘favourable accounts from English and 
American officers’ lacked ‘full and necessary evidence’.123 Wolf’s information was 
backed up by British sources. Sir Percy Wyndam in Warsaw confidentially reported 
that Josef Pilsudski, the Polish Head of State, had confessed in a meeting with the 
American Minister to Poland that General Haller was disposed to ‘ma[k]e life 
miserable for Jews and this was causing [a] renewal of such acts by [the] civilian 
population.’124 Haller’s culpability was also suggested in the press.125 British 
intervention in facilitating the passage of Haller’s troops made this a sensitive point. 
Foreign Office discomfort was increased by a Parliamentary question, which raised the 
issue of Haller’s troops joining ‘the mob in attacking Jews.’126  
A telegraph from the Foreign Office sent to Wyndham on 12 June pointed to the 
‘growing agitation’ in Britain over ‘Jewish excesses in Poland’ and suggested his 
recent reports did ‘not assist us adequately in meeting criticisms’.127 It highlighted a 
number of inconsistencies, omissions, and unsubstantiated assumptions, which made it 
‘hard to make [a] case for [the] Polish authorities’.128 The Anglo-Jewish campaign was 
starting to unsettle the Foreign Office who had ‘been approached’ by leading British 
Jews to hold a Mansion House protest meeting, but they had ‘not felt in a position to 
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place any obstacle in the way of the meeting being held.’129 In the end they exploited 
internal divisions within the Anglo-Jewish community to refuse the request.130 
The Anglo-Jewish leadership pressed ahead with its campaign to alert the public. An 
ad hoc committee was appointed to organise a demonstration along the lines of the 
recent New York protest.131 They arranged for a Jewish National Day of Mourning for 
26 June. British Jews refrained from work to process silently through London and 
attended services of prayer and mourning. The press was either indifferent or opposed 
outright. Days before the protest The Times and the Morning Post made their 
antagonism clear. They published letters that denied the pogroms, blamed the Jews, 
more specifically ‘Jewish temperament’,132 or derided ‘mourning festivities.’133 
Disingenuous articles were published to stoke fears of a German armed renaissance in 
which the Jews were ‘agents provocateurs’134 in a ‘[p]lot [a]gainst Poland.’135 German 
blast furnaces were said to be ‘working night and day’ to manufacture ‘munitions to be 
used against the Poles’ and the public was asked whether it realised the ‘now 
impending...massacre of the Polish nation?’136 Poland was portrayed as ‘traditionally 
devoted to the British cause of national freedom.’137 On the day of the protest the 
Westminster Gazette refuted pogrom reports as ‘[e]xaggerated’ and claimed Polish 
action had been warranted because of the aggressive behaviour of the Jews in Vilna 
and Pinsk.138 The protest was afterwards portrayed in distinctly anti-Semitic tones and 
British Jews as in thrall to suspicious ‘foreigners’.139 
Balfour drew Paderewski’s attention to ‘the strong feeling which has been aroused in 
England and parts of the British Empire’ and asked him to impress upon Poles the 
‘necessity of adopting a conciliatory attitude’ towards Jews whilst giving ‘the strictest 	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orders to officers of the army to refrain from any action which may be considered as 
showing an Anti-Semitic bias.’140 He was careful though to avoid causing offence by 
suggesting reports of violence were ‘exaggerated.’141 Paderewski accused Polish Jews 
of Franc-Tireurs tactics.142 The Government had exploited similar accusations when 
mobilising anti-German sentiment during the war so it was significant that these 
charges remained uncontested by British officials and politicians. The Polish premier 
also suggested that over-stated reports of atrocities were part of wider systematic 
attempts to undermine Poland’s territorial claims. This particular claim contained a 
disturbing dimension. He suggested ‘[c]ertain pogroms in neighbouring countries have 
in one single day made fifty times as many Jewish victims as all the rioting and 
disorders in Poland during the last eight months.’143 Unchecked anti-Jewish violence in 
Russia and the Ukraine was invoked to demonstrate that Polish ‘reprisals’ were 
relatively restrained. The Times and the Morning Post welcomed Paderewski’s 
‘reassuring’ statement.144  
Members of the British military mission in Poland persisted in defending Haller. 
Captain Crewdson, the senior officer in Warsaw, suggested a recent riot in Cracow 
‘owed its origin to overcharging by a Jewish shop-keeper’ rather than Haller’s troops 
who had ‘retaliated by giving him a thoroughly good hiding.’145 He also accounted for 
some of the day-to-day persecution suffered by Jews. ‘[Polish soldiers] have a playful 
habit’, he stated, ‘when excited of catching a Jew and shaving his beard off.’ This, he 
reasoned, was ‘natural’ because of the plethora of ‘low class’ Jews who were ‘dirty and 
disgusting’. Crewdson thought the name ‘Jew’ was ‘synonymous with that of 
profiteer’, furthermore ‘nearly every Jew’ was ‘armed’ and it was ‘their habit’ to ‘work 
the revolution through hands other than their own’.146 Paton agreed ‘[t]hese anti-
Semitic excesses may easily have an economic origin’ but conceded Poles were 
‘strongly affected by racial and probably also by religious feeling.’147 Esme Howard 
suggested ‘animosity’ was ‘mainly economic,’ but also ‘due to the distinctly anti-
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national or anti-Polish attitude of many Jews’, who could not ‘disguise their feelings 
for the Germans.’148 When it came to understanding ‘reasons’ for the violence, the 
propensity for British officials to believe their agents in Poland coloured their 
judgement. Nevertheless, the escalation of anti-Jewish brutality caused them increasing 
concern. Doubts about the impartiality of British representatives in Poland eventually 
surfaced in Parliament but were refuted by insinuations that Jews were prone to 
Bolshevism.149 
Public pressure in America led the U.S. government to send a three-man team, headed 
by Henry Morganthau, to investigate anti-Semitic disorders.150 Ostensibly, requested 
by Paderewski, the idea probably emanated from Herbert Hoover and Hugh Gibson.151 
The move outflanked Jewish leaders. Wolf felt that ‘as Paderewski has challenged an 
enquiry we could not well refuse our assent to it.’152 Louis Marshall, President of the 
American Jewish Committee, had ‘advocated such an investigation’ since the Lemberg 
pogrom.153 However, he and Wolf foresaw considerable pitfalls. As a result of placing 
a Jew at the head of a very large and visible commission, American Jewish protests 
subsided.154 However, the pro-Polish attitude of the remaining two members was also 
to have a crucial effect on the findings. The mission departed for Poland in mid-July. 
The British government was refused permission to send a British representative.155  
In July Parliamentary pressure increased and accounts of Polish violence gained 
credence in the press. This did not dent an overwhelming sense of optimism regarding 
the new state of Poland, which was now guaranteed by Article 93 of the Peace Treaty. 
A Times editorial pointed out that if the Poles treated their minorities (by which they 
meant Jews) ‘loyally’ they would be ‘able to resist…outside influences’; it also called 	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on Polish minorities ‘to be loyal subjects of the new Polish State and to identify 
themselves with this new and proud nationality.’156 Jews, in other words, were called 
on to lose their distinctiveness. British officials continued to express their disquiet. A 
telegram to Balfour stated ‘[t]here is still a strong feeling in the country and Parliament 
about the treatment of Jews in Poland. One cause seems to be complete inefficiency 
and corruption of [the] Polish police.’157 These concerns combined with frustration at 
the unreliability of information from Poland, public displays of dissatisfaction by the 
Anglo-Jewish community and fear that ‘outside influences’ would jeopardize the 
Polish state, prompted the Foreign Office to action. They decided to send a mission of 
their own. 
On 9 August Wyndham was notified of the government’s intention. He reported that 
the proposal ‘met with the strongest opposition’158 from Paderewski and was only 
eventually granted ‘with great reluctance.’159 Eyre Crowe had ‘always been against 
these missions’160 later confirming his views to Curzon. He reinforced his opinion by 
quoting Hoover who not only believed the pogroms were ‘immensely exaggerated’, but 
that Jews were guilty of ‘profiteering to the limit of their opportunities’. He also 
‘expressed surprise at the restraint and moderation displayed by the Polish troops’ who 
were protecting Jews from ‘the infuriated Christian population.’161 Significantly, there 
was high-level liaison between American and British diplomats. The similarities 
between the ways in which both missions were construed and presented their findings 
suggest they were not entirely independent of each other. The Times announced on 23 
August that the mission was to be headed by Sir Stuart Samuel. The Morning Post saw 
the mission as part of a ‘great conspiracy against Poland’162 and launched a personal 
attack on Samuel. What escaped the notice of critics was the appointment by Duncan 
Gregory at the Foreign Office of Captain Peter Wright as Assistant Commissioner.163 
Wright was an associate of Dmowski.164 Another important appointment was Sir 	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Horace Rumbold on 3 September as Britain’s First Minister to Poland who had  ‘been 
the Foreign Office’s link with the Polish nationalists’ whilst stationed at Bern.165 
Rumbold, Wright and Gregory were to have a significant effect on the outcome.  
Samuel was instructed by Curzon to inquire into the pogroms, the attitude of the Polish 
authorities, the general condition of Jews and to assess means of ‘reconciliation’ 
between ‘Christian[s]’ and Jews.166 He was told not to ‘represent the mission as an 
interference in the domestic concerns of the Polish State.’167 Samuel was concerned 
that the timing in the immediate wake of the American mission ‘may lead to 
complications.’168 The Foreign Office refused to provide Samuel with a secretary and 
Polish displeasure led to some practical problems. The Polish press accused him of pro-
Germanism and of representing Jewish finance and nationalism.169 From the moment 
the mission was announced in July 1919 to the report’s publication twelve months later 
the British government continued to prevaricate in Parliament using the mission as a 
smokescreen for inactivity.170 
The Morgenthau Commission returned to Paris in late September 1919. They were 
divided in their views. Morgenthau was keen to play down divisions between Poles and 
Jews. He tried unsuccessfully to compromise with his fellow commissioners leaving 
himself open to criticism from two sides. The Jewish Chronicle denounced him for 
blaming the violence on Polish Jews.171 Fellow commissioners, Homer Johnson and 
Brigadier General Edgar Jadwin, refused to sign Morgenthau’s report and in their 
‘supplement’ exonerated the Poles and impugned the Jews.172 Marshall wrote to 
William Phillips, the Assistant Secretary of State that ‘[t]he entire document is redolent 
of the stock arguments in which anti-Semites have indulged for centuries.’173 The 
report stood.  Sir Stuart Samuel was to encounter similar problems.  
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The beginning of 1920 saw little respite in the daily intimidation and violence suffered 
by Polish Jews.174 Anti-Jewish bias was increasingly evident in the press and 
periodicals. The British Catholic press also aligned itself with Polish anti-Semitism.175 
Although a small number of MPs sporadically raised Poland in Parliament,176 Lewis 
Namier became steadily more isolated in his attempts to advocate stronger support for 
Polish Jews. On one folder entitled ‘Alleged Polish outrages in White Russia’ Sir Percy 
Lorraine had scribbled ‘this is the sort of thing that Mr. Namier buttons on. No action 
required’.177 Rumbold added ‘Let us hope he enjoys his fodder.’178 The growth of 
British anti-Semitism and Samuel’s high profile role in the mission meant concern over 
anti-Semitism in Poland abated.  
In April Polish-Soviet antagonisms became full-scale military conflict. The advent of 
war meant anything other than advocacy of Poland, largely portrayed as the Western 
bastion against marauding Bolsheviks, became increasingly untenable. Poland 
benefitted from its status in the British imagination as a ‘small nation’. The Prime 
Minister stated to Parliamentary acclaim that the Poles were surrounded by ‘enemies’ 
and ‘hatreds’, that they were a ‘gifted’ race but found themselves facing ‘catastrophe’ 
before they had reached maturity.179 Although the commission returned in December 
the government delayed publication of its findings. In May Harmsworth announced 
Parliament would not see the report until the League of Nations had because the 
investigation of the Jewish position in Poland lay strictly within the province of the 
League as custodians of the minority clauses of the Treaty. This ignored the 
government’s role in instigating and paying for the mission. At this stage the report 
consisted of two submissions. Samuel wrote one, Wright, the other. They differed 
vastly in tone and structure. Samuel’s report is notable for its restraint, Wright’s for its 
patent anti-Semitism. 
A letter dated 8 May from Gregory to Rumbold is revealing both in terms of 
government tactics and the ideology behind them. Gregory believed ‘the mission ought 	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never to have gone’ and lamented ‘[i]t was started when I was away last year and was a 
‘fait accompli’ when I got back.’180 The momentum of the previous summer, which 
partly underpinned the decision to send the mission, had dwindled. The Foreign Office 
was left with a potential embarrassment at variance to its support for the Polish 
government. By implication a damage limitation exercise was needed. Gregory 
therefore asked Rumbold to supply a ‘mollifying coverer’.181 Wright was increasingly 
considered an expert regarding ‘outrages on Jews’182 and Gregory therefore stated 
‘Wright has even gone so far as to sketch out the sort of lines we expected or hoped 
your despatch would follow.’183 Importantly, in view of the contrasting reports, 
Wright’s views were given precedence. Gregory then alluded to the delay in 
publication. ‘After prolonged discussion we decided that Parliamentary pressure 
requires immediate publication. Then all of a sudden I thought of the League of 
Nations trick – and this has so far succeeded.’184 Nevertheless, he continued, 
‘Harmsworth does not think…that we are entirely safe, as, even when the League of 
Nations have pronounced…the thing may not be completely dead.’185 He concluded  
there is everything…to be said against publication…But I think it is only a 
small fraction in the House which would really press us to publish. This would 
be a hopelessly inopportune moment and would be sheer Bolshevik 
propaganda.186 
This reflected the heightened sensibilities wrought by the war. Moreover, it showed 
that at this point British Jews, no matter how respectable, were susceptible to anti-
Semitic slurs. The file containing Gregory’s letter had been seen and either tacitly or 
explicitly approved by Foreign Secretary Curzon. Meticulous attention to detail meant 
it was now safe for Lloyd George to announce that the report would be made available 
after all.187 The report was published on 3 July 1920.  
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In its published form Samuel’s account was sandwiched between Rumbold’s letter and 
Wright’s report. It was a commentary on the violence and day-to-day trials faced by 
Polish Jews based on witness statements. He outlined the effects of the economic 
boycott, the pernicious role of the National Democratic Party and the xenophobia of the 
Polish Press. Samuel drew a distinction between the interpretation of the word 
‘pogrom’ in Britain, where it was associated with state-sponsored or state-sanctioned 
terror, and on the continent where the authorities were not necessarily culpable. 
Crucially, he concluded that the occurrences at Lemberg, Lida and Vilna ‘come under 
the head of pogroms in the sense generally understood in England.’ He estimated the 
total number of deaths as not ‘less than 348’ but underlined the widespread and regular 
low-level intimidation and violence to which Jews were subject and in which the larger 
manifestations had their roots. He believed the Polish government would exert a 
‘sobering influence’ over Poles and that ‘Jews must have patience in order to give time 
for this to become effective.’188 In this sense his report was balanced, something that 
could not be said for Wright’s. 
Whilst using dispassionate language, Wright’s commentary was conspicuous for its 
prejudice. Most of his report was geared towards providing ‘context’ for the troubles 
rather than focusing on the violence. For him, Judaism was ‘primitive’ and ‘not 
civilised in our sense of the word’ therefore Jews were educated but in ‘what was not 
worth knowing’. Jewish practices were portrayed as an attack on reason. He claimed 
Jews were complicit in German efforts to ‘to squeeze and drain Poland.’ Jewish 
support for so-called German methods meant Polish violence was typified as reprisals. 
Bolshevism in Poland was ‘almost purely a Jewish movement’ and their espousal of 
this ideology was driven by ‘big profits.’ Poverty-stricken Jews were therefore 
‘capitalists’ with a tendency to exploit local peasants and the Polish peasant soldier was 
merely taking what ‘the Jew has so long extracted from him.’ It was an even contest in 
which ‘[t]he Jew claims a right to all the profits, and the Poles to kick the Jew 
whenever he feels the inclination.’ Charges of ritual murder were characterised as a 
myth which had its root in Jewish difference, but he contradicted this by citing a case 
in Lida where ‘a Polish soldier was murdered by a Jew, and with those horrible 
mutilations practised by Jewish Chassidim murderers and which is one of the main 	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ways in which they do not seem to be European.’ When it came to the number of 
Jewish casualties Wright was ‘more astonished at their smallness than their greatness.’ 
That the Jews ‘have been an oppressed and persecuted people’, he stated, ‘has every 
merit as a theory except that of being true.’189 
Wright consistently used an English framework to clarify his points. Soldiers were ‘the 
Polish Tommy’, and beard cutting was ‘mere rough fun.’ His portrayal of Lemberg, the 
site of the first major pogrom, was designed to appeal to British xenophobia. It was 
equated with an imaginary version of Birmingham. Here, he postulated, Jews would 
predominate numerically, all the ‘printed inscriptions’ would be in Hebrew, with shops 
and factories Jewish owned. These Jews would be different from Englishmen not only 
in their dress and the cut of their hair but when speaking to each other they would not 
only use ‘a foreign tongue, but that foreign tongue itself [would be] the language of an 
enemy.’ For Wright Polish Jews were nationalists and meeting their demands would be 
the equivalent of surrendering a number of seats in Parliament. There would be 
separate Jewish law courts that used ‘Yiddish as well as English in the King’s Bench 
and Chancery Division’ and ‘Bank of England notes [would be] printed in Yiddish as 
well as in English.’ Finally, Wright saw value in the idea that ‘anti-Semitism has been 
the shield of Poland’ and furthermore, that if the government were to tackle the 
problem of popular anti-Semitism it would ‘violate the very first principle of its 
[democratic] constitution’.190 As has been shown Wright provided the draft for 
Rumbold’s covering letter.  
Rumbold used a tone of reasoned diplomacy. He differentiated between eighteen 
murders in ‘Poland proper’ and ‘330’ in ‘war zones’. The absence of established Polish 
authority meant excesses ‘los[t] the character of pogroms’. Polish violence was 
therefore distanced from so-called frightfulness. That Jews comprised a ‘larger 
percentage of the population’ was cited as a mitigating factor in their persecution. 
Jews, he believed ‘devoted themselves exclusively to commerce’ as opposed to Poles 
who were ‘either engaged in war or settled on the land’. In fact, Jews were actively 
prevented from either joining the army or hampered by a widespread economic 
boycott. Jewish association with Germany meant Polish authorities were justified in 	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‘relieving many Jews…of their offices, and not reinstating them.’ Rumbold singled out 
Samuel’s observations for criticism.  Close comparison between his first draft and the 
finished article shows emphasis was carefully and particularly applied. The overall 
impact of the changes reveal a deliberate and calculated choice to isolate Samuel, limit 
leeway for Anglo-Jewish reaction and relativize anti-Jewish violence in Poland.191 His 
‘mollifying coverer’ ended with a rebuke for the Anglo-Jewish community. The 
condition of Polish Jews was ‘far better than in most of the surrounding countries’, 
furthermore, 
the massacres of Jews by Ukrainian peasant bands can find, in their extent and 
thoroughness, no parallel except in the massacres of the Armenians in the 
Turkish Empire… It is giving the Jews very little real assistance to single out as 
is sometimes done, for reprobation and protest, the country where they have 
perhaps suffered least.192 
This passage was misleading. Attempts by Anglo-Jewish leaders to intercede on behalf 
of the persecuted in Russia or Ukraine had been rebuffed. The result gave the 
impression that agitation on behalf of Polish Jews was politically or ideologically 
motivated.  
The majority of the press chose to ignore Samuel’s account. The Daily Mail, Britain’s 
largest selling newspaper, emphasised the ‘Germanised’ nature of Polish Jews.193 The 
Daily Telegraph, Daily Express and Daily News gave prominence to Rumbold’s 
letter.194 The Morning Post was confident that the government paper ‘sufficiently 
disposes of the exaggerated reports’ of anti-Jewish violence by Poles and praised 
Wright’s contribution as ‘one of the most illuminating documents of the subject which 
has yet appeared…which is not only a political statement but a valuable ethnological 
treatise.’195 The Times drew readers attention to Wright’s commentary as ‘a most 
interesting disquisition’ which  
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shows the extraordinary difficulties presented by the existence in Poland of a 
large population which perpetuates in itself an archaic polity, curious customs, 
and as meticulous observance of its religious ordinances as was that of the 
Pharisees 2,000 years ago. It is a foreign body in the very heart of the State, an 
Oriental civilization hitherto racially insoluble, which now under the guidance 
of nationalist leaders seeks to erect itself into a close politico-religious 
corporation with the widest powers while yet remaining in Poland.196 
The Guardian refrained from comment and more or less limited itself to a verbatim 
reproduction of Rumbold’s letter.197 Only the Daily Herald chose to emphasise the 
anti-Jewish nature of the violence.198 
The Board of Deputies decided to take no action with regard to the report. However, 
this was only agreed on the basis that a ‘précis of the history of the appointment of the 
Commission and of the presentation of the two reports be entered on the Minutes.’ It 
was asserted that Wright was appointed ‘without any previous consultation with Sir 
Stuart Samuel’. Additionally, ‘[i]t was afterwards discovered that Captain Wright was 
a personal friend of M. Dmovski, the Polish anti-Semitic leader, and that he had other 
anti-Semitic associations.’  He ‘gave very little assistance’ to Samuel and up to the 
moment of writing ‘there had been no hint of any differences of opinion between the 
Commissioners, nor did Captain Wright propose to discuss any differences with a view 
to arriving at an identic [sic] report.’199  
Why then did the Anglo-Jewish leadership choose not to respond publicly? The answer 
lies in the unprecedented surge of anti-Jewish feeling in Britain.  In July 1920 anti-
Semitism manifested itself in ways previously unimagined. The Samuel report was 
published on 3 July; on 8 July the Dyer debate prompted unparalleled anti-Jewish 
scenes in Parliament and on 12 July the first instalment of the serialised Protocols of 
the Learned Elders of Zion was published in the Morning Post. The Church Times 
criticised the Morning Post for publishing the Protocols. However, it warned of 
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‘Jewish bigotry’ in Eastern Europe and added ‘Russian Hebraism needs watching’.200 
In addition the Board of Deputies was still attempting to refute accusations of Jewish 
complicity in the Tsar’s murder. These originally appeared in the government White 
Paper Russia No.1. In August The Times published a series of articles that amounted to 
a fabrication of Jewish complicity.201 The combined effect of the American and British 
missions to Poland had created a Western consensus on anti-Jewish violence. The 
Anglo-Jewish community were forced onto the defensive. A letter to Lord Rothschild 
from the Chairman of the Press Committee of the Joint Foreign Committee of the 
Board of Deputies of British Jews and the Anglo-Jewish Association, shows Jews in 
Britain saw the violence in Eastern Europe as fundamentally connected with anti-
Jewish agitation in the United Kingdom. He wrote: 
The fate of Eastern Europe depends to such an extent on the sympathy and 
goodwill of the allied nations that no political party in those countries can 
afford to ignore their public opinion, particularly the public opinion of all-
powerful Great Britain. The Anti-Semites are well aware of that. It is precisely 
for this reason that they are strenuously endeavouring to permeate allied public 
opinion with their own spirit, making particular efforts to win the sympathy of 
Great Britain. This is why London is now enjoying the doubtful privilege of 
being made the chief base for the anti-Semitic propaganda in Allied countries. 
These efforts have already been crowned with considerable success. An 
important portion of the British Press is already serving diligently the purposes 
of Anti-Semitism, turning British public opinion in a direction which a little 
time ago would appear unthinkable. In no other Allied country have the Anti-
Semites so far obtained such results.202 
Anglo-Jewish leaders channelled their energy into refuting the propaganda, expressing 
confidence in Britain’s ‘traditional respect for truth and justice’.203 Frustration at the 
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inability to influence opinion led to the Anglo-Jewish community focusing on Eastern 
European relief work.204  
The attitude of Britain to Jewish persecution in Eastern Europe was markedly different 
from wartime German atrocities or the ‘race murder’ of the Armenians. In the case of 
the East European Jews, the qualities that helped the British characterise themselves as 
the benevolent protector of the defenceless were largely cancelled out by a number of 
opposing forces. For a period in the summer of 1919, at a moment that coincided with 
the official creation of Poland, strong pro-Polish forces in Britain felt confident enough 
to give Jewish advocates a hearing. This did not last. In this instance Britain’s 
traditional commitment to a sense of fair play did not take root in the public 
imagination. In Britain, Jews were left with a legacy of mistrust. 
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Chapter Four. 
The Abyssinian Crisis: The Battle for British Foreign Policy  
 
Italy’s invasion of Abyssinia provoked the largest outbreak of peacetime humanitarian 
outrage in Britain since the 1870s Bulgarian agitation. The Abyssinians were unlikely 
recipients of British compassion. Harold MacMillan wrote ‘Abyssinia…was a country 
without any powerful central Government or any advanced civilisation. It was…a wild 
land of tyranny, slavery and tribal war’’.1 Yet the perceived ‘savagery’ of the natives 
became reason to pity them when faced with the modern war machine of Fascist Italy. 
Moreover, their fate, in the British public imagination, was intimately bound to that of 
the League of Nations.  
There was widespread public commitment to the League Covenant. For many it was 
firmly associated with memory of the war. Its premise was that ‘[a]s a remedy for the 
war of some against some there was to be in the last resort a war of all against one. It 
was hoped that this would prevent the war from beginning or, at worst, make it short 
and comparatively bloodless.’2 Failure to implement the Covenant in the 1931 
Manchurian dispute heightened indignation at the treatment of Abyssinians and meant 
many feared for the League’s future.  
Baldwin’s National government wanted to extricate Britain from commitment to the 
Covenant, or more specifically, the parts requiring action. They saw the Abyssinian 
crisis as the means to achieve this. As Duff Cooper wrote with more candour than other 
main protagonists, or indeed subsequent chroniclers, could ever muster, the 
‘opportunity of finally dissolving the ties that bound us to the decaying corpse of the 
League of Nations was unique.’3 Other Britons saw the League as very much alive and 
believed the values enshrined within the Covenant harmonized with a tradition of 
British altruism. 
Portrayals of 1930s Britain tend to show National government politicians as desperate 
to rearm in the face of a stubbornly pacifist public. This is false. Many were 	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‘pacificist’.4 In other words, they wanted peace but understood a League with teeth was 
necessary to defend it in the last resort. Senior government figures wanted to rearm, but 
were not prepared for it to happen under the auspices of a League they distrusted. The 
League of Nations was anathema to Baldwin’s vision of England. According to his 
friend Tom Jones ‘[h]e did not like foreigners of any kind’ and ‘never went to 
Geneva’.5 The Prime Minister was determined rearmament should occur only within a 
‘nation state’ framework. For those in power, the Covenant was, at a moment when 
international affairs preoccupied the British, in danger of becoming realpolitik. As 
Keith Fieling, Chamberlain’s biographer, later admitted ‘Britain’s foreign policy had 
come to depend upon public opinion’.6 Old-fashioned ‘common sense’ foreign policy 
needed to be restored. The government therefore committed to re-educating the public. 
This required moral justification that stretched the bounds of political or moral 
credibility. The course of action was facilitated by leadership frustration with 
democratic principles when faced with Continental dictatorships, which seemed to have 
endless room for manoeuvre.  
The foreign policy difficulties faced by the government in the latter 1930s should not be 
underestimated. However, uncovering the subtle political and ideological machinations 
requires focus on two main factors and their interaction. Firstly, the extent to which the 
inner Cabinet and the Foreign Office colluded to manipulate public opinion to regain 
the ideological initiative. Secondly, the extent to which the public were 
compassionately moved on behalf of a small East African country. The country turned 
outwards. Committing to the League Covenant was seen by a majority as an 
opportunity to fulfil long-held ideals of British compassion abroad. This was linked to 
cherished notions of national character.  
The Abyssinian affair is often seen either as a precursor to the period of high 
appeasement or an issue that diverted British attention away from German 
machinations. This chapter argues it was central to British reactions to parallel or 
subsequent foreign crises. Firstly, politicians and senior officials were as captivated by 
foreign affairs as the British public. Secondly, it disorientated the British public who 	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found themselves questioning the League rather than the government that helped pull it 
down. Thirdly, re-instituting a policy that favoured the protection of the ‘national 
interest’ and the creation of international alliances increased international distrust 
between democracies. This helped fragment the international community at a time 
when a corporate response was most needed. This therefore links the Abyssinian crisis 
with the growing German menace because Britain’s effective withdrawal from the parts 
of the Covenant requiring action left the central framework for foreign relations in the 
interwar period an empty shell. 
International relations during the interwar period were largely governed by the 
Covenant. Legally binding to over fifty countries, it had been devised after the Great 
War to prevent further conflicts.7 Of its twenty-six Articles, Article XVI was crucial. 
This stated, any member who resorted to war in disregard of the Covenant would 
immediately be subject to the ‘severance of all trade and financial relations’. It would 
also be cut off from communicating with ‘the nationals of any other State’.8  Military 
sanctions could be applied along with expulsion from the League. Britain’s 
responsibility to uphold the Covenant had been enhanced by America’s refusal to join.  
During the Manchurian crisis in 1931 and 1932, in which Japan effectively annexed the 
Chinese province, the British government and the majority of the population effectively 
accepted Japanese aggression as a fait accompli. This was partly down to the dreadful 
conditions created by the Great Depression, and partly because pro-Chinese voices 
were decidedly in the minority. As Sir Robert Vansittart, Permanent Under-Secretary at 
the Foreign Office, stated, ‘nobody in Britain thought seriously of sacrificing her sons 
for yellow men. In such matters unavowed racialism prevailed.’9	    Leading politicians 
snubbed American attempts to create international consensus against Japan. Lord 
Lytton was the author of a widely respected report, which concluded that Manchukuo, 
the new name for Manchuria, was ‘indistinguishable from a Japanese protectorate’.10 
By this time any signs of protest had been snuffed out.11 Nevertheless, as it became 	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clear that Japan had every intention of exploiting its gains and in doing so threatened 
British interests in the Far East, discontent grew. In June 1933 Conservative M.P. 
Vyvyan Adams deprecated attempts to ‘identify the words “pacifist” and “conscientious 
objector” and advocated the use of Article XVI against Japan because ‘the young would 
be ready to fight “in a just war”’.12 A growing sense of European threat, Government 
inaction, and evidence that Japan had deliberately flouted the agreed system of 
international security caused momentum to build behind League principles. This found 
manifestation in the 1935 ‘Peace Ballot’ and the Abyssinian Crisis.  
The Japanese took a progressively more belligerent attitude in China. The ‘Open Door’ 
policy in which British interests were protected was perceived to be under threat.13 In 
May, Lytton criticised the government for failing ‘to appreciate the obligations of 
League membership’.14 In particular he condemned as ‘insincere’ the claim that Britain 
had fulfilled its League obligations because of the false implication that ‘the League is 
an entity apart from the States that compose it.’15 This distinction became integral to the 
rhetorical and ideological argument concerning Britain’s League commitment. Lytton 
believed Britain’s traditional role as ‘friends of Japan’, status as ‘principal naval power’ 
and interests in China meant they were ‘better qualified…than any other State’ to take a 
lead. He also condemned the failure to reciprocate America’s advances.16 The defection 
of a recognised authority on international affairs who commanded cross-party respect is 
significant.  
Public opinion responded to ominous European developments by defining its 
commitment to ‘pacificism’ rather than ‘pacifism’. Two events illustrate this. Firstly, 
the Labour Party isolated its pacifist section by recognising in 1934 that force was 
necessary to sustain the Covenant. It pledged, with little dissent, ‘unflinchingly to 
support our Government in all the risks and consequences of fulfilling its duty to take 
part in collective action’.17 Secondly, and more importantly, in late 1934 the influential 	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cross-party League of Nations Union (LNU) that promoted the League in Britain, 
embarked on a national campaign to measure public commitment to ‘collective 
security’.18 Despite cross-party support, the refusal of the Conservative and Unionist 
Associations to help facilitate the vote reflected muted disapproval from senior party 
figures.19 The Ballot appealed to the popular imagination with over 11 million people 
voting. It constituted a shot across the bows of a government determined to sideline the 
League. News of the impending crisis in Ethiopia was received in this context.  
Senior government ministers were aware of an Italian threat to Abyssinia long before it 
became public knowledge.20 On 13 September 1934 Foreign Secretary, Sir John Simon 
privately signalled his concern over Italian troop movements in East Africa, especially 
near ‘the important wells at Walwal and Wardair’.21 A minority familiar with the terrain 
knew Italy had significantly encroached on Abyssinian territory.22 Furthermore, the 
government believed the French viewed Italian colonial ambition sympathetically. On 
24 September Simon pointed out to Sir George Clerk, the British Ambassador in Paris, 
that Italy could depend on a French ‘attitude of benevolent neutrality.’23 Events became 
so ominous that diplomat Geoffrey Thompson, recalled Simon saying in January 1935 
‘[y]ou realise, don’t you, that the Italians intend to take Abyssinia?’24  
On 5 December 1934 a ‘serious encounter’25 took place between Italian and Abyssinian 
troops leaving 107 Abyssinians dead. Italian losses were never quantified. Ethiopian 
casualties were sizeable because the Italians, clearly prepared for action, were 
‘supported by aeroplanes and tanks’.26 Not long afterwards, at the Stresa Conference in 
April 1935, Britain was negotiating with France and Italy to reaffirm the Locarno 
Treaty and create a ‘front’ to counter German air force expansion. British 
representatives failed to challenge Italian expansionism. Conservative MP Leopold 	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Amery commented that their ‘silence’ was ‘incomprehensible and inexcusable.’27 
Although the Abyssinian question was not on the agenda, Thompson met his Italian 
counterparts and in a frank exchange was informed bluntly that they ‘could not exclude 
the possibility of force’.28 The government did nothing through the collective apparatus 
of the League to dissuade them. In fact, the instructions from London to Sir Sidney 
Barton, the British representative in Addis Ababa, was to guard against giving the 
‘impression’ that the Emperor, Haile Selassie, could rely on Britain’s support against 
Italy ‘and/or’ the French.29 The Times supported the government.  
The Times’s role was significant in the upcoming crisis. Initially, the editor, Geoffrey 
Dawson, a close ally of the National government, took a pro-Italian stance.30 A report 
of the Walwal incident on 17 December portrayed the Italians as heroically opposing 
Abyssinian ‘aggressors’. After the initial fracas the Ethiopian government asked that 
the incident ‘be referred to arbitration under Article V of the Italo-Abyssinian Treaty of 
1928.’ Instead the Italians demanded a public apology from the Harrar Governor who 
was also to salute the Italian flag, the guilty were to be ‘punished’ and ‘indemnities paid 
for the dead and wounded.’31 The Times praised Mussolini for his ‘conciliatory spirit’.32 
Abyssinians were portrayed as ‘slave-hunters’, prone to committing atrocities.33 
Attempting to placate public concern over impending Italian aggression, The Times 
suggested it was ‘too soon to assume’ that Italian action was ‘more than precautionary 
and defensive.’34 Italy was only ‘defending her own rights and national dignity’ and 
represented ‘ordered and productive civilization against a sterile and anarchical regime 
that tyrannizes over enslaved peoples’.35 It set the tone for many themes later used by 
pro-Italians in Britain.  
In June 1935 two events shaped British responses to the Abyssinian crisis. Firstly, a 
change of Prime Minister and secondly, declaration of the Peace Ballot results. On 7 	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June Baldwin swapped places with Ramsey MacDonald. Most saw this as a seamless 
change.36 However, in the realm of foreign affairs generally and Abyssinia particularly 
there was a significant difference in ideological emphasis. Despite personal suspicions 
of the League, MacDonald had seen the Covenant as a method of gaining a ‘new 
mentality of peace’.37 For him, ‘alliances and war’ were something he would always 
prevent.38 Cabinet colleagues blamed him for a perceived dearth in Britain’s defensive 
capability but the Socialist Prime Minister was not averse to the notion of collective 
security.39 According to David Marquand, MacDonald could only ‘question his [foreign 
policy] assumptions, not abandon them altogether.’40 Whilst publicly endorsing its 
continuance, Baldwin’s accession signaled a decisive break with Britain’s League 
commitment.  
Baldwin saw America’s lack of involvement as fatal to the successful implementation 
of the Covenant.41 It is no coincidence that an embryonic form of the Hoare-Laval 
agreement, which advocated transferring vast areas of Abyssinia to Italy, surfaced after 
the change of government. Thompson accompanied Eden and William Strang, head of 
the Foreign Office’s League of Nations Section, to Rome to offer Mussolini a 
‘‘rectification’ in Italy’s favour of the undelineated border between Ethiopia and Italian 
Somaliland’ which included ‘a sort of Danzig corridor’ later ridiculed in the Times as a 
‘corridor for camels’.42 Mussolini rejected it.  
There was anxiety on opposition benches that government ministers were cutting a deal 
with Mussolini at Abyssinia’s expense. Labour leader, George Lansbury sought 
clarification but was castigated in The Times for raising the issue in a ‘public 
assembly’, as ‘[t]he only result of Mr. Lansbury’s representations might well be a 
return to the methods of secrecy which he and his party have so frequently 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Eden, Anthony, The Eden Memoirs: Facing the Dictators (London: Cassell, 1962) p.216; Mowat, 
Between the Wars. p.479. 
37 Cited in Robbins, Keith, ‘Labour Foreign Policy and the League of Nations’ in Robbins, Keith, 
Politicians, Diplomacy and War in Modern British History (London: The Hambledon Press, 1994) 
p.268. 
38 Cited in ibid. 
39 Fieling, Chamberlain, p.249. 
40 Marquand, David, Ramsey MacDonald (London: Jonathan Cape, 1977) p.757. 
41 See, for example, speech to Conservatives in Glasgow on 22 November 1934. Toynbee, Arnold J., 
Survey of International Affairs 1935: Volume II: Abyssinia and Italy (London: Oxford University Press, 
1936) p.50. 
42 Thompson, Front-Line Diplomat, p.103. 
	   137	  
condemned.43 This was both disingenuous and arrogant. It was the government who 
were being secretive. Yet advocating more open government was portrayed as 
justification for increasing secrecy. The most positive criticism of this attitude is that it 
was paternalistic. Viewed less sympathetically, it suggested subversion of the 
democratic process.44 
The ‘Peace Ballot’ results were announced on 27 June by the LNU.45 For Baldwin, this 
was an event of major political significance and one that forced him to change his mind 
in public, but not in private, about collective security until the following April when he 
reverted to his familiar anti-League mantra. On 23 July, the Prime Minister told a 
deputation from the LNU that he viewed the result as a ‘national declaration’. 
Moreover, he asserted ‘that the League of Nations remains…the sheet-anchor of British 
policy.’46 Baldwin’s public change is understandable if the notion of Baldwin’s desire 
to rearm in the face of an unwilling public is taken at face value.47 However, it was not 
that British people were unwilling to rearm. In the words of Baldwin’s ‘favourite’48 
newspaper the Birmingham Post, a clear majority ‘still believe[d] in a need to resort to 
arms, in the last event, to prevent or defeat aggression.’49 Churchill concurred that the 
British people were ‘willing, and indeed resolved, to go to war in a righteous cause’ 
under the auspices of the League.50 For Baldwin and his government, the Abyssinian 
crisis was not about Abyssinia or Italy, it was an ideological battle over the terms on 	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which Britain should be prepared to rearm. This ideological battle has remained hidden 
beneath the 1930s rhetoric concerning the ‘Peace Ballot’ and ‘pacifism’ in general.51  
The Prime Minister already had a mandate to rearm but he could not agree with its non-
nationalistic premise. Therefore it was decided to wrest the internationalist initiative 
from League supporters and ‘re-educate’ an overwhelmingly pro-Covenant public 
genuinely moved by Italian aggression and African suffering. 
A memorandum dated 25 July 1935 from the influential Head of the Civil Service, 
Warren Fisher provides an indication of the rationale behind government thinking.52 
The sole addressees were Baldwin and Chancellor of the Exchequer, Neville 
Chamberlain. Fisher suggested, if Britain’s aim in the crisis was ‘championship’ of the 
League then it was guilty of ignoring policy precedent because ‘England [did] not 
intervene by force on behalf of China when Japan seized Manchuria.’53 The League, he 
suggested, was not and never could be ‘an effective instrument for world peace.’ 
Specifically, he believed ‘[w]hatever happens about Abyssinia, there is bound to be a 
further setback for the League,’ but crucially added this did not mean desisting ‘from 
affirming and re-affirming the principles which it represents.’54 Fisher provided a 
‘moral’ justification for positive-sounding pronouncements on League principles by 
senior government figures whilst allowing the facility to deny the practical measures 
that its originators, and moreover the British public, saw as essential. In an echo of 
Bonar Law in 1922 that would not have been lost on Baldwin, Fisher suggested it could 
not become ‘the effective conscience and policeman of the world’. Its role should 
instead be ‘as a world rostrum which can be used for the assertion of moral principles in 
the international sphere’.55 Chamberlain wrote in his diary that same day, if the League 
was ineffectual in stopping the war ‘it would be practically impossible to maintain the 
fiction that its existence was justified at all.’56 All subsequent pronouncements by 
senior figures in the National government only make sense in the light of this 
ideological stance. It was adopted as unofficial policy. 	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Abyssinia increasingly preoccupied the public. On 7 August 1935 Lord Robert Cecil, 
Vice-President of the LNU wrote to The Times asking for clarification of government 
policy. An editorial attempted to brush it aside as ‘untimely’.57 The Times was sensitive 
because government secrecy left the impression of policy drift. This created a political 
vacuum, which was filled with increasing indignation. A letter from Lord Oliver to The 
Times provides an indication of the way opinion was moving. He condemned claims 
that Italy would be a civilizing force in Ethiopia and reflected widespread British fears 
of aerial warfare, transposing this onto the Ethiopian arena. The Abyssinians were 
recreated as potential victims because ‘as the Abyssinians wear no shoes, the soles of 
their feet will be burnt away by thermite diffused from the air…so they will not be able 
to fight.’58 He believed Britain should not renege on their ‘promise in treaty or 
covenant’ which was bound to ‘our honour as a nation and our humanity as a civilised 
people’. Oliver drew attention to the potential ‘fate of the League’ and thought that the 
danger of ‘bloodshed’ spreading to Europe should be no barrier for Britons to be 
‘unconcerned’ about ‘the assured butchery and subjugation of Abyssinia.’59 
Others endorsed Oliver.60 Lord Noel Buxton, a veteran of pro-Armenian campaigns, 
also attacked Italian ‘civilizing’ arguments by suggesting that Italian provocation was 
responsible for Ethiopia’s failure to reform by diverting resources to defence.61 
Abyssinia’s apparent connection to Christianity was rediscovered. Abyssinia, according 
to James L. Cox: 
cradles some of the earliest Christian memories…she may be a wild and 
undisciplined people otherwise, but any barbarities she may have committed in 
the past will sink to utter insignificance against the indiscriminate and horrible 
massacre of women and children now being organized.62   
Knowledge of the Abyssinian slave trade was widespread in Britain having been 
accentuated by Right wing Italian supporters, but it was ‘trumped’ by the Christian 
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connection.63 Italy’s ‘aggressive regime’ was consequently seen as a greater threat than 
Germany, whose rearmament was ‘justified’ due to the ‘vindictive peace’ of 
Versailles.64 Germany’s treatment of their Jewish citizens, widely reported in the 
British press, had been in progress for over two years, yet German repudiation of 
Versailles was favourable compared to Italy’s ‘flouting of the Covenant’.65  
Most newspapers printed maps of ‘Abyssinia And Surrounding Territories.’66 Demand 
was so great they had to be reprinted.67 Perceptions of nineteenth century benevolent 
imperialism pervaded humanitarian responses. George N. Barnes looked ‘wistfully to 
the days of Palmerston and of Gladstone’ for someone to rally the population.68 He was 
convinced there was the same sense of justice and fair play now as there was then…the 
mass of our people would respond if it were made a question of right or wrong’.69 The 
nation’s ‘compassionate’ past meant Britain’s stewardship of the Suez Canal made the 
country especially responsible. To allow Italy the ‘convenience’ of using the waterway 
for shipping arms would give them an ‘unspeakable advantage’. Not only did this 
distort the ‘humane purpose of its construction’, but it facilitated ‘those very calamities 
which it is the duty of the League to prevent.’70 The advanced state of Italian 
rearmament meant the ostensibly fair arms embargo on both countries was 
‘incompatible with all canons of British justice.’71 British guarantees to Belgium, which 
sparked involvement in the Great War, were compared unfavourably with the 
government’s seeming vacillation.72 On 18 August Hoare acknowledged to 
Chamberlain that ‘public opinion’ was ‘greatly hardening against Italy.’73 He admitted 	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privately to Sir George Clerk that ‘the people were deeply stirred and…[t]his was the 
opinion not so much of extremists or sentimentalists or fanatical people, but rather the 
general body of opinion [which] regarded the League and the Covenant as an 
instrument of this policy of collective security’.74 
The impending crisis created tension in the Church. On 19 August 1935 Lansbury 
called for a ‘Truce of God’.75 He was supported by Canon H.R.L Sheppard, founder, in 
1936, of the Peace Pledge Union who believed any war was ‘a denial of Christianity’ 
and ‘a crime against humanity.’76 This ‘Christian pacifism’ was a minority view and 
was quickly challenged by the ‘pacificism’ of Cosmo Lang, Archbishop of Canterbury, 
who called for ‘organized action’.77 On 20 August 1935 William Temple, the 
Archbishop of York was more forthright, claiming that to undermine the League 
‘would be sheer wickedness involving indelible disgrace’. Britain had ‘a responsibility 
for leadership’ to ‘make operative the terms of the Covenant’.78 In an address broadcast 
on 1 September he added, if upholding the Covenant ‘involves the use of armed forces, 
we ought to be prepared to use them. There is nothing un-Christian in that.’79 He later 
condemned Christian pacifism as ‘heretical’.80 He was not alone. ‘How long’, asked 
one Guardian correspondent ‘are we to treat aggression, injustice, and cruelty with 
purely spiritual weapons…For how many centuries did Armenia and the Balkans 
endure the foulest oppression and wrong.’81 The use of force was perceived as 
compatible with traditional ‘British’ humanitarianism. Opponents of the League had 
difficulty comprehending the idea that so-called pacifists could favour military 
intervention.82 Most were in favour of strict adherence to the Covenant and prepared to 
countenance both economic and military sanctions.  
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Harold Nicolson’s diary entry for 21 August captures the mood of foreboding. He wrote 
‘[t]he posters of the evening papers bear headlines, ‘‘Ramsey MacDonald says Worst 
crisis since 1914”…Opposition consulted…A general crisis atmosphere.’83 Hoare and 
Eden sought the advice of Lloyd George, Lansbury, ex-Foreign Secretary Sir Austen 
Chamberlain, leader of the Liberal Party, Sir Herbert Samuel and Winston Churchill.84 
All of them counselled, with varying degrees of emphasis, that action should be taken 
within the auspices of the League.85 It is a measure of the impact of the LNU on public 
opinion that Eden’s conversation with Lord Robert Cecil drew the greatest response 
from the Foreign Office. It forced them to confirm, as policy, what had been expressed 
as principle by Fisher. The interview was innocuous enough, with Lord Robert Cecil 
assuring the government of LNU support ‘in any efforts…to carry out the Covenant.’86 
Lord Robert Cecil was keen for the government to ‘declare in unmistakeable terms its 
obligations under the Covenant’.87 Eden countered by suggesting this might embarrass 
Pierre Laval, the French Prime Minister. Lord Robert Cecil was not deterred. He 
suggested a ‘circular dispatch’ including a formal diplomatic commitment to the 
Covenant should be sent to all League members, the United States and Japan ‘without 
mentioning Italy or Abyssinia’.88 He believed this would have ‘an immense effect’ if 
stated ‘with all the force of a first class state proper’.89 Lord Robert Cecil cited previous 
such declarations which had been made ‘long after the attitude of the United States was 
known.’90 Thus he challenged the central argument of Baldwin and senior officials.  
R.J. Campbell of the Foreign Office responded by composing an extraordinary 
document effectively outlining government policy over the following months. Foreign 
Office officials were not in a position to dictate policy but the writer was acting within 
an ideological framework imposed by his political leaders. The imposition of this 
policy, running counter to public opinion, sounded the death knell for the League of 	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Nations and was the root of Hoare’s December resignation. On 22 August the Cabinet 
had decided to make a ‘public declaration of their position’ in Hoare’s maiden speech at 
the League Assembly. Campbell directly countered Lord Robert Cecil’s contention by 
reiterating Baldwin’s view that America’s absence rendered the League ‘conspicuously 
incomplete’, and that obligation to the Covenant would cause war, not prevent it. ‘Far 
from expressing these doubts’ he continued, the government had ‘repeatedly asserted 
their intention of standing by their obligations under the Covenant’ therefore it was 
‘incumbent upon them’ in the case of Abyssinia ‘to show every disposition to give to 
the existing procedure of the League in its present form an honest chance to prove 
itself.’ He therefore proposed Britain ‘stand by their undertaking’ at Geneva but in the 
meantime ‘decide whether they wish at this moment permanently to commit themselves 
for the future to the League and its rules as they now stand. This was deemed 
‘inadvisable’. Public opinion, he contested, was confused because ‘the sanctity of the 
principles has been extended to the methods and still attaches to these after they have 
been vitiated.’ If the public ‘understood’ their error then it was ‘doubtful’ whether 
support for upholding the obligations of the Covenant would hold. There was, he 
continued, ‘a strong case for correcting public misapprehension of the position; for 
separating our obligations under the head of principles from those under the head of 
methods.’ Commitment to the League was deemed responsible for introducing  
into the solution of international questions an element alien to the issue which 
injects an artificial criterion into their treatment and prevents their solution 
strictly on their merits.91 
This undermined the efficacy of the Covenant. The League was no longer to have any 
means of enforcing its precepts. The new toothless body that replaced the League 
would facilitate the restoration of its ‘universal character’ because legal requirements 
would be replaced by a mere moral imperative. Although British popular opinion held 
that adherence to the old treaty system had been responsible for the outbreak of the 
Great War, international relations would return to their pre-war state and the 
government would be free to decide whether under existing treaties the Italian 
government had actually transgressed. 
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Strang believed ‘[w]e ought not to nail our colours to a mast at a moment when the 
mast, under crucial test might come crashing down.’ He advocated expending every 
effort to upholding the League’s principles, but, conspicuously, not the methods. 
However, if that did not work, he advocated Britain ‘withdraw from the League 
altogether’ or ‘remove’ Article 16 and the active part of Article 10 ‘from the 
Covenant’.92 It is significant that the document was ‘[s]een by Mr. Eden.’93 Eden is 
perceived by most historians of the Abyssinian crisis as, perhaps, the most stalwart 
government defender of the League. He offered no word of objection. It is 
inconceivable that Baldwin would not have been aware of the implications of this 
document. Those primarily responsible for upholding British commitment to the 
Covenant, a responsibility exacerbated by Britain’s status as its leading and most 
powerful member, were intent on destroying its precepts. All that was required was that 
inflamed public opinion be re-educated. 
On 24 August Hoare wrote to Sir George Clerk to avail him ‘very confidentially of the 
background of our present position’. He argued that the ‘general feeling of the country’ 
was the ‘determination to stick to the Covenant and of anxiety to keep out of war.’ This 
misrepresented pubic opinion. Like Campbell, he believed such sentiments ‘self-
contradictory’ adding that ‘[a]t present at least the country believes that they can be 
reconciled.’ ‘[I]t is essential’ he asserted ‘that we should play out the League hand in 
September’, because the League must be seen to declare sanctions as impracticable, 
‘not the British Government’. The blame should either be placed on League members 
who ‘will not play their full part’ or non-members whose absence, he believed, made 
the application of sanctions futile. The intention was to deliberately create a set of 
circumstances in which Baldwin’s overall view of the League could be vindicated. In 
other words, a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy that was designed to ensure League 
failure did not reflect badly on the government. No wonder Hoare emphasized to his 
Paris-based ambassador that he should ‘treat this letter as entirely between you and 
me.’94 Hoare was relying on world moral condemnation of Italian action to prevent the 	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invasion. His stereotypical picture of the Italians as a ‘mercurial people’ contributed to 
his view that once they had ‘gained a victory and avenged Adowa’ they would halt their 
military advance.95 By any stretch of the imagination, this could not be called 
realpolitik.96 
Eden was already actively facilitating the right public impression. A memorandum in 
mid-August of a conversation between the League of Nations minister and A.L. 
Kennedy of The Times states Eden was ‘convinced’ of public commitment to the 
Covenant.97 However, knowing the government had no intention of fulfilling its 
obligations, he asked Kennedy if The Times could help ‘convince’ the Italians that it 
was not ‘bluff or selfishness or electioneering’ on the government’s part. This would 
render ‘the Government a great service’.98 The government was indeed attempting to 
bluff the Italians but in doing so they were misleading the British public.99 
Senior officials were preparing for a crucial meeting of the League Assembly in 
Geneva in early September. Vansittart, who would ‘pay almost any price’ to align all 
Europe against Germany and believed the League had been dead since 1925, conducted 
his negotiations with military leaders and Ministers accordingly.100 The Admiralty was 
nervous of military engagements without the assurance of military support from France. 
However, although they pressed for time to prepare it is significant that they never 
mentioned the possibility of defeat by Italian forces.101 At this point Vansittart conjured 
the idea of ‘the risk of a mad dog coup by Mussolini’,102 a phrase that meant a sudden 
Italian attack on Britain or its interests. This theme became well established in 
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Foreign Office or Neville Chamberlain.103 Even more pertinent was an intelligence 
report indicating that an Italian attack on Abyssinia would ‘decrease her potential 
military value in the event of any major European crisis.’104 Safeguarding against 
Italian desertion from the ‘Stresa Front’ became a principle justification for the eventual 
imposition of half-hearted sanctions, yet their Abyssinian deployment clearly 
undermined potential European involvement. 
The Italians rejected versions of the Hoare-Laval plan in August as they had in June. 
Thompson, in Paris with the rest of the negotiating team including Eden, Vansittart, 
Strang and Clerk, later recalled that Vansittart effectively persuaded Eden to mobilize 
the Home Fleet.105 Rather than pursue the matter through the League, Britain took a 
unilateral decision to protect its interests in the Mediterranean. This created a public 
impression that Britain was at last acting like a Great Power by providing leadership to 
other League nations.106 Buoyed by the sudden show of Naval strength the British 
public were enthused by the prospect of the September meeting in Geneva.107 Hoare 
was due to make his maiden speech to the League Assembly at a moment of ‘first class 
international crisis’.108  Vansittart was intrinsically involved in the construction of the 
speech.109 Hoare met Baldwin and Chamberlain on 5 September for a ‘quiet 
discussion’110 and it is inconceivable that the speech was not discussed and probable 
that it was the principle topic of conversation.111 What was less well known, because it 
was deliberately kept secret, was that on the day prior to the speech Hoare had informed 
the Italians through Laval that his speech would display ‘moderation’ on the 
‘Abyssinian question’ but ‘resolution as regards the principles of the League’ thus he 
would ‘go as far as possible in the way of conciliation and would avoid provocation.’112 
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He would not contemplate military sanctions.113 In a communication to his cabinet 
colleagues on the Anglo-French dialogue Hoare admitted he had proposed that ‘the 
word “sanctions” need not be used. He himself had never used it in his speeches.’114 
Hoare’s speech caused a sensation. He pronounced,  
In conformity with its precise and explicit obligations the League stands, and 
my country stands with it, for the collective maintenance of the Covenant in its 
entirety, and particularly for steady and collective resistance to all acts of 
unprovoked aggression. The attitude of the British nation in the last few weeks 
has clearly demonstrated the fact that this is no variable and unreliable 
sentiment, but a principle of international conduct to which they and their 
Government hold with firm, enduring and universal persistence.115 
Reports in Britain emphasized Hoare’s apparent unequivocal support for the Covenant. 
In fact, the speech was, in many ways, a masterstroke of political rhetoric. It was laced 
with caveats and compromises. He implicitly criticized the British people who although 
usually showing ‘a sound instinct upon the big issues’, in this case had ‘clung to their 
ideal’ of collective security and were ‘not prepared to abandon it.’116 He criticized the 
League for ‘lack of universality’ which he suggested created ‘uncertainty’ in garnering 
full international consensus.117 He gave the impression of leadership by suggesting 
Britain would be ‘second to none in their intention to fulfill, within measure of their 
capacity, the obligations which the Covenant lay upon them.’118 Hoare used language 
throughout that implied one thing whilst meaning something entirely different. Its tone 
and structure, the mood of public expectation and the emphasis given by Hoare in a 
subsequent broadcast to Britain from Geneva showed domestic opinion was convinced 
of a ringing endorsement of League principles and crucially, the methods laid down in 
the Covenant.119 Hoare later admitted the speech was a bluff.120 Mussolini was not 
taken in, but the British public was.121  
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The ‘British’ tone of the speech was lauded by The Times, Manchester Guardian and 
News Chronicle. It was a ‘note of quiet firmness in the face of the threatened crisis’,122 
‘without rhetoric’123 and its tenor was one of ‘studied moderation’.124 The Times and 
Daily Telegraph hailed the speech as ‘momentous’.125 The Manchester Guardian had 
until this point been a fierce critic of government ‘drift’ but now confidently stated 
there would be ‘[n]o foreign master, then, for Abyssinia, and no conquistador, under the 
Covenant’.126 The Labour-owned Daily Herald and the anti-government News 
Chronicle both carried front-page banner headlines suggesting Britain was now 
providing a lead to the world and would countenance military action under the auspices 
of the Covenant.127 The Star suggested ‘[n]ever, even in the great days of Palmerston, 
had the voice of England been heard in the councils of Europe to finer effect than it was 
at Geneva’.128 Periodicals and regional papers carried the same message. The 
Nottingham Guardian saw it as a refutation of the ‘old system of alliances’.129 One 
correspondent to The Times captured the extent to which national identity and memory 
of the Great War was intertwined with the ideals of justice enshrined in the Covenant. 
This was: 
a second chance to uphold that principle of right which in 1914 our peoples 
believed themselves to be defending…A chance to administer defeat to this 
philosophy of violence, and register a victory for the principles and ideals which 
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the Covenant enshrines. On this issue one surely hears “the trumpets sounding 
from the other side.”130  
Most responses were framed with perceptions of national identity, drawing on a long-
standing tradition of honourable behaviour rooted in perceived national characteristics. 
Senior members of the National government became associated with this. Whereas 
before the speech Eden was the only one credited with these values, ‘[n]ow the Foreign 
Secretary [had] taken his stand beside his younger colleague; and behind both is that 
most typical of Englishmen, Mr. Baldwin.’131 
Political opponents heaped praise on the government. Labour leadership contender 
Herbert Morrison, declared the speech had the ‘overwhelming support’ of public 
opinion.132 Lloyd George was ‘confident that the country…without distinction of party’ 
would support the government in any step to ‘implement the Covenant’.133 Churchill, 
who until very recently had been at odds with the government over the India Bill, was 
‘stirred’ by the speech.134 Hoare wrote afterwards that he was ‘amazed’ at the 
reaction.135 He had underestimated public enthusiasm for the League and the lengths to 
which most countenanced firm resistance to Italian aggression. However, if it caught 
him by surprise, he did nothing to disavow the impression he had given. In fact senior 
government members seized on its reception and incorporated Hoare’s apparent 
proclamation of loyalty to the League as its central election message.136 
Newly found ‘loyalty’ to the League made some right wing colleagues uneasy. Leo 
Amery expressed misgivings to Hoare who told him it had been ‘too late to change the 
policy when he took office’ adding ‘we might get out by the failure of others to support 
us’.137 A few days later he described Chamberlain’s attitude as ‘like Sam’s’ and added 
‘there was no question of going beyond the mildest of economic sanctions…If things 
became too serious the French would run out first, and we could show that we had done 
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our best.’138 Fear of French betrayal had dogged senior government figures and many 
on the Right since the Chanak crisis. Middlemas and Barnes suggest Baldwin 
‘remembered the Chanak incident vividly’ and reminded the Cabinet that the League 
was not trustworthy. ‘We must be careful’ he stated ‘not to be drawn into a quarrel with 
France as well as Italy, as a result of what is happening at Geneva.’139 Austen 
Chamberlain was similarly concerned that if the government assented to sanctions 
under public pressure that ‘Chanak…would be repeated’.140  Lord Rothermere, 
proprietor of the Daily Mail, and vociferous supporter of Mussolini, boasted to 
Beaverbrook, proprietor of the Daily Express, that a ballot organized by the Mail was 
overwhelmingly anti-League. Beaverbrook’s reply was telling. He stated: ‘Ah, people 
you’ve trained to be Rothermereites…The people aren’t with you this time. Over 
Chanak when you pushed Ll.G. in 1922 they were with you. This time you haven’t a 
doggone man with you.’141 Right wing writer Douglas Jerrold frustrated by the failure 
of the Hoare-Laval plan and pro-Abyssinian public opinion stated ‘[i]t was left, as it 
had been left in the Chanak crisis of 1921 [sic], to the heads of the fighting services and 
the right wing of the conservative party to fight the battle of sanity.’142 Those on the 
right recognised that British opinion had changed since 1922. It was no longer inward 
looking. The public imagination had been captured by events abroad and believed that 
within the League Britain could now be the ‘policeman of the world’.143 
The Italians invaded Abyssinia on 3 October, accompanied by widespread British 
indignation.144 It is significant for demonstrating both the strength of public outrage and 
the extent that establishment figures wished to control it that the day before the widely 
anticipated invasion, the Times printed an apology to its readers. The number of letters 
was, it wrote ‘so great that it is impossible to find room for more than a very small 
proportion of them.’145 The LNU declared ‘the whole force of the League should be 
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used to stop the war.’146 Leaders representing mainstream Christianity in Britain 
condemned Italy’s ‘act of aggression’ and set out their belief that the Covenant was ‘a 
practical application of the principles of Christianity.’147 Moral and spiritual leaders 
ranged themselves against aggression and gave the Covenant divinely ordained status. 
Widespread distaste of war increased sympathy for the Abyssinians because they were 
perceived as defenceless. Archibald Murray wrote ‘it is almost unbearable to those who 
know what war means under modern conditions to think of the battlefields of Abyssinia 
and to visualize wounded without any medical services.’148 Indignation was transferred 
into practise. A national appeal was launched for the British Ambulance Service in 
Ethiopia by Lang, Lansbury, Lord Lothian, Lord Lugard and supported by the 
Archbishop of Westminster. On 11 October the executive Committee of the National 
Railwaymen’s Union instructed its members to refuse to transport any war supplies for 
Italy.’149 On 14 October ‘[t]hree hundred representatives of hotel and catering trades 
demonstrated in London…against the employment of Italian labour in hotels and 
restaurants in the city.’150  
After an ad hoc meeting at the Brighton Labour Party conference the National Council 
of Labour passed a resolution, which ‘deeply deplored’ war in Abyssinia and expressed 
‘abhorrence’ at the Italian initiation of hostilities.151 Reports of the Conservative Party 
conference, running concurrently, show a conspicuous absence of comment on the 
situation. Baldwin merely referred to ‘grave reports…regarding the movement of troops 
and aircraft’ in Abyssinia.152 The Prime Minister was aware of discontent in the 
Conservative party concerning the leadership’s apparent enthusiasm for the League.153 
It was important not to show division in the party before the exigencies of a general 
election forced dissidents to toe the leadership line.154 A mass meeting held at the 
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Albert Hall on 30 October by the LNU and attended by senior representatives of all 
parties gave the impression of cross-party pro-League consensus.155  
In the light of evidence showing that unofficial policy was to leave the League or 
render it impotent, Eden’s speech on 5 October is instructive. He stated to his 
constituents in the Warwick and Leamington Division, that ‘[t]he real issue is whether 
or not the League of Nations can prove itself an effective instrument in this dispute and 
whether its members are prepared to respect and uphold the Covenant…[t]he present 
dispute is a test case.’156 He was setting the League up for a fall. The phrase ‘test case’ 
was regularly employed over the next few months.157 The Times also sought to prepare 
informed opinion for the inevitable, arguing that if League members were:  
prepared to tolerate inactively a concrete and unequivocal act of unprovoked 
aggression, then the Covenant and the Pact of Paris are dead. If they are dead, 
the world specifically abandons its greatest effort for the restraint of 
war…British opinion has a firm grasp of this truth.158 
Although The Times argued that the public were ‘neither alarmist nor alarmed’ at the 
prospect of League failure, the majority of the correspondence to The Times that they 
had decided to publish, suggested otherwise. In October Hoare made a speech in the 
Commons, which, whilst not advocating any change in policy to that pronounced at 
Geneva, was decidedly different in tone and emphasis. He suggested that the ‘breathing 
space’ before sanctions were applied should be used to ‘attempt…a settlement’. Italy 
was still, after all, a ‘fellow member’ of the League as well as an ‘old friend, and 
former ally.’159 He emphasized his pro-Italian credentials by reminding the House that 
he was ‘the first public man…outside Italy who admitted the Italian case for expansion 
and economic development.’ Eden concurred adding ‘[t]here is no question of a bargain 
in some unknown way.’160 These arguments, made on 22 October, were lost on MPs 
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and the public who were more concerned that an election date of 14 November was to 
be announced the following day.  
During the election campaign all main parties advocated commitment to the Covenant. 
As Mowat points out, not only was foreign policy the ‘chief concern’ during the 
election but ‘Baldwin’s campaign left the Liberals and Labour party at a disadvantage. 
He had stolen their clothes, and they could only protest that he would never wear 
them.’161 The National government won by a landslide. Baldwin’s personal appeal was 
a significant factor and was summed up by the Daily Telegraph who wrote ‘the average 
Englishman is satisfied that Stanley Baldwin is John Bull’s principal alias.’162 Toynbee 
confirmed that for many Britons ‘who differed from him in politics, Mr. Baldwin had 
hitherto typified the English character as it pleased the English to picture it to 
themselves: the character of a man who might not be a genius, but who was 
unmistakably free from guile.’163 This cherished image was about to be destroyed. 
In line with the government’s professed ‘double line’ policy of commitment to the 
League and attempt to reach a negotiated settlement, Maurice Peterson, head of the 
Foreign Office Abyssinian Department, arrived in Paris on 21 November to complete 
negotiations, which had effectively started in June.164 Hoare and Laval had previously 
agreed ‘that until the British General Election had taken place…neither the original 
Paris plan nor the consequent British amendments should be disclosed to the League 
Council.’165 Negotiations were reaching a crucial stage. The Committee of Eighteen, 
which was coordinating the imposition of sanctions was due to meet on 29 November 
‘with the aim of putting into practice Proposal No. 4 A’. This related to the extension of 
existing embargos on exports to Italy, already agreed in principle, including oil. Its 
imposition would have effectively ended the Italian advance.166 The British and French 
colluded to postpone the meeting to ‘a date not earlier than the 11th December.’167 
Hoare, encouraged by Vansittart and Eden, went to Paris to finalize negotiations on 7 	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December.168 The news that Hoare had agreed with Laval for Italy to annex virtually all 
Abyssinian territory that had so far been occupied by force, in contravention of the 
Covenant, broke over the following week, although, not before the Cabinet had agreed 
its content and put pressure on the Abyssinian government to accept the terms. They 
were faced with an unprecedented outburst of public indignation. 
Newly elected M.P.s and newspaper editors were deluged with expressions of 
protest.169 Before looking at these, the role of The Times deserves a mention. It had, up 
until Hoare’s Parisian faux pas, been a staunch supporter of the government line. The 
nature of its coverage suggests Dawson was kept well informed on policy decisions and 
agreed with the underlying motives. For reasons, which remain unclear, Dawson 
decided to desert the government at this crucial moment.170 His sudden about turn, 
though short-lived, especially the editorial ‘A Corridor for Camels’ galvanized 
widespread resentment over the treatment of Abyssinians.171  
Letters sent to national newspapers and to Conservative M.P., Vyvyan Adams reveal 
public indignation can be broadly divided into three themes. Firstly, dismay that the 
principles of democracy had been betrayed. Promises made during the election 
campaign regarding the League constituting the foundation of foreign policy, especially 
by Baldwin, had been false. One correspondent could not believe that Baldwin ‘of all 
men’ should endorse ‘proposals which are a deliberate betrayal of Abyssinia, the 
League and the honour of our own country.’ He added that if such proposals had been 
made ‘immediately before the General Election instead of after it, he would have been 
swept (politically) out of existence.’172 In fact, Baldwin and others, emphasizing a 
powerless version of the League to which they could be committed had maintained a 	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form of inner logic. This had been hidden from the electorate. The National government 
manifesto had stated ‘[o]ur attitude to the League is dictated by the conviction that 
collective security by collective action can alone save us from a return to the old system 
which resulted in the Great War.’173 The government had been caught out attempting to 
manipulate an issue that was central to the memory of the last war. The ‘old system’ 
was precisely what they were trying to recreate. New M.P.s, dismayed by, what was for 
them, unprecedented levels of public protest required a sacrifice. This was to be Hoare. 
Secondly, many felt personal shame over Britain’s ‘national humiliation’.174 One letter 
addressed to M.P. Geoffrey Ellis from ‘two ordinary citizens…unacquainted with the 
finer points & details of foreign affairs and diplomacy’ stated they were: 
tremendously concerned that the eternal principles of truth and justice should be 
vindicated in international affairs, as they are in individual matters. Being very 
jealous of our country’s honour – for it is our own…175 
Many echoed this sentiment. Ideas of national honour were intrinsically linked to the 
precepts of the Covenant. This was anathema to Baldwin and his inner circle. For them 
these two ideals were mutually exclusive. Thirdly, there was a massive sense of 
betrayal concerning League principles. Hoare had correctly stated in his September 
speech that ‘[t]he ideas enshrined in the Covenant, and in particular the aspiration to 
establish the rule of law in international affairs…have become a part of our national 
conscience.’176 The decision to play politics with such forces cost him his job. Baldwin 
admitted the strength of public feeling in Parliament:  
I know that something has happened that has appealed to the deepest feelings of 
our countrymen, that some note has been struck that brings back from them a 
response from the depths.177 
However, although crass handling lost the government this battle, it still won the 
ideological war. Despite Baldwin’s protestation that the Hoare-Laval ‘proposals are 
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absolutely and completely dead’,178 the fight back started with Hoare’s resignation 
speech.  
Hoare reasserted his credentials to the Commons, by stressing the same ideology that 
had swept the Conservatives into office in 1922. He was ‘terrified’ to give the 
impression that ‘the League could do more than it can’ and feared Abyssinia would be 
‘destroyed altogether’. He could not 
help thinking of the past in which…we have given, and rightly given, all our 
sympathies to some threatened or down-trodden race, but because we had been 
unable to implement and give effect to those sympathies all that we had done 
was to encourage them, with the result that in the end their fate was worse than 
it would have been without our sympathy.179 
Hoare was invoking the plight of the Armenians. He was interpreting the Abyssinian 
crisis in a way that would have found favour with anti-humanitarian forces that were 
prevalent during the Chanak crisis. The Armenians were remembered by an ex-Cabinet 
minister who sought to use the example of ‘pernicious’ western influence in the Near 
East to justify non-intervention in Africa whilst countenancing Italian aggression. The 
allusion was not lost on new Labour leader Clement Attlee who replied that ‘to give 
immense concession to the wrongdoer at the expense of the victim is not British justice’ 
it ran ‘contrary to the British idea of fair play; that to betray a weak and backward 
people who trust us is an affront to the good name of this country’.180 Attlee and Hoare 
appealed to a perceived British tradition of aiding the weak. It was based on a 
perception of the past, of memory of British altruism. This was central to the debate. 
However, Hoare’s speech ‘won the sympathy of the House’.181 Its effect was, with 
regard to humanitarian foreign policy, to start the realignment of the new Parliament 
along party lines. Lord Halifax came closest to admitting the government had no 
intention of surrendering its policy of undermining the Covenant. He believed ‘that in 
the long run these events may even serve to win a new loyalty to the better international 
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order that we seek to create’.182 He was talking about national loyalty as against League 
loyalty. The government were increasingly charged with lack of leadership. In truth the 
government were leading but not in the way that most perceived. They were leading 
Britain out of commitment to a Covenant, which held within it the possibility of 
humanitarian ideals and back towards the pre-war system of international arrangements 
based on self-interest. The cost, in the short term, was Abyssinian lives. In the long 
term, lack of a strong League facilitated loss of Spanish, Chinese and Jewish lives. 
Government humiliation meant Italian wartime conduct came under greater scrutiny. 
Italian forces had, throughout December, been bombing defenceless towns including 
Red Cross installations. They were also using poison gas. The Times gave more space 
than before to the appeal for Red Cross work in Abyssinia. A Red Cross appeal at 
Mansion House coincided with the Hoare-Laval revelations. Austen Chamberlain 
noticeably strayed from the party line. He did not wish to impute ‘any barbarity of 
thought or deed to the Italians’ but stressed the inequitable nature of conflict.183 The 
Daily Herald claimed they had ‘[p]roof that Italians Bombed Red Cross’184 devoting a 
page of pictures to Abyssinian air raid victims. Punch published a cartoon in which 
Italy was characterised as an armoured knight spraying poison gas into the eyes of a 
stereotypical Abyssinian holding only a spear. Entitled ‘When Knights Are Bold’, the 
Italian knight states ‘[i]ts your own fault. A civilised man must protect himself – and 
what’s more, its beginning to rain.’185 The latter comment referred to a growing 
perception that Italy’s progress was slowing due to adverse weather conditions. The 
Spectator suggested in a nod to Campbell-Bannerman’s resonant Boer War rhetoric that 
‘methods of barbarism were deliberately adopted.’186 The New Statesman alluded to 
Italian ‘frightfulness’.187 Thus familiar phrases were invoked designed to resonate with 
public opinion. This caused indignation on the political right. Douglas Jerrold 
suggested to little effect that ‘the mobilisation of opinion in this country bears a painful 
likeness to that organization of hatred against Germany which we witnessed in the 
years from 1914 to 1918.’188 However attempts by Italians to influence public opinion 	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failed. They circulated ‘anecdotes of the Boer War, Amritsar…&c.’189 A book was 
published for the English market by C.G. Baravelli entitled The Last Stronghold of 
Slavery.190 The Spectator’s review described it as ‘propaganda pure and simple and 
only worth mentioning for its disingenuousness.’191 This reaction was typical. 
However, the effect of apparent government retreat over Hoare-Laval ultimately 
undermined public outrage. It gave the impression that humanitarian values had 
regained the upper hand in Parliament. It was also affected by the death of King George 
V on 20 January 1936. 
Eden, now Foreign Secretary, attended a meeting at Geneva on 2 March. He was better 
than Hoare at maintaining a pretence that the government was in favour of tightening 
sanctions to include oil. Having agreed, after a telephone call to Baldwin, that, in 
accordance with French suggestions, there should be a further attempt to mediate 
between Italy and Abyssinia, Eden ‘launched his proposal for an oil sanction’ in the 
form of ‘an afterthought’.192 This was consistent with the strategy agreed in August that 
an extra layer of negotiation be imposed on the agreed Covenant.193 Having accepted 
the French proposal Eden had more latitude to sound bombastic but it had no effect. 
The resulting resolution called on ‘both belligerents’ to open negotiations ‘within the 
framework’ and ‘spirit’ of the Covenant to end hostilities.194 The phraseology was 
unjust to the Abyssinians who were raised to the status of co-belligerent despite having 
to defend their territory against an aggressor. Its content was no less biased, providing 
no deadline for the conflict to end giving the Italians the breathing space to finish the 
war and license to continue atrocities. The nature of this failure was overshadowed in 
Britain by Germany’s annexation of the Rhineland on 7 March 1936.  
Widespread and continued use of gas in March led to increased public condemnation of 
Italy. T.A. Lambie, of the Red Cross, claimed ‘no adjective’ could ‘describe the hellish’ 
use of gas.195 Public response over the following weeks showed the horror was fully 
understood. Sir Henry Hesketh Bell suggested that wherever The Times was read 
‘sentiments of horror and indignation will have been aroused by the account given in 	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today’s issue.’ He believed Abyssinians would feel ‘everlasting hatred’ because of 
tortures inflicted on them by ‘white men’ bearing ‘terrible weapons and promising them 
the blessings of civilization and of true Christianity’ and asked: 
what excuse can the Italians offer for the deliberate blinding and maiming of 
women and children merely because they are the wives and offspring of the men 
who are bravely dying in scores of thousands in defence of their country and 
liberty?196  
Lord Robert Cecil read out extracts from Sir Henry’s letter in the Lords on 30 March. 
He also emphasised ‘the protocol signed on 17 June 1925’ banning the use of poisonous 
gases in warfare and suggested if it went unchallenged it would set a precedent for 
potential British conflicts.197 He described the use of gas and the bombing off 
unfortified towns as ‘perhaps as horrible and shameless a thing as has ever been done, 
even in the bloody annals of warfare’. Lord Halifax summed up the debate by pointing 
out that criticism and condemnation of Italy came from across the political spectrum, 
even from ‘those accustomed in other debates to take a somewhat different point of 
view.’198 The New Statesman wrote, the ‘bombing of Harrar seems to have struck 
people’s imagination in England.’199 All united in condemning the atrocities, which 
were fully comprehended. 
Evidence for atrocity was so overwhelming that pro-Italian Lord Mottistone could not 
deny them but instead was driven to cloud the issue by suggesting ‘whatever is said is a 
lie on both sides.’ That public feeling found expression in the Lords rather than the 
Commons is indicative of government inertia facilitated by an insurmountable majority. 
When questioned in the Commons as to what ‘action’ was being taken to protest against 
atrocities,200 Eden legalistically referred to ‘continuous use by Italy of asphyxiating gas 
and similar gases’ in violation of the Hague Convention and Geneva Protocol, merely 
adding these matters were for consideration by the ‘Committee of Thirteen’.201 There 
was no separate government condemnation. On 6 April, Eden ‘informed the Cabinet 
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that the military situation of the Abyssinians was desperate.’202 Eden was to speak in a 
foreign affairs debate that afternoon and in the same meeting colleagues ‘suggested that 
to point out the ineffectiveness of the League to prevent a breach of a Convention of 
this kind would be a good way of introducing’ his speech.203 The consistency of the 
government in the face of public opposition in pursuing anti-League policy was 
remarkable. 
The Times had now returned to government orthodoxy. In spite of overwhelming 
evidence to the contrary, its commentary on the Lord’s debate emphasised the ‘hope’ 
that allegations of atrocities were ‘unfounded’ and moreover ‘[e]very one indeed will 
cling to this hope as long as possible.’204 It cited ‘excitement or genuine error on the 
part of the airmen’205 and days later suggested reports were only ‘second hand’ and that 
the ‘use of poison-gas’ had ‘not been witnessed by an authoritative British observer.’206 
If gas was being used then ‘[w]herever the League fails to check one dictator in his 
disregard of treaty obligations, there is…a direct encouragement to others to follow his 
example.’207 Thus just as Eden had done in the Commons and Halifax had done in the 
Lords,208 The Times saw fit to bifurcate the League from British responsibility and 
blame it for inaction.  
Pro-Abyssinian newspapers responded by publishing British eye-witness reports. The 
Daily Herald ran the front page headline ‘Italians Shower Liquid Fire on Abyssinians – 
Doctors Confirm Use of Gas Bombs’.209 Captain Townshend Stephens of the Red Cross 
reported that gas sprayed from the air was indiscriminately affecting ‘men, women and 
children’ who were ‘victims of the horrible festering boils and sores’, often resulting in 
death.210 Graphic descriptions were thus given emotional emphasis. On 7 April an 
‘[i]mpressive’ protest was published in the Manchester Guardian on behalf of twenty 
two national women’s organizations and twenty eight individual women including 
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M.P.s ‘deeply moved by the terrible sufferings of the Ethiopian men, women and 
children’.211  
Ethiopians were cast as the ‘plucky underdog’ as a way of aligning them to British 
values. Other cherished forms of Englishness were also bestowed upon them. One 
periodical suggested ‘Ethiopia is an ancient empire, and its sins, such as brutal 
imprisonment and slave trade, are the sins we practised ourselves scarcely a century 
ago.’212 The Ethiopian Royal Family were described as ‘articulate’ and the Emperor 
had picked out ‘the cleverer young men’ and instilled in them a cosmopolitan, Christian 
education. Ethiopians generally had ‘a certain independence of mind free from any 
truculence’.213 Britain’s failure to live up to its ‘traditional’ role of defending the weak 
and protecting small nations was contrasted to Abyssinian suffering and heroism. One 
correspondent wrote ‘the Great British Empire, Defender of the Faith, Protector of the 
Weak, champion of the oppressed, stands by supinely, inert, indifferent whilst helpless 
men, women and children are slaughtered, maimed and blinded by a vicious 
aggressor.’214 Another added ‘[a]re we to wait until the brave little people defending (as 
we would do) their country against a foreign invader are quite exterminated.’215 
Although the government was criticised, they were no longer subject to accusations of 
subverting democracy. Significantly, public anger was no longer directed towards 
government failure to implement the Covenant. In fact a growing number now blamed 
the League. One asked ‘[h]as the League lost all regard for its responsibilities?’216 
Although there was a continuing sense of shame, what was noticeably different from 
December’s protest was lack of cross-party consensus.217 
At the April meeting in Geneva, Eden asked ‘how can we have confidence that our own 
fold, despite all solemnly signed protocols, will not be burned blinded and done to 
death in agony hereafter?’218 He then suggested that if the authority of the League had 
been fatally shaken ‘then we should each of us have to consider the policy which in that 	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situation it would be our duty to pursue.’219 While in Geneva, Britain’s chief 
representative for foreign affairs hinted at withdrawal from the League. Eden was 
presenting one image to the British public, that of a pro-League, pro-humanitarian and 
another to Britain’s League partners. Chamberlain was more forthright arguing, ‘[t]he 
League’s weapons to-day will not shoot’.220 The Committee of Thirteen appealed to 
‘the Italian and the Abyssinian Government’, condemning atrocities.221 Addressing it to 
both, when Italians were known to be the guilty party, once again undermined the 
Abyssinian cause on the international stage. Eden was complicit in this process 
suggesting ‘to both parties that they should not employ poison gas.’222 A few days later, 
Eden was to receive Baldwin’s support. 
Most historians see the ending of the Abyssinian affair in Britain as occurring on 10 
June 1936 when Chamberlain openly criticized the continuance of sanctions as ‘the 
very midsummer of madness’.223 In fact, it can be traced to Baldwin’s April speech to 
the Bewdley Division Unionist Association in Worcester Guildhall. Like most leaders 
who wish to make defining statements he chose his own constituency. Having 
deliberately changed his public stance concerning the Covenant the previous June after 
learning the result of the LNU ballot, the Prime Minister, after regaining control of his 
party, returned to his previous anti-League incantation. He reiterated his view that the 
absence of America, Germany and Japan undermined the effectiveness of sanctions.224 
He condemned the Covenant by stating that not only had the League been unable to 
‘prevent the war’ but that taking the ‘prescribed collective steps in imposing certain 
sanctions’ showed there was no ‘effective machinery’ for stopping war if one party 
does not submit to arbitration.225 Baldwin would say ‘nothing’ on ‘the use of gases in 
Abyssinia’, claiming breaches on ‘both sides’. He was more concerned that:  
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if a great European nation, in spite of having given its signature to the Geneva 
protocol against the use of such gases, employs them in Africa, what guarantee 
have we that they may not be used in Europe?226 
Eden and Baldwin were acting according to inner Cabinet policy. Consequently, their 
statements echo one another. Both were falsely claiming the League had no machinery 
for dealing with the invasion of Abyssinia by Italy. However, Article Eleven of the 
Covenant stated that ‘any war or threat of war,227 whether immediately affecting any of 
the Members of the League or not, is hereby decreed a matter of concern to the whole 
League, the League shall take action that may be deemed wise and effectual to 
safeguard the peace of nations.’228 The Manchester Guardian highlighted the relevant 
clause but very few people realised the import of Baldwin’s speech. Because of the 
intellectual paradigm elucidated by Warren Fisher and R.J. Campbell that separated 
League principles from League methods, Baldwin was still able to say without hint of 
irony but not without cynicism that ‘[w]e want the Covenant of the League to become 
the law of the world’.229 He was saying one thing and doing another. The Times did not 
make a habit of printing all his speeches, however, it is no coincidence that this speech 
was published. Establishment figures in Britain had successfully combined to create the 
illusion that the League but not its principal member had failed. 
Throughout the crisis political leaders had been regularly accused of lacking leadership. 
Lloyd George, in what Churchill felt was his best ever Commons performance, 
condemned the government for just that.230 The government was leading all along but 
not in the direction that most people thought. From the end of April senior Conservative 
figures whose presence had signalled essential cross party consensus started either to 
resign from the LNU or undermine the policy of sanctions.231 ‘All the talk in the lobbies 
and smoking rooms’ of the Commons, according to The Spectator, was ‘centred around 
“the reform of the League,” or in other words, decent burial of Article XVI.’232 	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Politicians on all sides had been adequately prepared and on 6 May Eden confessed 
under pressure from Hugh Dalton that ‘without doubt, a blow’ had ‘been struck at the 
structure of the League and the conception of collective security.’233 At the beginning 
of May it was widely rumoured that Sir Samuel Hoare was to return to the Cabinet as 
First Lord of the Admiralty. 234 ‘[S]urely’ Collin Brooks correctly predicted, this 
‘heralds the abandonment of the Sanctions policy.’235 Hoare restated his political 
credentials by announcing government policy to the Unionist Canvassing Corps. ‘The 
time had come’, he stated,  
when the British Government might make it quite clear to the world what 
questions they regarded as vital, for which they were certainly prepared to 
fight…they should judge a situation as it arose. It would be both futile and fatal 
if they made specific commitments upon issues that were not vital Imperial 
issues…236 
Eden concurred, the ‘manifest failure of the League, which has rightly been tried out to 
the uttermost’ he misleadingly stated, ‘must be admitted and remedied “in a spirit of 
candid realism.”’237 Lord Robert Cecil admitted defeat because ‘the chance of any 
fruitful reform of the League may well be destroyed if it has to be undertaken under the 
shadow of complete failure by the League to discharge its obligations to one of its 
members’.238 The following day Chamberlain condemned the continuation of sanctions 
because it ‘would divert our minds as practical men from seeking other and better 
solutions.’ Because of the internal logic adopted by the ‘inner Cabinet’, he was able 
magnanimously to suggest that the League and the ‘ideals’ for which it stood should not 
be abandoned.239 It was instead to be a moral influence. 
The Italian victory on 5 May had created a fait accompli. Protesters were faced with a 
stark choice, either for militarily ousting Italian forces or not.  Pro-sanctionist 
arguments became vulnerable to attack. The government was free to return to pre-war 	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foreign policy. It could now decide, without being encumbered by humanitarian 
considerations, external forces, or other nations what it was prepared to fight for. There 
is a clue to the direction favoured by Baldwin in Eden’s diary of 20 May. He wrote 
‘[t]alk with S.B. in evening. Did not get much out of it save that he wants better 
relations with Hitler than Musso – we must get nearer to Germany.’240 On 21 June 
Baldwin announced the end of sanctions. In the papers of Vyvyan Adams there are 
more letters of protest relating to this than there were in December.241 However, it was 
too late. Just before the Commons voted to drop sanctions, Baldwin stated, “I 
understand that hon. Members opposite are going to launch a great campaign against 
this Government on what we have done in regard to the League of Nations…I welcome 
it…the country will be educated. That is wholly to the good.’242 The government had 
regained the initiative.  
Although public compassion had played its biggest role yet in British politics, the 
resignation of the Foreign Secretary was a diversion. Baldwin’s ideological stance was 
stated with relative clarity when he wrote to Thomas Jones ‘[o]ne thundering good 
thing we have got out of it is the realisation of what sanctions mean. They mean that we 
have got to be much more self-contained.’243 Self-containment meant freedom from 
foreign influence, which Baldwin inherently mistrusted. Rearmament, for him, could 
only be approached on that basis. Middlemas and Barnes suggest that Hoare’s 
resignation was ‘the first major defeat of the British tradition of pragmatic foreign 
policy’.244 To call this type of foreign policy ‘pragmatic’ grants it an insurmountable 
status. It was much more subtle than that. For a while the Covenant of the League 
looked like it might constitute ‘common sense’, which it was for many millions of 
Britons. The Abyssinian crisis became a successful attempt to wrest from the British 
public the initiative in establishing what constituted realpolitik. However, had the 
public been led in the way that many wanted, then British foreign policy could have 
gained a more humanitarian emphasis.245 In addition future calls for international 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
240 Eden, Facing the Dictators, p.374. 
241 Vyvyan Adams Papers. Also plenty of examples in Rathbone, Eleanor, (ed.) The Tragedy of 
Abyssinia: What Britain Feels and Thinks and Wants (London: League of Nations Union, 1936). 
242 Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 5th Series, Vol.313, 23, Cols.1728-9, June 1936. 
243 Middlemas and Barnes, Baldwin, p.897. 
244 Ibid., p.899. 
245 For the popularity of the League of Nations Union and adherence to its precepts see Helen 
McCarthy, ‘Democratizing British Foreign Policy: Rethinking the Peace Ballot, 1934-1935’, The 
Journal of British Studies, Vol. 49, No. 2 (April 2010), pp. 358-387. 
	   166	  
condemnation of atrocities would have actually meant something. Certainly, when it 
came to the Final Solution, calls for international condemnation were used as a 
smokescreen for inactivity. If Britain had made a meaningful stand over Abyssinia by 
providing a strong lead to the League it is feasible that Hitler would have taken a 
different route after 1935. Eric Phipps, British Ambassador to Berlin stated in 1937 that 
in the early 1930s Germany’s avowed aim was:  
an understanding with England…It was in deference to English public 
opinion…that the persecution of Jews and political prisoners was mitigated. 
Such concessions…were regarded here as very important and they were made to 
no other nation. British influence and prestige reached its height towards the end 
of 1935 when, for a brief space, it was thought that England at the head of the 
League, might succeed in stopping Signor Mussolini’s Abyssinian 
adventure...The German began to ask himself whether it was necessary to 
conciliate a Power, without whose favours Italy seemed to be doing very 
well.246
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Chapter Five 
Spain and China: Unlikely Victims 
 
The Spanish Civil War had an unprecedented impact on Britain’s political, 
social and economic life. Its ideological resonance was felt at all levels of 
society and impacted on all shades of political opinion. For some, events in 
Spain were the key to preventing Bolshevism from entering Europe via the back 
door.1 For many others they confirmed the seemingly relentless march of 
fascism. As such the issue elicited passionate debate in an ideologically 
polarized atmosphere. As Helen Graham states, 
Spain was the focus of European anxiety, the centre of its disequilibrium. 
Her civil war, both in terms of its domestic origins and 
internationalization, held up a mirror to class tensions and imperialist 
rivalries in Europe.2  
Yet in the first year of the conflict British reactions to Spanish atrocities proved 
to be one factor that was more powerful than deeply entrenched, widely 
expressed principles. In the early stages of the civil war, atrocities committed by 
forces loyal to the Spanish government confirmed, for the majority, the moral 
rectitude of the British government’s apparently neutral policy. As it became 
clear that atrocities committed by the Spanish rebels were part of a deliberate 
policy of terrorization, there was a broad shift in public opinion. The first part of 
this chapter tracks the trajectory of this steady but unmistakable swing in British 
sympathy away from Spanish Nationalists, towards the Republicans. It 
culminates at the bombing of Guernica, when the Western world was confronted 
with a new terror: the decimation of innocent civilians from the air. For a period 
British opinion was, almost without exception, united in indignation. The force 
of public outrage shook the pro-Franco British government. 
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One of the main reasons why the public became less focused on Spain in the 
summer of 1937 was the commencement of the Sino-Japanese war. Once again 
the atrocity discourse was decisive for British understanding. On the surface it 
appeared from the moment Japan invaded Chinese territory that Britain was 
united in condemnation of this blatant act of international aggression. Influential 
voices on the Left believed the Far Eastern conflict would be more effective than 
Spain at alerting ordinary Britons to the dangers of fascism. However, the 
government resolved that whilst offering limited assistance to China it would not 
allow itself to be manoeuvred into a position where a schism developed with the 
Japanese government. As with the Spanish conflict, the interaction of 
government policy and its efforts to mollify public opinion played a key role in 
the outworking of the international crisis in Britain. The chapter brings to light a 
largely forgotten national campaign on behalf of the Chinese. 
In each case the atrocity discourse was played out within the context of 
peculiarly British reactions to foreign acts of violence. Memory of previous 
atrocities combined with specific ideas of whom the British thought themselves 
to be. ‘Frightfulness’, a term with specific connections to wartime Germany, was 
increasingly employed, showing that myth and reality could exist side by side in 
1930s Britain. Versions of Britishness were superimposed on the victims of 
atrocity whether they were Basques or Chinese. Actual distance from events did 
not dim indignation. What is clear is that British compassion in both cases was 
genuine and manifested in real actions that had identifiable outcomes at a 
moment in modern history when the intransigence of senior politicians was 
arguably at its most impenetrable.  
This chapter is concerned with showing that foreign atrocities touched the 
British imagination right up to the outbreak of the Second World War. Although 
Spain was indeed deemed to reflect tensions in Europe, there was a noticeable 
sense of myopia to the dominant threat in Europe, which, of course, was 
Germany. That Germany supplied the bombers for Guernica was almost 
overlooked. Indignation over Spanish deaths on both sides showed that the 
mistreatment of one set of civilians by another within a sovereign state was a 
legitimate focus for British concern. When it came to Jews in Germany most 
commentators, whether on the Right or Left, were keen to distance themselves 
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from ‘interference’ in the internal affairs of another county this; did not count for 
Spain. The government were certainly concerned about threats to British 
interests in the Far East and this, together with the experience they had built up 
over Abyssinia and Spain, helped them to get better at channelling and 
mollifying public indignation. This experience certainly helped officials when it 
came to anti-Jewish atrocities in Germany. By emphasising the response of 
opinion formers and the British public to the suffering of Chinese civilians, this 
chapter also shows that years of stereotyping ‘the yellow peril’ was no barrier to 
compassionate expression. Therefore it draws a stark comparison with attitudes 
towards European Jews who were often seen as the cause of their own 
misfortune.  
The Spanish Civil War began on 17 July 1936. The spark was a failed coup by a 
coalition of disparate Right wing forces against the recently elected left wing 
government. The Spanish military was the main rebel contingent. As Franco’s 
Army of Africa moved northwards from Morocco to Madrid, their advance was 
marked by a ‘horrific trail of slaughter…[i]n one town after another, the 
occupying troops raped working-class women and looted their houses.’3 
Government-controlled zones were also marked by widespread violence. 
Ideological opposition to an oppressive social system found expression in the 
murder of those who were perceived to uphold it. Priests, policemen, the wealthy 
and their agents were victims of revolutionary fervour. However ‘there were also 
criminal acts, murder, rape, theft and the settling of personal scores.’4 The 
violence committed by Nationalist forces also had an ideological element. Those 
perceived a threat to the cause were identified and killed. However, its wider 
purpose was to instil terror into Spaniards not yet under their control. Violence 
in government areas was without official sanction. Brutality in the Nationalist 
sector was sponsored by the leadership or allowed to go unchecked.  
Initially British representations of the conflict did not reflect Spanish realities. 
British officialdom was already ideologically inclined towards the rebels. 
General Franco, eventual leader of the Nationalist cause, was seen as 	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representing the social traditionalism and fiscal orthodoxy of the pre-Republican 
order. Strong connections between British commerce and the Spanish 
aristocratic and upper-middle-classes reinforced shared social, cultural and 
political assumptions.5 Thus when reactionary elements within the British 
diplomatic corps reported harrowing Republican atrocities they found ready 
acceptance in ministerial and bureaucratic circles.6 There was a predisposition to 
believe they were witnessing a Spanish Kerensky-style government, impotent 
when confronted by the anarchy they associated with Bolshevik revolution.7 
Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden shared these views.8 However, British 
ministers could not be seen to question the legitimate democratic outcome of the 
Spanish elections. The government was wary of the force of public opinion so 
soon after the Abyssinian crisis, so instinctive support for an invading force 
against an existing regime had to remain hidden from the public. Therefore the 
Cabinet opted for a policy of ‘non-intervention’, which was in fact ‘tacit 
neutrality whose central aim was to avoid all direct or indirect help to the 
disowned government side and any hindrance to the rebels’.9  
Public debate on Spain was dominated by atrocity stories.10 Initially, because 
victims included representatives of the Catholic Church this reinforced the idea 
in Britain that the government was ‘anti-God’, whilst the rebels represented 
Christianity and civilizing values. This created a problem for Left wing 
commentators, who tended to sympathize with the Spanish government. They 
therefore deprecated atrocity stories altogether, suggested both sides were 
equally to blame, invoked stereotypical images of Spanish propensity for 
violence or accused the Right wing press of exaggeration. Labour supporters 
passed an emergency resolution in favour of Spanish workers on 20 July. The 
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Labour Party National Executive and the TUC General Council followed suit.11 
However, Labour leaders, influenced by fear of a communist threat to their own 
movement, moved to ensure pro-Spanish initiatives did not stray beyond those 
with strictly humanitarian emphases.12  
On 21 July the Daily Express printed unsubstantiated gossip that thousands had 
been killed by Republicans in Barcelona. Sefton Delmer’s article ‘set the tone 
for much early reporting from the Republic zone.’13 Atrocity reports reinforced 
Right wing fears that Spain had the potential to become the epicenter of a pan-
European epidemic of communism. On 22 July, Collin Brooks, editor of the 
Sunday Dispatch and close associate of Lord Rothermere, noted in his diary that 
atrocities committed against ‘nuns and priests’ were causing ‘increasing 
excitement’ and expressed fears that the ‘contagion’ would spread to France.14 
The Daily Mail aligned itself with outraged Catholic opinion publishing 
uncorroborated stories of a pseudo-sexual nature in which ‘nuns [were] stripped, 
tortured and outraged’, prisoners ‘crucified’ and dismembered. This ‘daily 
magnification of atrocities’ was condemned as ‘sinister’.15 Flagrant atrocity 
propaganda by the Daily Mail led to widespread criticism and reduced its impact 
on the national debate.  
More influential on informed British opinion was pro-Nationalist coverage in 
The Times. Dawson initially attempted to portray the paper as neutral, 
condemning atrocities on both sides. However, as Spain’s importance grew in 
the British political discourse there was a perceptible change in tone, which did 
not go unnoticed. Between the 20 and 30 July, Julian Huxley conducted a study 
of the language used to portray the rival factions in Spain.  The ‘descriptive 
terminology’, he concluded, ‘changed in a way which sets the insurgents in a 
better, and the constituted authority in a worse, light.’16 This was an accurate 	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observation. By early August The Times was providing a pro-Nationalist 
commentary, portraying atrocity as intrinsic to anti-Fascist ideology. Violence in 
Barcelona was a ‘war of extermination…a necessary stage in the consolidation 
of the anti-Fascist revolution.’17 Spanish officials were said to be either 
‘collaborating’,18 or ‘enforced’ to yield by ‘Marxists’.19 In other words, the 
elected government was portrayed as either sanctioning terrorism or too weak to 
hold a mandate. At a moment when the British establishment expected an early 
insurgent victory, stereotypes relating to Spanish propensity for violence and 
death were invoked to demonstrate they were unready for British-style 
democracy.20 The war was therefore portrayed as ‘a struggle between two 
extremes’ in which the Republic ‘must inevitably perish.’21 Correspondents were 
given ample space to point out the inappropriateness of terms such as ‘rebel’ or 
‘insurgent’ when describing Franco’s forces, which, they alleged, stood for ‘law 
and order.’22 The Nationalist generals were, according to one Times editorial, 
‘not known to possess political acumen or ability’.23 Therefore, in a choice 
between two ‘dictatorships’, that of the Right was granted benign status.24 The 
role of women and children in Republican violence was highlighted to 
emphasize the breakdown of familial structures and the radicalization of society 
under Left-wing extremism.25  
Just as The Times helped reinforce widespread support for the official 
government policy of non-intervention, ‘neutrality’ was advocated by other 
publications. The Spectator, for example, stated intervention would be ‘folly’ 
because of the risk of provoking Italy and Germany to ‘counter-measures.’26 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 The Times, 1 August 1936, p.12. 
18 Ibid.  
19 Times, 5 August 1936, p.12. 
20 Times, 10 August 1936, p.11. Some individuals with strong government connections argued influential 
elements ‘on General Franco’s side…admire the English parliamentary system and…these men may be 
counted upon to make their influence tell.’ Nineteenth Century and After, September 1936, p.292. 
Article by ‘a distinguished diplomat’. 
21 Times, 5 August 1936, p.12.  
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid.  
24 See also Contemporary Review, September 1936, p.277; Moradiellos, Enrique, ‘The Gentle General: 
The Official British Perception of General Franco during the Spanish Civil War’, Preston, Paul and 
Mackenzie, Ann L. (eds.) The Republic Besieged: Civil War in Spain 1936-1939 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 1996). 
25 Times, 6 August 1936, p.10. 
26 The Spectator, 7 August 1936, p.225.  
	   173	  
Winston Churchill argued for ‘strictest neutrality’.27 Events at Badajoz disturbed 
the growing momentum behind these views. 
On 14 August Nationalist forces massacred at least 2000 people at Badajoz on 
the Spanish-Portuguese border. The News Chronicle reported ‘mountain[s] of 
corpses’ and a ‘blood stained wall at the Commandancia, perforated with 
bullets…where some 2,000 men were executed by the insurgents.’28 The story 
represented the first significant blow to the view that both sides were equally 
committing atrocities. Moreover, it undermined assertions that Right wing forces 
in Spain stood for Christian and civilized values. Franco’s deployment of North 
African troops further undermined his credibility. Left wing critics in Britain 
exploited the issue using racial, religious and historical stereotypes. Badajoz 
marked a turning point in the nature of coverage in The Times and the Daily 
Telegraph. Their attempts to appear impartial became more studied.  
On 19 August The Times published a letter from a host of eminent opinion 
formers.29 They believed political liberty and Parliamentary democracy to be 
Britain’s ‘noblest’ contribution to ‘European civilization’. They asserted,  
[a]t any other time during the last 150 years of our history the sympathies 
of practically all classes in this country and of our Government would 
have been with the Spanish people and its Government in such a struggle 
of democracy against military despotism, and of freedom against 
Fascism.  
It was therefore ‘a matter of grave concern’ that in ‘many quarters’, especially 
the popular press, attempts were being made ‘to enlist the sympathies of Britain 
for the military rebels’. This, they wrote, was based on misrepresentation of the 
Spanish government as ‘Communist’. The signatories belonged ‘to various 
political parties, or to no party’ but were all committed to ‘the British ideals of 
political freedom and democracy’. They hoped that the British government 	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would return to the ‘traditional British policy of sympathetic benevolence.’30 
The appeal is notable for including all shades of opinion, for its passion and for 
its evocation of widely held ‘British’ values.  
Critics of non-intervention were slow to come to terms with the demise of the 
League of Nations. Clinging to the wreckage of the League after the deliberate 
destruction of its credibility during the Abyssinian affair had arguably placed 
government opponents at a disadvantage in the Spanish debate because they 
wasted energy advocating its importance. Furthermore, by paying it lip-service 
ministers were able to maintain the appearance of action whilst achieving little. 
Kingsley Martin, editor of the New Statesman, was one of the few to notice. For 
him, the shattered League created a central dichotomy within ‘Liberal opinion in 
England’, which he believed was created by the ‘incompatibility of pacifism and 
the desire to help the oppressed’. With the League’s breakdown, ‘[e]ither they 
must sponsor a policy which carries with it a threat of war or they must abandon 
any attempt to keep their word and to aid the victims of aggression.’31 Martin 
expressed the reasoning behind growing dissatisfaction with government policy:  
England has become less unsympathetic to the Spanish Government as the 
danger and methods of Fascist intervention have proved more apparent. General 
Franco’s terrible declarations about not taking prisoners, about completely 
depopulating any district that held out against him, about grinding to powder the 
bones of his opponents – these coupled with the actual savagery of his methods, 
the massacres at Badajoz and elsewhere, have estranged British sympathy but 
not in any way changed British policy.32 
Over the next few months there was increasing activity in the ‘centre’ ground of 
British politics on behalf of victims of the Civil War in general and atrocity in 
particular. The genesis of change in the way atrocities were to be represented 
and blame apportioned can be traced to late summer 1936.  
The mounting uncertainty of those previously inclined to support the rebels is 
evident in a policy change by the newsreel companies, predominantly under 	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Right wing ownership. Anthony Aldgate suggests whereas Spain ‘occupied key 
positions’ in newsreels until August, by September it only appeared in the 
‘middle ground’.33 The previously pro-Franco Daily Express now printed details 
of Nationalist killings. Significantly, their correspondent, Harold Pemberton, 
believed the Communists to be committing atrocities whilst the rebels were 
‘killing wholesale – mathematically and methodically – as a military 
expedient.’34 He thus drew a crucial distinction between the methods of the two 
sides. A schism was appearing in the Right wing press undermining pro-
Nationalist consensus. 35  
On 8 September The Times admitted ‘the ruthless cruelty’ of the Nationalists 
‘has equaled, if…not surpassed the worst excesses perpetrated by the other 
side.’36 On 12 September the pro-Franco Morning Post announced their 
correspondent had been expelled from Nationalist territory for an incidental 
reference to ‘insurgent frightfulness’.37 Metonymic terminology for officially 
sponsored terrorism was being used in an environment normally sympathetic to 
Franco. On the British Right, apart from an increasingly limited number, though 
more vocal, ardent pro-Nationalists, this creeping suspicion that the side they 
had been championing was engaged in terroristic methods grew into outright 
belief in the following months.38  
The Labour Party conference on 5 October revealed tensions in Left-wing 
politics. The leadership won a vote supporting non-intervention. Yet following a 
‘deeply moving speech’ by Isabel de Palencia, better known as La Passionaria, 
they were forced to reconsider.39 Clement Attlee and Arthur Greenwood, leader 	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and deputy respectively, were dispatched to discuss the Spanish situation with 
acting Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain. Before going, the Labour leader 
warned delegates of the danger of a European war if non-intervention ended.40 
However, when Parliament reassembled on 29 October the Labour Party 
changed its position, opposing non-intervention because ‘the policy was not 
bringing fair play.’41  
As insurgent forces battled to take Madrid, Franco’s employment of bombers 
received wide publicity in Britain. In November a cross-party group of MPs led 
by the Liberal Wilfred Roberts visited the Spanish capital. The subsequent 
report, ‘signed by two of the three Conservatives in the group, was authoritative 
in its account of the aerial bombing of Madrid’ and ‘drew attention to the 
humanitarian crisis in the city.’42 Newsreels gave it extensive coverage and 
raised concerns about potential aerial threats to London.43 Even a Daily Mail 
correspondent ‘testified to the deliberate and repeated bombing of hospitals by 
the insurgent troops.’44 At this point, as Brian Shelmerdine points out, ‘pro-
Republican commentators were able to develop the impression of victim and 
aggressor. Regular bombing of Madrid…added a new dimension – that of 
innocent civilian casualties.’45 In light of the failure of the Non Intervention 
Committee, an Anglo-French initiative to prevent materials reaching either side, 
and the official recognition by Italy and Germany of the Nationalist regime on 
18 November, Spanish government forces were increasingly portrayed as the 
plucky underdog.46 The New Statesman, for example, reported the defenders of 
Madrid, including ‘practically every able-bodied man (and many women) 
capable of handling any sort of weapon, have pushed the enemy back at several 
points.’47 The arrival of British volunteers created an additional complication for 	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pro-insurgent opinion. By 23 November the Nationalist attack was repulsed. The 
Badajoz massacre gained in notoriety because the possibility of a Nationalist 
victory in Madrid raised fears of a ‘similar massacre’.48 In a subsequent Lords 
debate, Badajoz was used to demonstrate the difference between the two sides. 
Lord Faringdon, for example, compared the efforts of the Spanish government to 
denounce and suppress brutality with the tendency of the rebels to glory in 
them.49 Rebel methods increasingly coincided with popular understanding of 
‘frightfulness.’  
Meanwhile the Cabinet was giving serious consideration to de facto recognition 
of Franco’s administration by granting him belligerent rights. Eden later 
portrayed himself as being the sole voice against this proposal. However on 23 
November he announced the introduction of legislation ‘rendering the carriage 
of arms to Spain illegal’ and warned British shipping accordingly.50 This was 
followed by the decision in January to forbid, under the Foreign Enlistment Act, 
the recruiting of British subjects for service in Spain. His fastidiousness in 
attempting to close down normal trade with the elected Spanish government was 
striking, especially with German and Italian arms being amply supplied to the 
rebels. The divergence between government action and shifting public opinion 
perhaps explains Sir John Simon’s comment in December that ‘the Spanish Civil 
War is getting troublesome from a domestic point of view.’51 Roberts’s group of 
MPs returned from Spain in December and on 6 January formed the nucleus of 
the National Joint Committee for Spanish Relief (NJCSR).52 By 16 January they 
were reported as representing a ‘large variety of different bodies’.53 The New 
Statesman claimed, ‘[f]ar more British help for the Spanish people is being 	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locally and unofficially organized than the casual reader of the press would 
imagine.’54 
It was becoming increasingly untenable to portray Nationalists and Republicans 
respectively as pro and anti-God. One critic argued that in Britain the ‘ordinary 
man’ believed the Catholic Church ‘was on the side of the insurgents.’ The 
Pope’s ‘comparative silence’, was likened to the Vatican’s response to 
Abyssinia.55 Catholics were criticised for supporting ‘the heathen African 
troops…instead of her own erring, Christian, Spanish children.’56 William Inge, 
the retired Dean of St. Pauls, criticised Catholics for pro-Francoism because of 
alleged Nationalist atrocities against evangelical workers. Catholic and 
Protestant leaders responded to this schism by endorsing a ‘Neutral Relief Fund 
for Spain’ along with Chief Rabbi Joseph Hertz and Austen Chamberlain. They 
promised that any funds would only be used ‘with equal impartiality’.57  Non-
political aid was seen as a way of channelling widespread concern over victims 
of atrocity and dissipating tension.  
A group of Anglican and Free churchmen visited Spain between 29 January and 
9 February. Their influential report finally quashed serious claims that 
government forces represented a threat to religion per se. It quoted a well-
informed Catholic ‘English observer of dispassionate views’ stating ‘[t]here is a 
strong anti-clerical movement but no anti-God movement in Spain.’58 
Confirmation from such a ‘dispassionate’ and ‘Catholic’ source in a Christian 
report added validity to other reports that insurgents were using Churches as 
munitions stores and vantage points for firing on crowds. The Spectator, called it 
‘a restrained and convincing document.’59 The report drew a distinction between 
established religion in Spain and the Catholic Church in Basque territory. The 
former was said to be viewed with contempt because the hierarchy had 
ingratiated itself with an oppressive social system; the latter was notable for its 	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policy of ‘Catholic social justice’ where ‘the clergy have lived in close sympathy 
and contact with their people’.60 The Basques generally were already well 
respected in Britain. There were strong economic links between Basques and 
Britons. Basque’s were seen as self-sufficient and democratic, in the British 
style. It is significant for British compassionate responses that both the Basque 
authorities and the region’s Catholic Church had elected to support the 
government.  
The momentum behind humanitarian action grew in March. For example, the 
International Association of Writers organised a Book Exhibition and Auction to 
which E.M. Forster, Rose Macauley and H.G. Wells, among others, contributed. 
This kind of activity was in sharp contrast to the increasingly shrill protests of 
pro-insurgent opinion. Broadcasts by Nationalist General Queipo de Llano, 
declaiming atrocities, were clearly at odds with the strained refutations of 
Franco’s British supporters. Douglas Jerrold, one of Franco’s leading 
protagonists, wrote to The Times on 22 March complaining that in the previous 
night’s Commons debate ‘many speakers, including some members of the 
Government’ endorsed estimates which pointed to significant Italian military 
involvement in Spain.61 This sparked a ‘flood’ of correspondence to The Times, 
which included the signatures of Attlee, Lloyd George, H.G. Wells and the 
Archbishop of York.62 Pro-Republican activists reinforced public sympathy. T. 
Lee wrote to Mass Observation of a meeting in Liverpool at which ‘all kinds 
gathered’. He could ‘hear people’ talking ‘of the awful things the Spanish 
Government had to put up with because the [British] National Government 
refuse to protect women and children.’63 The account reveals something of the 
pro-Republican energy and organization that was affecting ordinary Britons and 
moreover the strategy of eliciting sympathy through images of innocent 
suffering. Advocates of Franco had no comparable impact at grass roots level. 
Increasing cynicism at non-intervention and a mounting belief that Nationalists 
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were responsible for systematic slaughter provided the backdrop for the public 
response to the rebel blockade of Bilbao and the bombing of Guernica in April. 
Franco’s decision to implement the Bilbao cordon split the Cabinet. The 
majority believed unsubstantiated reports that sea approaches were mined and 
guarded by Nationalist ships.64 Hoare, First Lord of the Admiralty, implied 
British merchant vessels en route to Spain would receive no protection from the 
Royal Navy. There was considerable dissent in the Commons and Sir Archibald 
Sinclair declared that it was ‘Abyssinia all over again’.65 Another church 
delegation incorporating Anglicans and Catholics reporting from Bilbao 
reinforced humanitarian arguments. They witnessed ‘the dropping of the 
[Nationalist] bombs over Durango’,66 whilst highlighting the inconsistency of 
Franco’s claims that Communists had dynamited three churches. They also 
claimed food shortages were ‘real and desperate’ and Basques were suffering by 
‘fighting our battles.’67 When the British merchant vessel, the Seven Seas’ 
Spray, broke through the blockade with some ease, amidst widespread publicity, 
the government’s position became untenable. Hoare now confirmed British 
shipping would be protected up to the limit of Spanish territorial waters. 
Subsequent voyages became headline news in the Daily Express. In one case the 
simplicity of the story, which undercut more sophisticated political arguments, 
combined with understated British heroism to give the report greater 
resonance.68 The headline read ‘British Ships Reach Bilbao as Airplanes Bomb 
City.’69  
On 26 April German aircraft under Franco’s command bombed the Basque town 
of Guernica and strafed the fleeing population. The response represented the 
moment when Britain was most united in condemnation of Spanish atrocity. 	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George Steer’s Times report was seminal for British opinion. Just as it had 
caught the public mood by departing from its editorial policy of government 
support and highlighting the injustice of the Hoare-Laval plan, The Times 
managed the same feat over the unprecedented bombing of the undefended 
town. It was a testament to the continuing influence of The Times and moreover 
showed that, given an appropriate lead, the British public could respond with 
overwhelming indignation to foreign atrocity. Steer acknowledged the bombing 
was part of a systematic policy of terror and hinted at something more sinister by 
suggesting the object was ‘the destruction of the cradle of the Basque race.’ He 
emphasised the victims’ innocence and self-sacrifice of Catholic priests. Whilst 
pointing to the hypocrisy of the Nationalists, the intrinsic qualities of the 
Basques were accentuated. The restrained tone added authenticity. Significantly 
The Times supported Steer’s report with a favourable editorial that invited 
comparison between British and Basque values. Their tradition, institutions and 
historical sense of identity were contrasted with ‘ruthless mechanical 
destruction.’70  
Newspapers, which had until the previous day been fervently pro-Franco, 
reported events unquestioningly. The Daily Mail reported in bold print ‘[m]ore 
than 800 civilians were killed in three and a half hours’ bombing by German 
airplanes.’71 Noel Monks of the Express who subsequently visited the town with 
Steer wrote ‘Guernica was to these people what Westminster is to the 
Englishman.’72 The editorial admitted it had ‘[s]teadfastly’ advocated 
‘neutrality’ but now believed ‘there are some things that pass all bounds and cry 
for protest. The bombing of Guernica is one.’ It described the Basques as 
‘devout Catholics’ who had met to pray, 
[t]hey were not under arms. They were not the destroyers of churches or 
the murderers of priests or the ravishers of nuns. The insurgent air-
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raiders have added a new word to the vocabulary of massacre – 
GUERNICA.73  
The bombing captured the British imagination and trumped all previous 
Republican atrocities. 
The impact on British opinion must be understood in context. The bombing of 
unfortified open towns was unknown in Europe until 1937. It was classified, not 
as a legitimate act of war, but as an atrocity. It was widely recognized as 
contravening international law. The News Chronicle called it an ‘exhibition of 
frightfulness’ that exceeded ‘in its sickening horror even the worst that the 
Italians perpetrated in Abyssinia.’74 One element that sparked this convergence 
of opinion over Spain was that airborne terroristic methods were so imaginable 
over British towns. The Left-leaning News Chronicle saw the bombing as 
‘merely a foretaste of what will happen to other cities, larger and nearer home’.75 
While the Daily Mail declared ‘[a]ir [t]error’ showed the ‘[n]eed of [d]efence’.76 
Although leading English supporters of Franco such as Jerrold, Arnold Lunn and 
Robert Sencourt attempted to undermine Steer’s credibility, they were largely 
deserted by the Conservative Press. The New Statesman also suggested that in 
Parliament pro-Franco opinion immediately after the bombing ‘scarcely raise[d] 
its head and support [was] coming from all sides for the Basques.’77  
Seven thousand people at a meeting of the LNU on 30 April approved a 
resolution expressing horror over Guernica. Lord Robert Cecil, a leading 
dissenter in the Abyssinian affair, condemned the ‘wholesale slaughter’ as ‘a 
threat to civilisation’.78 Representatives of all major Protestant denominations 
joined the protest. The appeal to ‘Christian’ values that had previously 
permeated pro-Nationalist arguments now pervaded pro-Republican arguments. 
The Archbishop of York pointed out that earlier atrocities against the Church 
‘inclined our sympathy towards the insurgents’ but after Badajoz and Guernica 
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they had alienated themselves from British sensibilities.79 Spanish atrocities 
were condemned from pulpits in much the same way as German atrocities in 
World War One.80 Anglican and Methodist ministers held a special service at 
Birmingham Parish Church and the Bishop of Winchester spoke of  ‘a cruel 
deliberate, cold-blooded act against the laws of God and against every law of 
civilization.’81  
The Daily Mail gave prominence to a picture of the bombed town, published the 
Archbishop of York’s and Lord Robert Cecil’s protests, and allowed only 
limited space to ‘Franco’s Denial’.82 In a report on by-elections in Wandsworth 
and West Birmingham, the latter widely recognized as ‘Chamberlain country’, 
the Mail affirmed that the ‘great and decisive factor’ was the bombing of Basque 
towns, ‘[e]very meeting and every canvasser on both sides found the electors 
reacting to it.’83 The force of public opinion affected even the ardent pro-Franco 
press.  
Memories of the Great War and German ‘frightfulness’ provided a framework in 
which the atrocity could be understood. One correspondent to The Times wrote 
that Steer’s report ‘rekindled all the anger I felt 21 years ago’ when he had been 
torpedoed in ‘an act of coercive frightfulness’. He felt compelled ‘to cry aloud 
yet once again that never will “frightfulness” achieve its avowed object of 
killing human determination to preserve its freedom.’84 It is remarkable that 
prevailing memories of the war were challenged and that The Times, a zealous 
advocate of appeasement, printed these views.  The Spectator emphasized the 
‘sickening butchery at Guernica’ which ‘took rank among crimes which their 
very hideousness prints indelibly on history.’85 The New Statesman 
characterized it as ‘“frightfulness” which has left the world aghast.’86 A joint 
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National Executive of the Labour Party denounced the bombing as ‘an outrage 
upon humanity and a violation of the principles of civilization.’ It also blamed 
‘rebel forces and their Nazi and Fascist accomplices’, specifically condemning 
Hitler for his cynical declaration of May 1935 in which ‘the German 
Government opposed the use of air craft for the destruction of open towns and 
the bombing of non-combatant women and children.’  They stated that ‘[t]his 
example of frightfulness’ called for ‘instant action’ by the League of Nations.87  
Guernica dominated Parliamentary debates. The Commons was ‘deeply moved’ 
by Steer’s account.88 The use of poison gas by Italians in Abyssinia was an 
immediate point of reference.89 Josiah Wedgewood believed ‘[i]t beats anything 
that happened in Abyssinia.’90 Eden, attempted to mollify outrage by 
announcing he had received assurances from both sides in Spain that they would 
refrain from using poison gas. Geoffrey Mander asked if ‘poison gas’ would ‘be 
much worse than’ recent rebel activity.91 Eden’s subsequent statement was 
notable for its refusal to mention Germany and the attempt to blame both sides 
for aerial bombardments.  
The role of the German air force had been widely recognized and the 
government trod a delicate line attempting to refrain from a diplomatic schism 
with the German government. As a result of its coverage, the German 
government censured The Times. Privately, Dawson did ‘his utmost’ to refrain 
from printing ‘anything that might hurt [the Germans’] susceptibilities’.92 He 
wrote to Lord Lothian in May 1937, ‘I spend my nights…dropping in little 
things which are intended to soothe them’.93 Publicly, the paper defended itself. 
In an editorial entitled ‘The Times Bombs Guernica’ it complained about being 
unable to ‘tell the simple truth’ without ‘incurring charges of Machiavellian 
villainy?’94 It was caught between the need to remain credible and the desire to 	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advocate appeasement. After further evidence of German involvement the paper 
reverted to type, suggesting there were ‘delicate hints…that the atmosphere is 
propitious for a fresh effort in the direction of an Anglo-German 
rapprochement.’95 
On 6 May, the opposition used the proposal to adjourn for a full-scale 
Parliamentary debate. Eden struggled, in the face of overwhelming sympathy for 
the Basques, to maintain his ‘neutrality’. However, as Herbert Southworth has 
shown Eden knew ‘more than he revealed’ about Guernica’s destruction.96 MP 
David Grenfell endowed the Basques with British characteristics to drive his 
point home. ‘In that ancient country’ he stated, ‘the foundations of our 
democratic system were laid long ago’.97 The bombing was ‘an example 
of…frightfulness’,98 and supported by other MPs, he pressurized the government 
to agree to an impartial investigation. Archibald Sinclair pointed out that 
Francoists were employing ‘air power as an instrument of massacre and 
terrorism.’ The Liberal leader received support from the Conservative Duchess 
of Atholl. Phillip Noel-Baker asked Eden to use diplomatic channels to inform 
Franco ‘that public opinion’ in Britain was ‘more deeply stirred by this matter 
than it has been by anything for many years.’99 Eden prevaricated. He refused 
the request, and suggested an international inquiry would be impossible due to a 
lack of consensus. 
The debate moved seamlessly from expressions of horror to the proposed 
evacuation of Basque children, which had been formally submitted to the 
Foreign Office on 28 April by the NJCSR. Massive public outrage prompted the 
government to give their ‘fullest approval’.100 It was a grudging gesture by a 
government determined not to offer financial assistance. However, this gesture 
and the reluctant decision to escort British shipping to Bilbao represented a 
definable climb-down for an administration sympathetic to Franco’s cause and 
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ideology. Chamberlain privately acknowledged protests had been ‘savage’101 
and Eden later bemoaned government criticism.102 Noel-Baker was correct when 
he told Steer that his report had helped challenge government policy by helping 
to formulate and capture the mood of outraged public opinion.103 
There was an immediate humanitarian response. Leaving Spain on 21 May the 
Royal Navy escorted nearly four thousand people, predominantly children, to 
Southampton. It was the largest single influx of refugees in British history. Their 
arrival caused considerable local and national interest. The journal John Bull 
stated ‘so long as their need remains, we may presume the British public will not 
be found wanting in generosity.’104 National relief efforts were echoed by local 
fund-raising schemes and individual gestures. The Catholic authorities and the 
Salvation Army provided hundreds with homes. The Labour movement offered 
considerable support. For Buchanan the case of the Basque children is 
significant because it showed that the TUC bureaucracy was ‘capable of acting 
with initiative and imagination in an environment in which it would not feel 
politically compromised.’105 Newsreel companies emphasized the 
humanitarianism of the evacuation.106  
Yet the action was not without opposition. Prime Minister Baldwin expressed 
‘grave doubts’ on ‘practical grounds’.107 Sir George Mounsey, Assistant Under-
Secretary with responsibility for Spain, protested at length.108 Labour M.P., Leah 
Manning, highlighted official inertia suffered by activists.109 Nevertheless, the 
initial response was overwhelmingly positive. In The Spectator, Goronwy Rees 
gave an account of his personal involvement, demonstrating how his imaginative 
conception of Guernica drove humanitarian action. Whilst traveling on the train 
to the refugee camp at Southampton,  	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a flight of aeroplanes appeared in the sky…the bombers overhead made 
me realize even more sharply what I was going to see at Southampton, 
the 4,000 children from Bilbao, the Catholic refugees from General 
Mola’s guns and Germany’s aeroplanes.110  
The Basque children were eventually spread around the country. Regionalized 
humanitarianism was motivated by perceptions of atrocity and the blamelessness 
of the refugees. An appeal from the Bolton and District United Trades Council 
on behalf of the Basque Children suggested ‘[t]hey are unable to help 
themselves. Innocent victims of brutal and in many cases fiendish atrocity’.111   
During the summer of 1937, for several reasons, Guernica as an event but not as 
a symbol gradually faded from the public discourse. Firstly, hard-core pro-
insurgent opinion launched a counter-attack on the facts surrounding Guernica. 
Secondly, Bilbao’s fall on 19 June enabled Franco’s supporters to argue civilians 
were no longer in danger.112 Thirdly, pro-Republicans in Britain seem to have 
been affected by the inevitability of Franco’s relentless military victories. One 
contributor to Mass Observation stated that Spain was the first item he looked 
for in the news. When he saw that Franco’s troops were ‘still advancing’ he 
‘[f]elt depressed and could not bear it’. Moreover on reading ‘of government 
successes’ he could not bring himself to believe it.113 The same respondent also 
alluded to the final reason why Guernica faded in the public discourse after 
reading of ‘fighting between Japan and China’. Although unsure why there was 
‘fighting’, he decided he ‘must really try and find out what it is all about.’114 
Japanese aggression in China vied with Spain over the next eighteen months as a 
focus for humanitarian concern in Britain.  
Tension between China and Japan had existed since 1931 when Japan forcibly 
annexed Manchuria. The Chinese government, weakened by internal feuding 
between Nationalists and Communists, made a truce with Japan. Following this 
the Japanese exploited the situation in a demilitarized zone south of Peking, 	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encouraging powerful movements for local autonomy. Japanese troops, far 
exceeding the agreed amount, were provocatively deployed in manoeuvres close 
to Chinese territory. On 7 July this sparked a military exchange outside 
Wanping. It ignited into full-scale war. Savage Japanese tactics provoked 
nationwide British sympathy for the Chinese. 
Government policy towards the Sino-Japanese war was driven by economic 
interest and the desire to protect British citizens. Britain had long taken the lead 
in a policy of ‘extraterritoriality’ in China, compelling China to open up ports 
for trade and erecting the system of imperialism. By 1937 British investment in 
China was significant. However, Britain’s military presence in the Far East was 
comparatively weak and undermined by European tensions. Therefore 
challenges to British interests had to be met with the help of other powers, but a 
legacy of suspicion between Britain and America originating in the Manchurian 
Crisis, meant cooperation was unlikely. The British government was 
ideologically opposed to collaborating with the Soviet Union. The Foreign 
Office therefore adopted ‘a middle course’ giving ‘moral support and limited 
material aid’ to China but which ‘aimed to prevent a breakdown in Anglo-
Japanese relations.’115 As one Foreign Office official stated ‘[w]e are after all 
pledged to consider means of supporting the National Govt. (so long as it 
remains the constitutionally recognized Govt. Of China); but this does not 
necessarily mean incurring serious friction with Japan.’116 
British perceptions of China underwent a radical shift in the 1930s. In the mid 
nineteenth century John Stuart Mill had been influential in portraying China as 
‘a symbol of recalcitrant backwardness’.117 This image dominated until the late 
1920s and popular allusions to the Chinese as the ‘Yellow Peril’ lasted well into 
the 1930s. The Manchurian crisis helped rehabilitate China. Up to 1931 the 
Japanese had been viewed as a force for law and order and a bulwark against 
Bolshevism that would protect British Far Eastern interests; the Chinese were 
seen as divided and ungovernable. This changed as the 1930s progressed. In the 	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light of atrocities in Abyssinia and Spain, the Manchurian dispute grew in stature 
in the public imagination being the identifiable point at which the British 
government was perceived to have reneged on the British tradition of resisting 
aggression. Continual Japanese encroachment into Chinese territory meant by 
the time war broke out China was increasingly cast as a victim. Despite its size it 
benefitted from Britain’s traditional compassion for small nations and the 
oppressed. Attempts by the British government to come to terms with Japanese 
expansionism before the war were doomed because a conversation between 
Yoshida Shigeru, the Japanese ambassador to London, and Eden ‘gave rise to 
fears that Britain was planning a Far-Eastern ‘Hoare-Laval Agreement.’118 
Although Neville Chamberlain considered an accommodation with Japan 
acceptable, the Foreign Office did not want to ‘aid and abet Japan’s ‘spoliation’ 
of China’.119 Nevertheless, when questioned in Parliament in July 1937 about 
Japanese aggression in North China, Eden’s evasiveness was seen by the 
Japanese press as evidence of British indulgence. They hoped Britain would 
demonstrate the same flexibility as that allowed to Mussolini and Hitler. 
Government views were backed by The Times, which commented that ‘Britain 
was fully prepared to recognize the obvious fact of Japan’s “special position” in 
regard to China.’120 An article by Freda Utley, soon to be an influential pro-
Chinese activist, stated there was ‘little doubt that preparations’ for a deal with 
Japan would ‘secure for her virtually all she wants in China.’121 The Japanese 
bombing of undefended Chinese saw rumblings of discontent snowball into a 
nationwide campaign. 
By mid-August Japanese forces had advanced south to Shanghai, the location of 
substantial British commercial interests. Japanese aerial bombardment severely 
affected British property and they deliberately targeted British gunboats. The 
British Ambassador to China, Sir Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen, was severely 
injured after Japanese forces shot at his car. This event signalled a change in 
tone by the Right wing press in Britain. The Daily Express wrote ‘Japan is 	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invading China exactly as Mussolini invaded Abyssinia.’122 The Times lectured 
Japan that their Chinese ambitions did not ‘include licence to play havoc with 
the lawful interest of Great Britain.’123 It accused Japan of launching a ‘full-
dress invasion of China without even declaring war.’124 On 24 August the 
National Council of Labour denounced Japan’s ‘invasion…as a further lawless 
act of aggression.’125 The Communist Party Executive issued a resolution linking 
Japanese action with German Fascism and suggesting world peace depended 
‘upon the success of the heroic Chinese people.’126 Condemnation of Japan came 
from across the political spectrum. After weeks of prevarication Japan 
reluctantly apologized for the shooting. However, the Japanese were roundly 
criticized for their impudence and failure to punish those responsible.  
Consensus over condemnation hid significant differences of opinion about how 
Britain should respond. The Times, for example, consistently advocated moral 
condemnation but criticized calls for economic sanctions. The New Statesman 
drew attention to the hypocrisy of The Times and Daily Telegraph, which had 
excused the invasion of Manchuria but were now ‘solemnly lecturing Japan.’127 
One aggression after another throughout the 1930s fuelled indignation. It warned 
the British public not to be lulled by government protestations to Japan and 
claimed that:  
the story of Manchuria, Abyssinia and Spain is being repeated in China. 
Deceived by a Liberal tradition of support for the victim of aggression 
rather than for the aggressor, the Englishman imagines that his 
Government is opposed to Japan’s new invasion and this impression is 
confirmed by British warnings to the Japanese not to damage our 
interests in China.128 
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There was growing clamour for the imposition of economic sanctions and the 
journal accused the Right wing press of attempts to ‘deliberately obscure’ 
Japan’s weaknesses so as to stave off the threat of public pressure to impose 
them. The blanket bombing of Shanghai in mid-September placed pressure on 
Right wing opinion to advocate firmer action. In the belief that moral 
condemnation would be enough to mitigate Japanese aggression the high Tory 
press increased their invective.  
On 20 and 21 September Times’ headlines announced Japanese air attacks on 
Shanghai and Nanking respectively.129 The Telegraph suggested ‘the conscience 
of civilisation’ was ‘deeply stirred’ by the ‘devastation’ in Nanking and Canton 
which were ‘well outside the actual war zone’.130 No doubts were expressed as 
to the veracity of reports. The unanimous critique was laced with appeals to 
civilized values and human morality. International law was invoked to show that 
Japanese action was outside the accepted code of ethics for war conduct.131 The 
Spectator reinforced the view that Japan’s ‘recourse to any barbarity’ was 
predetermined and systematic.132 The Morning Post appreciated ‘Japan’s 
legitimate grievances’ but suggested opinion would be alienated by ‘a policy of 
sheer frightfulness.’ It drew comfort from the idea that ‘atrocities’ were not 
‘condoned by the vast majority of her people.’133 The Times summed up the 
overwhelming feeling with an editorial simply entitled ‘Frightfulness.’134  
It drew attention to the gap between Japan’s words and deeds. Japanese 
protestations of innocence were followed by a description of how a submarine 
near Hong Kong had ‘systematically destroyed by gunfire…a fishing fleet of 
junks’ making no attempt ‘to rescue the men, women, and children’. Clearly, 
bombing was not the only atrocity that affected British sensibilities. Japan had 
resorted to ‘a campaign of promiscuous and indiscriminate terrorism’ to ‘break 
the spirit of the civilian population.’ Conversely, the Chinese were portrayed as 
stoic in the face of terrorism. Their fighting qualities had been reinforced by a 	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new sense of nationhood. The Chinese communist forces’ ‘voluntary self-
enlistment’ in the nationalist cause ‘epitomize[d] the unifying effects of 
Japanese aggression.’ Echoing the old pro-Boer mantra, The Times suggested 
that Japanese impatience meant recourse to ‘tactics of barbarism.’ The Times 
thus used familiar historical phrases and images to reinforce condemnation of 
Japanese atrocities and to elicit sympathy for Chinese victims. The only caveat 
was the bifurcation of Japan’s ‘acknowledged agents’ in China and ‘the vast 
majority of her people’ who were characterised as chivalrous and humane.135  
The government responded to indignation by issuing ‘[v]ery strong 
representations’ through Sir Robert Craigie, their Ambassador in Tokyo.136 
Craigie however favoured appeasement. His official reproach dealt 
predominantly with damage to British property.137 Chinese attempts to elicit 
material and moral support at the League of Nations were scuppered by the 
British. On 22 August, Charles Orde of the Foreign Office, stressed the dangers 
of war with Japan and suggested Britain obstruct moves toward sanctions at 
Geneva even if it meant ‘humiliation for the League and a diminution of its 
potential power for the future.’138 The Foreign Office agreed and along with the 
Secretary-General Joseph Avenol and French Foreign Minister Yvon Delbos, 
convinced Wellington Koo, the Chinese Ambassador in Paris to refer the matter 
to the Far Eastern Committee of the League. At a meeting of the Committee in 
September Lord Cranborne, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 
denounced ‘the indiscriminate slaughter of civilians’. Conspicuously, he 
suggested it was a matter that went ‘far beyond the interests of any single 
nationality’, thus advocating an international response in the full knowledge that 
the League had been effectively disempowered during the Abyssinian dispute. 
On the other hand, it had been argued in 1935 that the League’s moral influence 
was a valid tool of international diplomacy. Cranborne’s denunciation was 
consistent with this approach when he added that the effect of terroristic 
methods ‘on world opinion is...a factor which those responsible would do well to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135 Ibid. 
136 Ibid., Cutting, Times, 27 September 1937. 
137 Ibid. 
138 Lee, Britain and the Sino-Japanese War, p.52. 
	   193	  
take into account.’139 At the end of September, Eden responded to ‘growing 
pressure of public opinion’140 attempting to garner American support for ‘some 
form of economic boycott’.141 Chamberlain scuppered his initiative. In public 
the government were keen to show that they were reflecting public indignation, 
in private they were ensuring that manifestations of condemnation remained 
purely verbal. 
The National Council of Labour sharpened its position by calling for 
international cooperation, especially with the United States, calling on ‘British 
subjects at once…[to] express their detestation of Japanese barbarism by 
refusing to buy Japanese goods’142 and demanding the government ‘prohibit 
British citizens from selling war materials to and lending money to Japan.’143 
They were joined by the British Youth Peace Council, who despite holding onto 
the ‘old pacifist idea’ of the League as an instrument of conciliation rather than 
coercion, called for a protest against Japanese aggression.144 The formation of 
the China Campaign Committee (CCC) provided a focus for national protests. 
Under the Chairmanship of Victor Gollancz, it included Margery Fry, well-
known campaigner for prison and penal reform, Kingsley Martin, his partner 
Dorothy Woodman and Arthur Clegg.  Its first public meeting was held on 30 
September at Whitfield’s Tabernacle in London, and included speakers such as 
Lord Robert Cecil, Harold Laski, Ellen Wilkinson and leading British Sinologist 
Lady Dorothea Hosie. Its stated aim was to ‘rouse public sympathy and practical 
support of the British people for the people of China’.145 Within four months the 
CCC had organised hundreds of meetings and distributed over three-quarters of 
a million pamphlets nationwide.146  
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When the News Chronicle announced a national protest meeting at the Albert 
Hall, the New Statesman saw this as evidence of the rising ‘tide of popular 
indignation’ against ‘the massacre of non-combatants’.147 It printed an interview 
with a publican’s wife, described as an ‘old-fashioned Conservative’. Mrs 
Tompkins stated of the Japanese bombing ‘I couldn’t sleep at night for it’ and 
referring to a photograph in the press declared ‘I could just hear that little child 
screaming’.148 Japanese atrocities permeated the British imagination irrespective 
of political allegiance. There was general support from the popular Right wing 
press. The Rothermere papers referred to the Japanese as ‘sub-human’ and the 
isolationist Beaverbrook-owned Evening Standard stated Britain would ‘not be 
interfering in other people’s business if we boycotted Japanese goods.’149 The 
Spectator stated ‘[t]here are signs that British public opinion is not incapable of 
being moved today as it was by the Macedonian atrocities in the time of 
Gladstone.’150  
On 5 October three events unmistakably highlighted growing public indignation. 
Firstly, President Roosevelt’s speech in Chicago gave what appeared to be a 
clear intimation that the United States would join with other nations in direct 
action over Japan.151 The declaration was quickly ingratiated into pro-Chinese 
rhetoric.152 Secondly, at their Bournemouth conference, the Labour party 
adopted a strongly worded resolution, proposed by Attlee, against ‘the massacre 
of helpless Chinese people’.153 Thirdly, the national protest meeting at the Albert 
Hall took place with significant publicity.  
The News Chronicle headlined ‘Voice of Britain Heard at Albert Hall.’154 The 
event was patronized by an impressive array of opinion formers. It was presided 
over by the Archbishop of Canterbury. Lytton stated, ‘by tolerating that crime 	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[Japan’s invasion of Manchuria] we had invited another.’ He asked the audience 
to ‘remember that the Japanese army is modelled on the Prussian pattern and that 
frightfulness is a Prussian theory’. To ‘loud applause’ Lady Violet Bonham-
Carter proclaimed the meeting was ‘a call to action.’ Lloyd George, Winston 
Churchill, Sir Archibald Sinclair, Gilbert Murray and Ben Tillet sent messages 
of support. The ‘remarkable’ platform included Lord Allen of Hurtwood, ex-
Liberal minister Sir Francis Acland, Canon F. Lewis Donaldson, Archdeacon of 
Westminster, Lord Robert Cecil, Lord Rennel, Lady Gladstone and Viscount 
Samuel. It showed the film ‘Bombs on China’ and added:  
[t]he audience probably the greatest single film audience ever assembled 
watched in silence the tattered remnants of buildings in Shanghai, the 
litter of wounded and dying in the streets, the hopeless flight of refugees. 
There were occasional bursts of applause, occasional half-smothered 
cries of sheer horror.155  
The Spectator wrote the ‘spirit’ of the meeting represented ‘the feeling of a vast 
majority of the British people.’156 A public meeting organized by the CCC the 
following day was a send-off for the first consignment of medical supplies for 
China. On 10 October two thousand people demonstrated in Trafalgar Square 
and The Times announced Gilbert Murray had been appointed president of the 
CCC. Herbert Morrison stated ‘I have never known so great a wave of 
spontaneous moral indignation sweep across the British people as that which the 
war in China has called forth.’157  
Daily Telegraph correspondent Pembroke Stephens, continued to send graphic 
descriptions of Chinese suffering at the hands of Japanese forces who, he 
claimed, were now using ‘[p]oisonous and searing gases’.158 The News 
Chronicle reported the Japanese used dum-dum bullets and flame-throwers.159 
The ‘Lord Mayor’s Fund’ received ‘many generous subscriptions’. The Times 
encouraged its readers to sacrifice expenditure on Christmas to contribute to the 	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Mansion House fund.160 Positive Chinese stereotypes permeated the Press. They 
were ‘ancient courageous [and] peace-loving’.161 The Chinese soldier was 
‘under-trained and under-armed; and he still…carries an umbrella’. Yet his 
bravery and stoicism meant he could stand a bombardment that ‘would have 
dislodged any modern infantry under similar conditions.’162 It was a peculiarly 
inter-war English image of ‘muddling through’ against the odds, one that would 
have been familiar to many because of its similarity to Strube’s ‘domesticated’ 
‘little man’.163 Noel-Baker stated in Parliament, ‘[i]n this country there are 
divisions about Spain. There are none about China.’ There was a feeling on the 
Left that China might mobilise the British against the threat of Fascism in a way 
that Spain could not. One New Statesman correspondent stated, the Chinese 
campaign brought ‘the anti-Fascist side large numbers of people who can see in 
China what they did not feel sure about in Spain.’164  
Calls for an economic boycott grew amidst evidence of Conservative unease in 
Parliament. Tory MP, Mr. Moreing considered ‘the Far East’ was of ‘utmost 
importance to the men and women of this country’ and advocated ‘a firmer 
attitude than in the past.’165 Sir A. Southby believed Japan’s ‘horrible methods’ 
stunk ‘in the nostrils of the entire world.’166 Vyvyan Addams advocated 
‘effective action.’167 Chamberlain however, was ‘anxious to avoid the position 
which had been reached with Italy over Abyssinia.’168 At no stage did Eden 
specifically condemn the Japanese. Instead he steered the debate round to the 
idea of a meeting involving the parties to the Nine-Power Treaty of 1922.169 
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In public the government were confident the Brussels Conference would provide 
a settlement to the Sino-Japanese conflict. Privately, however, it was ‘at a loss to 
envisage how the war could be ended.’170 After some jostling for position 
between Britain and America over sanctions, Eden explained to the British 
Embassy in Washington that British policy was designed to ‘steer a middle 
course between [the] two dangers of seeming eager to adopt sanctions and of 
appearing to lag behind the Americans.’171 In fact, Eden and Norman Davis, the 
head of the American delegation, although perhaps the keenest on a sanctions 
policy, were held back by opposition in their own government departments and 
their leaders. Although Chamberlain believed the conference ‘had been a 
complete waste of time’, by building up anticipation of a peaceful settlement the 
government curbed momentum behind public protests.172 Furthermore, Japanese 
bombing was reported as being less intense than it had been in late September. 
On 3 November, three days after the Brussels conference the Italians joined the 
German-Japanese Anti-Commintern Pact. On 1 December it was announced that 
Japan recognised the Franco regime and that Italy recognised Manchukuo. 
Evidence of rapprochement between Right wing states encouraged officials who 
advocated appeasement to greater efforts. Craigie pushed for a settlement 
favourable to the Japanese. He suggested Britain should stop arms traffic to 
China. Eden sided with his advisor H.H. Thomas who suggested that Japan’s 
‘expansionist and aggressive mood’ would make it ‘impossible’ for Anglo-
Japanese friendship.173 This crisis seems to have created more tension within 
government circles than Abyssinia or Spain.  
Influential pro-Chinese voices started to express concern that concentration on 
the Far East was damaging public support for Spain. The New Statesman pointed 
out that the ‘daily press had diverted its attention to China’ because of long-term 
ramifications for the Far East, that British capital had ‘a stake six times as large 
as its investment in Spain’ and ‘unjustifiable defeatism over the prospects of the 
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Spanish Republic’.174 Both campaigns suffered.  The CCC continued to aim at 
garnering public support. They arranged a protest meeting at the Queen’s Hall 
for 6 November. The New Statesman called it ‘remarkable’ not just because it 
was ‘packed and enthusiastic’, but mainly because Chinese speakers ‘can talk to 
an English audience at once and be appreciated. They have the same kind of 
humour as we have and are not too emotional in their approach.’175 Chinese 
speakers spoke regularly at public meetings and Chinese artists were employed 
to perform to raise funds for humanitarian efforts.176  
In December as the Japanese approached Nanking, British and American ships 
were attacked, one Briton and eighteen Americans died on the Panay. The 
House of Commons, according to The Times ‘showed that restiveness which is a 
sure sign of deep feeling.’177 As the paper admonished the Japanese, pointing out 
how ‘curious’ it was ‘that a country most jealous of its national honour should 
set so slight a value upon the elementary decencies of international conduct’, 
Japan’s army readied itself to attack Nanking.178  
After routing the Chinese army, Japanese troops engaged in weeks of wholesale 
slaughter and rape of the civilian population of Nanking. A few westerners 
stayed in the city and created an international safety zone for Chinese refugees. 
They struggled to get messages out of the city, which was under severe Japanese 
censorship.  The violence received scant attention in the British press, which was 
preoccupied with Japanese offences against British vessels. One report in The 
Times gave ‘eye-witness’ accounts testifying that ‘the streets were littered with 
bodies’. However, the article played down the violence by euphemistically 
classifying the terror as ‘mopping up’, suggesting most victims were soldiers 
and implying that the worst was over.179 In reality, Japanese forces shot and 
bayoneted civilians with alacrity. Thousands of men were shot merely on 
suspicion that they had fought with the Chinese army. Women were raped in 
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their hundreds and homes looted and destroyed.180 A respected member of 
Nanking’s foreign community, ‘noted for his fairmindedness’ wrote on 15 
December that ‘the terror is indescribable’.181 A second Times submission, 
published on 20 December, deprecated atrocity ‘tales’ in the New York Times. It 
commented that such stories ‘while they have no direct relation to that of the 
sinking of the Panay, tend to reinforce it and to carry the public mind beyond 
any isolated incident, directly affecting the national pride, into a wider field of 
concern.’182 By focusing on the sinking of an American warship, it undermined 
the veracity of the reports by diverting the readers mind from the specifics of 
Nanking. The fate of Nanking reappeared at the end of January 1938. 
On 28 January the Daily Telegraph and Morning Post revealed ‘the full extent 
of the atrocities…at Nanking’. It referred to ‘wholesale executions, rape and 
looting’, giving some details. The article filled two complete columns but was 
not centrally placed. This was followed up by an article in the Manchester 
Guardian headlined ‘Terror in Nanking.’ Its correspondent, H.J. Timperley, 
detailed some of the brutalities, suggesting this was ‘only a fraction of the 
total’.183 Why then, did these reports fail to inspire public protest?  
Firstly the Manchester Guardian gave the impression that the violence was 
under control. The situation was said to have ‘now improved’ and discipline 
‘restored.’ It explained this was less due to the goodwill of ‘callous’ generals 
than to ‘the anxiety of the diplomatists’ concerned about the eventual failure of 
censorship.184 Neither the Guardian nor the Telegraph followed up with an 
editorial, thus demoting its importance as a news item. Significantly, on the 
same day The Times gave details of a rebuke by General Matsui, the Japanese 
Commander-in-Chief, to his subordinates in Nanking regarding ‘excesses’. This 
was said to be ‘unprecedented’ and his ‘frankness’ would be ‘widely 
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recognised.’185 Secondly, the Japanese Foreign Minister, Koki Hirota, made a 
conciliatory speech in the Japanese Diet, which senior Foreign Office officials 
responded to positively.186 Thirdly, the Foreign Office stifled information about 
the massacre, despite being fully informed by Reverend C.L. Boynton of the 
National Christian Council who sent a daily account of Japanese atrocities. 
Officials had no difficulty in believing the account, with one calling Japanese 
action ‘unpardonable.’187 Yet, referring to the two newspaper reports he added 
that there was ‘nothing to be gained by more publicity,’ particularly as 
conditions had ‘improved’.188 Details of the atrocities continued to filter through 
to the Foreign Office in March. Nigel B. Ronald of the Far Eastern Department 
was ‘glad that the English press has not written up these dreadful tales, for their 
dissemination’ would cause ‘unnecessary bitterness’ and advertise ‘our own 
impotence’.189 In the meantime after ‘privately’ approaching Japanese 
authorities, a ‘special military officer’ was sent to Nanking to investigate. 
Matters, it was reported, had ‘shown considerable improvement.’190 Fourthly, 
the government’s response to Parliamentary questions by Arthur Henderson 
deliberately played down Japanese violence. The first draft of Eden’s reply 
referred to ‘many atrocities…by Japanese forces’.191 The actual reply failed to 
directly implicate Japanese forces and contained the more neutral phrase, 
‘considerable lawlessness and numerous cases of unrestrained violence’. When 
Henderson asked Eden if he was aware of the Daily Telegraph account of 
Nanking, Eden merely replied ‘Of course. I have seen it.’192 Finally, the 
bombing of Barcelona by Nationalist aircraft stole the headlines at the end of 
January just as reports of Nanking became available. The News Chronicle 
headlined with ‘350 Civilians Killed in Barcelona Raids’193 and the Daily 
Telegraph reported ‘Hundreds Missing After Barcelona Air Raids…Bomb Falls 
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on Children at Play in Nursery’.194 Newsreels extensively covered the ‘Horror of 
Barcelona’ and in some cases attached stories on air raid precautions in 
Britain.195 Public outrage forced Chamberlain to make a Commons statement 
expressing his ‘horror and disgust at the indiscriminate bombing’ in 
Barcelona.196 The Spectator, finally withdrew its support for the policy of non-
intervention. The bombing of Barcelona became a major topic of concern 
because of its high profile in the press, fears of aerial bombing and because it 
destroyed hopes that a bombing truce could be reached between the two sides.  
In mid February all stories were eclipsed by Eden’s resignation. Responses to 
Mass Observation on the ‘Eden Resignation, Austrian Crisis and Spain’ are 
notable on two counts. Firstly, it is apparent that the vast majority closely 
followed international events. Secondly, the overwhelming reaction was one of 
disenchantment over Spain. One respondent stated ‘I cannot be more 
disillusioned than I am about it’, another believed ‘[w]e can do nothing about it 
because when we do raise an outcry there is no notice taken’. Yet another 
bemoaned that public opinion was ‘conditioned’ to forget ‘quickly and easily.’ 
One Communist admitted ‘it is too late for Spain.’197 Some perceived Eden’s 
departure as the death knell for the League of Nations because Chamberlain 
made a speech that was widely interpreted as a confirmation of how little faith 
he had in its machinery.  
After the furore over Barcelona had died down, the Far East continued to vie 
with Spain for public attention. In early February the International Peace 
Campaign Conference was held in London. Associated public meetings ‘filled 
the Covent Garden Opera House and the Adelphi theatre simultaneously.’198 The 
Times devoted a column to reporting its deliberations. H.L. Stimson, Secretary 
of State during the Manchurian crisis sent a message urging an ‘unofficial 
boycott of Japanese goods’.199 The Spectator recognised fear of war was the 
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economic boycott and instead suggested consumers should ‘unostentatiously but 
stedfastly [sic], refrain from buying Japanese products.’200 Pro-China activist 
Freda Utley, claimed ‘[t]here is hardly a single considerable line of export which 
does not show a decline in recent months.’201 One Mass Observer stated he 
‘would like to go to protest meetings, but they are too far off.’202 This implies 
the Far East was still a live issue even for those unable to take part in public 
protest. Parliamentary pressure continued to be applied to the government both 
in the Commons and the Lords.203  
By equating the Chinese plight to an English framework, supporters of China 
managed to successfully facilitate understanding of foreign suffering. Winifred 
Galbraith pleaded for the plight of Chinese refugees, asking: 
What would you do if, up for your first term at Cambridge, you heard 
that an invading army had taken London, destroyed your home on, say 
Streatham Common, and taken possession of the telegraph and post 
office so that you could not get into touch with your people? Then 
repeated air-raids destroy your College (Pembroke), and the approach of 
the army northward breaks up the University since the enemy is said to 
kill all professors and students out of hand in case they are Communists. 
You make your way on foot to, say, Nottingham, which is being fortified 
as a front line town. What would you do next? This is the question that 
hundreds of thousands of young men and women and school boys and 
girls have to decide today in China.204 
Furthermore, Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist movement, which had until a few 
years previously been the perceived cause of anti-British agitation in China, was 
now portrayed as ‘a kind of Puritan national resurrection movement, a revised 
Confucianism-cum-Y.M.C.A. ideal, rather than a Fascist movement.’205 
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Attributed to Chiang were the characteristics of self-discipline, ‘determination’, 
‘loyalty’, ‘simplicity, modesty and lack of display’.206 Furthermore, his devotion 
to Christianity meant even ‘at the front, even when under artillery fire one could 
always see [his] copy of the Bible on his desk’.207 He had ‘[a]lmost overnight’ 
welded China into a ‘united nation’.208 China was no longer a divided, 
stagnating and anarchic country. ‘Japanese aggression’ had ‘produced in China a 
new unity and a national consciousness more profound than any in its modern 
history.’209  
In May two more instances occurred to reinvigorate public indignation over 
China. Firstly, the Japanese were seen by British forces to execute unarmed 
Chinese prisoners at Amoy. In Parliament, Noel-Baker accused the Japanese of 
violating the Hague Conventions. The Foreign Office was convinced that reports 
were correct because of ‘what the Japanese did at Nanking’.210 R.A. Butler, 
Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, condemned the action but refused a request 
to make a formal protest to Tokyo.211 Instead Cadogan spoke to the Japanese 
Ambassador, and fearing mutual ‘recriminations’ agreed to ‘let the matter 
rest.’212 Public opinion was again being carefully managed. Away from public 
scrutiny the Foreign Office resolved not to let atrocity reports detract from their 
policy. One official commented that so long as diplomatic relations with China’s 
government continued then recognition of their sovereignty over occupied areas 
should continue. However, this did not prevent them 
from accepting the fact of Japanese occupation & making the best 
arrangements we can with the de facto authorities for the protection of 
our interests on a de facto basis. There is nothing unfamiliar about the 
problem: it is Spain all over again.213 
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The resumption of Japanese bombing over Canton was the other factor 
provoking renewed public outrage. On 31 May the Archbishop of Canterbury, 
was prompted by missionaries working with the Church Missionary Society in 
China, to write to Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax because the bombing had 
‘moved them to indignation.’ Cosmo Lang was against further public protest 
because when he had taken part in the Albert Hall meeting in October it had 
caused ‘considerable anxiety among Japanese Christians.’214 Halifax duly 
instructed the British Ambassador in Tokyo to protest and wrote back to Lang 
that previous protests had had ‘a good effect’, arguing that the Japanese had 
since ‘confined themselves almost entirely to military objectives until the recent 
bombings at Canton.’215 He failed to mention the atrocities at Nanking. 
In response to dogged Parliamentary questioning from Henderson the Foreign 
Office suggested four lines of defence. Firstly, queries over Japanese atrocities 
were merged with questions over the bombing of ‘British ships in Spanish 
waters’, thus diffusing the focus on specific atrocities. Secondly, Butler was 
encouraged to refer to an ‘interdepartmental survey’ which would give him 
leeway pointing out ‘the great difficulties in the way of making any rapid 
progress.’ Thirdly, he should point to previous government protests and finally 
refer to relevant ‘League Resolutions’, any British speeches at Geneva on ‘Spain 
or China’ and ‘endeavours to enlist the good offices of other Governments’.216 
All were designed to fudge the issue. 
Officials only showed indignation when the Japanese government attempted to 
blame the Chinese for the raids, suggesting the presence of anti-aircraft guns 
drove the bombers so high that they were ‘not able to identify their targets with 
reasonable certainty’. A. Blunt, stationed in Canton, pointed out that if they 
made no protest then, ‘if ever there were an air attack on London’ then Britons 
could suffer from this strategy. ‘The Japanese contention’ he wrote, was  
the old, old argument that because circumstances make it difficult or 
impossible for the rules to be observed therefore they may be ignored. 	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This is the argument which the Germans put forward in the war to justify 
their unrestricted submarine campaign.217  
Halifax endorsed this view and informed British military chiefs. Chamberlain 
was forced to admit ‘most of the bombs fell on places which cannot be 
considered as of military importance.’ When accused of merely ‘holding up their 
hands in horror’, the Prime Minister replied ‘[i]f we could hold up in horror the 
hands of other people we would certainly do so’, thus placing the blame on a 
lack of international cooperation, which he had, in fact, done little to 
encourage.218 
As The Spectator re-invoked the accusation of ‘frightfulness’ against Japan, the 
CCC organised a week of protest.219 This included a ‘Protest and Boycott 
Parade’ on 13 and 14 June. On 15 June there was a ‘Great Protest Meeting’ at 
Queen’s Hall held jointly with the International Peace Campaign and the LNU 
including speakers Lord Robert Cecil and Harold Nicolson, followed by a march 
to the Japanese Embassy. On 16 June, MPs were lobbied in the Commons and 
on Sunday there was a ‘Mass Demonstration’ in Trafalgar Square.220 This was 
followed by an attempt to present a resolution to the Japanese Embassy, 
‘vigorously’ protesting against the barbarous bombardment of Canton.221 The 
Japanese Ambassador refused to accept the resolution stating that the bombing 
of Canton was being carried out ‘to demoralise the Chinese and to prevent 
reinforcements coming from there.’222 The following week a protest meeting 
against the bombing of Spain and China was held in Stevenson Square in 
Manchester. It was organized jointly by the Manchester Spain and China 
Committees and presided over by the Chairman of the Manchester Borough 
Labour Party.223  
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Press, 2003) p.66. 
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On 14 August the CCC called another day of protest against Japanese bombings. 
Special services of intercession were held in St. Paul’s, Westminster Abbey, 
Westminster Cathedral, St. Martin in the Fields, the City Temple, the Methodist 
Central Hall and Kingsway Hall as well as others throughout the country. On 15 
August a deputation led by Canon Lewis Donaldson, Archdeacon of 
Westminster, the Reverend S.W. Hughes, Secretary of the National Free Church 
Council and Arthur Clegg of the CCC visited the Japanese Embassy. This was 
followed by a parade along Oxford Street and a meeting in Hyde Park.224 The 
event was widely covered in the national and London press, especially because 
the Assistant Japanese Military Attaché assaulted Mary Jones, the Assistant 
Secretary of the CCC. By September the CCC had held more than one thousand 
meetings throughout the country and distributed over a million Aid China 
leaflets. Although there were signs that the Far East was regaining momentum in 
the public sphere, events in Czechoslovakia finally diverted attention.   
Despite the British government’s pro-Nationalist sympathies, after Guernica British 
opinion remained predominantly on the side of the Republican cause, especially when it 
became clear that it was the underdog. It is telling that ardent pro-Francoist and 
Conservative MP Henry ‘Chips’ Channon wrote in his diary in the Spring of 1938 that 
‘Franco advances – victory is clearly his. He has been so misunderstood, so 
misrepresented in this country that to champion him as I have done, is dangerous from a 
Constituency point of view.’225 For a constituency that had voted for one of the most 
reactionary individuals in Parliament this admission was significant. It arguably shows 
the effect of Spanish atrocity on the British mind. On the issue of China it appeared that 
both the British government and their supporters in the press had learnt lessons over 
Spain about how to control and channel public indignation. One of the most interesting 
aspects of the combinatory effect of Spain and China is that the World War One myth 
that the Germans were in fact innocent of atrocities was finally challenged, if not 
altogether refuted. The metonymic expression ‘frightfulness’ once again became 
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common parlance but still there was resistance to the notion that Germans were capable 
of such behaviour.226
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Chapter Six 
Jews Under German Rule: Hierarchies of Compassion  
 
In Germany during February and March 1933 the Nazi Party launched a nationwide 
campaign against Jews. Stormtroopers smashed Jewish businesses, beat up individual 
Jews, and used ‘naked terror to force the dismissal or suspension of Jewish office 
workers and civil servants.1 This marked the beginning of twelve years relentless anti-
Jewish measures. Nazi inspired violence was fully understood in Britain from the 
earliest weeks of the regime. Yet compared to other atrocities of the same period, 
violence against German Jews had little impact in Britain. Other atrocities, although 
not uncontested, impacted on the prevailing political and ideological consensus. This 
was because in these cases public indignation gathered enough momentum to become a 
force to be reckoned with. In the case of Jews, countervailing forces cut across 
compassion.  
When Hitler came to power there was a strong pro-German consensus in Britain. 
Atrocities committed by German troops during the war had become a ‘myth’. Most 
people believed the atrocity stories were either fabricated or embellished. Worse, 
Britain was held responsible for this travesty. This view was accepted on all sides of 
the political spectrum throughout the 1930s and deep into World War Two. It was one 
reason why the Versailles Treaty was vilified and why Hitler was given such leeway. It 
was also a factor obstructing sympathy for the Jews. The ‘myth’ of German atrocities 
combined with another fiction; that Jews invariably exaggerated their own suffering. 
For those in power or close to it, recent events in Poland contained ample practical 
evidence.2 If English Jews wished to protest against German brutality they either had to 
show ‘English’ restraint or galvanize Britons to make their case. The inertia they 
encountered was considerable.  
The gradual escalation of violence against the Jews interspersed with Hitler’s periodic 
‘protestations of peaceful intent to induce a sense of security abroad’, might give the 
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impression that it was difficult for foreign observers to react with certainty to events.3 
It is also argued, presumably with the ‘Final Solution’ in mind, that the magnitude of 
atrocity made it difficult to comprehend. Both cannot be true. Its incremental nature 
was more likely to facilitate understanding of brutality than undermine it. Furthermore, 
when the British public united to condemn the bombing of Guernica or Shanghai it did 
not mean they had to imagine the complete destruction of the Basques or the Chinese. 
In the same way, when the British reacted to anti-Jewish brutality in 1933 or 1938 it 
did not require them to envisage the Final Solution. When news of the destruction of 
European Jews was officially acknowledged, mainstream newspapers were quick to 
place it in the context of ten years increasing violence. In other words, contemporaries 
placed the terrible events within a familiar frame of reference. It is therefore arguable 
that before the war the nature of Jewish persecution came well within the grounds of 
comprehensibility and during the war this prior knowledge facilitated understanding of 
what was happening in the Final Solution. Furthermore, the reactions to atrocities in 
Abyssinia, Spain and China show that the British public was no stranger to death on a 
massive scale. 
Many commentators, including Andrew Sharf, Walter Laqueur and Tony Kushner have 
wrestled with the seeming intransigence of the British conscience when confronted 
with anti-Jewish violence.4 Kushner’s argument that the illiberal nature of Nazi 
violence could not penetrate the British liberal imagination has been particularly 
influential. By highlighting the acceptability or otherwise of ‘diversity’ and the terms 
upon which ‘difference’ was accommodated as of ‘central importance in British and 
American confrontations with the Jewish crisis’, Kushner points towards the generic 
flaws in liberalism as the major reason for lack of compassionate response. Yet by 
placing reactions to anti-Jewish violence in the wider context of British responses to 
other contemporary atrocities the strength of Kushner’s paradigm becomes 
questionable. British reactions to other man-made humanitarian crises in the same 
period were extensive and intense. They often took on the characteristics of a national 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Dispatch by Rumbold in April 1933, which became known in the Foreign Office as the ‘Mein Kampf’ 
dispatch. Read by Ramsey MacDonald and circulated to the Cabinet. Cited in Kershaw, Ian, Making 
Friends With Hitler: Lord Londonderry and Britain’s Road to War (London: Penguin, 2005) p.41.  
4 Sharf, Andrew, The British Press and the Jews Under Nazi Rule (London: Oxford University Press, 
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campaign with indignation spreading well beyond those who had an immediate or 
vested interest. Either the liberal imagination prevented understanding and 
compromised compassionate action for all foreign victims, or it cannot serve as an 
overall framework for exploring responses.  
Reactions to foreign atrocity in the 1930s show many Britons believed in a tradition of 
compassionate concern for the oppressed; that it was part of the national character. 
Evidence suggests identification with victims was paramount. Response to foreign 
atrocity was deeply connected to a shared sense of British identity. National 
‘characteristics’ were conferred on a disparate set of victims, who then became worthy 
causes. In the case of Jews, this rarely, if ever occurred. Moreover, this belief dictated 
action. Responses were certainly complex and were in some cases ambivalent. Overall, 
however, Jews were subject to a hierarchy of compassion and the whim of memory. 
Atrocities against Abyssinians, Spaniards and Chinese evoked stronger and wider 
responses than the Jews. In the narrower context of Germans and Jews, the former 
evoked more persistent understanding and sympathy than the latter, partly because of 
the misappropriated memory of earlier atrocities. In order to verify that memory of 
German atrocities, a hierarchy of compassion and perceptions of Englishness worked 
together to condition responses to Jewish persecution, evidence and sources will be 
examined over a period of ten years. 
During early March 1933 London press offices received irrefutable evidence of 
escalating violence in Germany.5 Agents of the Nazi Party were known to be 
instigators. Victims included Communists, Socialists, pacifists and Jews.6 The 
Spectator reported Germany was under ‘martial law and the tyranny of gunmen’. Many 
feared a ‘massacre of Jews and “Marxists.”’7 The same journal took issue with a 
London-based German correspondent who attempted to ‘repel the charges’ of brutality. 
If correct then the reports of British correspondents had been ‘consistently 
misrepresenting the situation’, whereas the ‘facts’ stood ‘incontestable.’8 The Times, 
confirmed accounts of ‘violence and intimidation’ everywhere came in ‘from official 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 New Statesman and Nation, 4 March 1933, p.241. 
6 Karl Schleunes suggests that by March, Jews were top of the SA’s list of potential victims. Schleunes, 
Karl, The Twisted Road to Auschwitz: Nazi Policy Toward German Jews 1933-1939 (Urbana and 
Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1990) p.71. See also, Evans, Richard, The Coming of the Third 
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and trustworthy private sources.’9 Events were widely reported, the facts verified and 
the nature of the terror was clearly understood. The press was the main channel through 
which the British public comprehended events.10 It was in a unique position to forge 
opinion through the dissemination of information and comment. Yet alongside 
disapproval, press coverage contained countervailing discourses that diminished the 
impact of anti-Jewish violence on public opinion.11 
Since the war Germans had been recast in the British imagination as civilised and the 
victims of injustice.12 For most, it seemed unbelievable they were confirming wartime 
interpretations of their character. For example, Lieutenant-Colonel Acland-Troyte 
questioned in Parliament whether ‘events show that the mentality which caused the 
Belgian atrocities in 1914 still exists in Germany?’13 As a minority view it was 
ignored. Commentators of all political hues searched for other explanations, arguing 
the situation was temporary and a ‘democratic Germany’ would ‘re-emerge.’14 
Underlying this was an unshakable belief in the German character. The Daily Express 
predicted ‘the disciplined intellect’ of Germany would ‘assert itself, modifying the 
forces of reaction’.15 The News Chronicle, believing most Germans found the brutality 
‘repugnant’, optimistically predicted ‘sober opinion’ and the ‘sobering effect’ of office 
would prevail.16 Germans were generally bifurcated into moderates and extremists and 
the former were expected to prevail. German leaders were similarly divided. Hermann 
Göring’s inflammatory speeches cast him as the latter,17 while Nationalists were 
potentially a ‘moderating influence’18 along with Hitler.19 A.L. Kennedy of The Times 
stated, a ‘struggle is beginning between Goring & Goebbels, the extremists, against 
Hitler, Backed [sic] by Rosenberg, who are moderates.’20 
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The Times selectively reported Hitler’s speech on 10 March to stormtroopers, 
emphasising moderate aspects and omitting passages designed to incite.21 The Nazi 
government’s claim that upheaval was ‘inevitable’ was ‘not…unreasonable’ because of 
the impossibility of drawing ‘fine distinctions’ in ‘national revolution’.22 Instead, 
‘provocateurs’ were partly blamed.23 It was ‘difficult’ to control ‘irresponsible 
elements’ in ‘so big a movement’.24 Thus the first editorial on the ‘Hitler Revolution’ 
was apologetic.25 Referring to the myth of unimpeachable wartime conduct by the 
German military,26 it stated, Hitler’s ‘young’ troops ‘never learnt discipline in the old 
Army’, but ‘sedulously imitated the methods of their chief opponents’.27 The Times 
therefore deflected charges of brutality towards Nazi dissenters. The transitory nature 
of the violence was reinforced by the claim that Hitler’s ‘seizure of power’ was ‘almost 
complete’. In any case ‘[n]o one expects revolutions to be made with rose-water’, and 
Hitler had now enforced ‘the strictest discipline’.28 That Germany was in the throws of 
a ‘revolution’ provided mitigation.29 Prime Minister, Ramsay MacDonald told the 
German Ambassador in April 1933, ‘he had not believed’ excesses had occurred and 
‘he understood very well the character of and circumstances attending a revolution.’30 
Although the Manchester Guardian was the most critical of Nazi violence, the Daily 
Telegraph also highlighted its anti-Jewish nature.31 However, sympathy for the Jews 
took its place in a hierarchy of issues, above which many of the press and the public 
felt more strongly. The end of Parliamentary democracy by the Enabling Law was one 	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March 1933, p.6. 
22 Times, 11 March 1933, p.9. 
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7. 
30 Cited in Griffiths, Richard, Fellow Travellers of the Right: British Enthusiasts for Nazi Germany 
1933-9 (London: Constable, 1980) p.116. 
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of these.32 Commentators found it hard to believe German ‘sober opinion’ endorsed 
Hitler’s violent political control. The News Chronicle thought the matter should be 
settled internally.33 Having recognised the ‘Funeral of a Parliament’,34 the liberal 
Chronicle distanced itself from active protest. Its editorial comment lacked the 
crusading zeal, which later characterized its response to crises in Abyssinia, Spain and 
China. 
News of American Jewish protests marked a change.35 Right and Left wing papers 
embellished the extent to which Jews could influence international finance. On 24 
March, the Express, in tried and tested fashion, reported that globally Jews had ‘banded 
together as one man to declare war’ on Germany. Germans would be forced to pay 
dearly because it was ‘a heavy borrower in foreign money markets, where Jewish 
influence is considerable.’36 The Left wing Daily Herald gave front-page coverage to a 
‘‘Jews’ World boycott of Germany’.37 ‘Jewish financiers’ were ‘now “working” the 
money market’ until persecution ceased.38 The News Chronicle wrote of a ‘Jewish 
Storm Against Hitler’. German exporters were ‘[a]larmed’ and their government forced 
into a ‘[d]enial of [t]ortures’.39 This angle was not limited to the popular press. The 
Observer believed Hitlerism would ‘pay dear’ if persecution continued.40 A cross 
section of newspapers portrayed a battle between two great forces with Jews wielding 
ultimate power through financial control. Jews in western Europe and the U.S. did have 
some economic and political levers, but their power was puny and the contest unequal, 
although facts never got in the way of exaggeration, stereotype and myth. This 
undercut the idea of Jews as victims.  
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Despite the reported indignation of the Anglo-Jewish community,41 the Board of 
Deputies protested in a restrained ‘English’ manner.42 President, Neville Laski asserted 
that their quarrel was ‘not with Germany’, even conceding ‘no revolution is without its 
excesses.’43 They were also highly sensitive to charges that atrocity reports had been 
embellished and concerned lest exaggerations made things worse.44 This was on the 
back of intelligence from Bernard Kahn, Director of the Joint Reconstruction Fund, 
representing the German Jewish community. He described Hitler as a ‘moderate’ and 
warned Anglo-Jewish leaders to be careful of ‘exaggerated’ reporting for fear of 
repercussions.45 The Zionist Organization in London urged Stephen Wise, President of 
the American Jewish Congress, to ‘dispel wild exaggerations’.46 As a result, Jewish 
representatives undermined the potential for raising indignation. However, less 
restraint would have laid them open to the charge of conforming to popular pre-
conceptions. They were caught in a double blind. Effectively, Anglo-Jewry gambled on 
calibrating their response to the much-lauded British tradition of compassion. Laski 
hoped a mass protest meeting ‘representative of all phases of English public life’ would 
be held.47 It did not happen in the way he envisaged.  
In March, Parliament debated German events.48 Foreign Secretary, Sir John Simon 
denied the treatment of German Jews had any bearing on international relations as 
defined by the League of Nations Covenant. In fact, League rules could have been 
applied but unlike the Abyssinian crisis, lack of public pressure to intervene meant the 
government could interpret the relevant article of the Covenant as they wished.49 	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Salford M.P., John Morris tabled a Commons motion on 30 March, expressing 
Britain’s ‘ancient tradition, to respect the numerical weakness and defenceless 
position’ of German Jews. MacDonald evaded a full-scale debate citing pressing 
‘Parliamentary business.’50 In the Lords, Viscount Cecil encouraged the government to 
lodge a verbal protest. The Archbishop of Canterbury, whilst stressing he was 
motivated by ‘sincere friendship for the Germans’, supported him. Viscount Hailsham, 
the Secretary of State for War, rebutted these pleas on the grounds that representation 
might ‘defeat the very objects Lord Cecil had in mind.’51 In other words, if the 
government intervened the violence might intensify. Effectively German Jews were 
hostages.52 
Towards the end of March most of the serious press implied the German leadership 
was reining in violence.53 This, together with belief in Jewish power, meant that when 
the German government announced a boycott of Jewish businesses to counteract 
‘foreign atrocity propaganda’ for 1 April,54 the press tended to characterise the action 
as ‘reprisals’.55 Limiting the boycott to one day was interpreted according to a 
persistent belief in the strength of Jewish finance. Germany’s foreign trade would be 
‘strangled’ and Hitler’s government unable to service its debt.56 The Telegraph 
reported ‘responsible German statesmen’ were aware of ‘the dangers of antagonising 
the strong Jewish influences in the world’s money and commercial markets.’57 The 
idea of powerful ‘Jewish finance’ also affected influential economists. John Maynard 
Keynes stated of Germany ‘[t]hey’re doing something very queer with their money…It 
may be the Jews are taking away their capital.’58 Hjalmar Schacht, President of the 	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Reichsbank, and Foreign Minister Konstantin von Neurath pressured Hitler to halt the 
boycott for fear of stoking anti-German feeling abroad.59 The real threat to the German 
economy emanated from the possibility of Jewish protests spilling over to non-Jews. 
The Times echoed the Telegraph, lauding Hitler for ordering restraint which was 
‘obeyed almost everywhere’.60 The Times believed Nazi leaders wanted an ‘excuse’ to 
end the boycott to salvage prestige and maintain unity.61 By distancing Nazi leaders 
from the violence, the myth that they were motivated by rational values was 
maintained. Vernon Bartlett, News Chronicle correspondent and later admirer of 
Republican Spain’s stoicism under the Fascist onslaught, in an article for The Listener 
expressed ‘astonishment’ at Nazi restraint believing ‘moderate Germans’ were 
‘disgusted’ by the anti-Jewish campaign.62 
Letters defending the new regime reinforced imbalance in the public debate. Eleanor 
Rathbone, Independent MP for the Combined Universities and staunch Jewish 
advocate, expressed frustration about letters to the Press from ‘responsible Germans’ 
which showed Germany was ‘not yet disillusioned’ with Nazism.63 Many drew 
attention to atrocity propaganda during the war. The Daily Telegraph and News 
Chronicle published a letter from sixteen London-based German journalists 
complaining that ‘false rumours and reports’ about atrocities were reviving the ‘general 
psychosis created during the war.’64 The Spectator backed ‘British correspondents on 
the spot’.65 This prompted a barrage of protests. These cited the ‘painfully 
reminiscent…campaign of defamation which is one of the most inglorious pages of the 
Great War’,66 and the ‘embittered atmosphere of mutual recrimination’.67 Patrick du 
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Val from Cambridge was angered by the publication of Louis Raemakers’ ‘anti-
German cartoon’, asking ‘is it not time to drop the cry of German atrocities’ which had 
been ‘hastily believed.’68 The Spectator’s fragile attempt to highlight persecution was 
overshadowed by a feature article by ex-editor Evelyn Wrench, who claimed eye-
witness status. As well as highlighting as ‘fact’ the disproportionate number of Jews in 
the medical profession, he pointed to the Black and Tans as evidence that 
‘Governments often do what large sections of the Community disapprove of’. This 
gave weight to the notion that violence was temporary and replicated 1920s arguments, 
which saw German ‘frightfulness’ sidelined in British atrocity discourse. For Wrench, 
criticizing German violence was hypocritical as there was little difference between 
German and British governments.69  
The press invoked the spectre of the last war. The News Chronicle editorialized that 
reporting of Jewish treatment was ‘sensational’ and ‘distorted’, warning that feelings in 
Britain ‘unpleasantly resemble the sort of feelings aroused during the war.’70 
According to the Telegraph the ‘new Nazi “frightfulness” was not even frightful. It was 
called off before it reached that dangerous pitch.’71 Atrocities against Jews were 
specifically designated as exaggerated and the ‘unjustified’ nature of British responses 
to wartime German atrocities was invoked as common sense. These myths intertwined 
to dampen indignation. 
On 4 April The Times reported ‘growing anxiety’ amongst M.P.s. Two early day 
motions called on the government to make friendly representations to Germany.72 A 
Parliamentary debate on 13 April reflected increased concern over Germany’s 
ambitions, if not their treatment of Jews. The Labour opposition wanted the 
government to challenge what they saw as the threat to democracy in Europe through 
the machinery of the League of Nations. Ex-Foreign Secretary Austen Chamberlain, 
speaking in the Commons, refused to discuss ‘internal happenings of Germany’, 	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limiting his criticisms to ‘foreign affairs.’ He challenged the government to refrain 
from meeting German demands for revision of the Versailles Treaty, being more 
concerned about the fate of Poles living in the ‘Polish Corridor’ who might ‘come 
under the heel’ of a Germany ‘afflicted by this narrow, exclusive, aggressive spirit’. He 
used Germany’s Jews as an example of what might happen if Britain acquiesced to 
German demands.73 Chamberlain’s focus on threats to European stability and the 
potential fate of Poles earned him the acclaim of the House. His reference to the 
suffering of Jews was marginal but encouraged some M.P.s concerned at their plight.74 
Simon’s reply emphasised Parliamentary feeling represented ‘not a Jewish outlook’ but 
an ‘Anglo-Saxon outlook.’75 He effectively distanced the government from Jewish 
protests. Despite Churchill’s assertion that it was ‘a matter for public opinion to bring 
itself to bear on the course of events in Germany’, the debate marked the zenith of 
British indignation in 1933, not the spark for a public crusade.76 
Anglo-Jewry attempted to galvanise support for broad-based public protests. Laski 
asked the Lord Mayor of London for permission to hold a protest meeting at the 
Guildhall. He was told that ‘sympathetic consideration’ would only be given if 
agreement came from ‘influential quarters’.77 This referred to the Foreign Office who 
did not acquiesce. One official stated such meetings would cause ‘moderate people’ 
who viewed Germany’s ‘doings with disfavour, to rally to its support.’78 Jewish-led 
meetings, Laski urged, should show ‘dignity and restraint’ and he especially welcomed 
meetings of ‘a non-Jewish character’ as one of these ‘was worth all the Jewish 
meetings which could possibly be held’.79 Non-Jews did attend some meetings, for 
example the Bishop of Birmingham, the President of the Methodist Church and the 
Lord Mayor of Manchester, but support was patchy. Leo Amery suggested, of a 
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meeting in Birmingham that support ‘was not specific Jewish sympathy but [a] general 
feeling about fair play…influenced the audience.’80  
The Board of Deputies convened a ‘sub-committee’ to co-ordinate meetings and 
produce a pamphlet to enlighten the public about Germany’s treatment of Jews.81 
Twenty-five thousand copies were to be sold at newsagents. It was also circulated in 
the Commons and Lords and to ‘learned Societies, Lord Mayors and Mayors, Clubs, 
Libraries, Labour and Women’s organisations, public men and public institutions’ as 
well as the national, regional and religious press.82 The sub-committee had some 
success claiming to have arranged ‘[n]umerous public meetings’ at which 
condemnation of the persecution was ‘received from all quarters, non-Jewish as well as 
Jewish.’83 This information was passed to the Foreign Office. The Board acted as a 
prompt and a conduit.84 During a short period after the boycott, Anglo-Jewish leaders 
acted on the possibility of a real manifestation of British indignation. This suggests a 
degree of optimism existed in Anglo-Jewish circles in 1933 based on belief in Britain’s 
compassionate tradition. This was perhaps reinforced by the creation of the High 
Commission for German Refugees and in May the Academic Assistance Council ‘to 
accommodate refugee scholars’.85 Optimism however, was largely unfounded. Unlike 
the subsequent Abyssinian affair and the response to atrocities against civilians in 
Spain and China, there was little spontaneity or momentum behind expressions of 
support.  
With regard to the content of meetings, messages of support were tempered by 
acceptance of Nazi explanations of violence, sympathy for Germany, overriding 
confidence in the German character and fear of war. The Bishop of Birmingham ‘was 
sure’ brutality ‘during the recent revolution’ was ‘gravely regretted’ by most Germans. 
He ‘expected from the German people a generosity of temper such as we ourselves, 	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after periods of excitement, could display.’86 By referring to past British atrocities he 
arguably invoked a sense of shame and reinforced sensitivity to charges of hypocrisy in 
Britain. Furthermore, the Bishop made favourable comparisons between Germans and 
Britons. Just as the British had argued that atrocities in India and Ireland had been 
aberrations, so German violence was cast as temporary because it was alien to the 
national disposition. Lloyd George, a prominent and effective critic of the 
government’s handling of the Abyssinian crisis, addressed the Women’s National 
Liberal Federation at Scarborough. He suggested two questions needed answers, firstly 
‘the abominable treatment of the Jews in Germany’ and secondly, ‘the abominable 
treatment of Germany by the Allies’ over disarmament.87 It is a measure of public 
feeling that the principal British author of the Versailles settlement responded to the 
majority view by displaying sympathy for Germany. It is also significant he mentioned 
Jewish and German suffering at the same time. Privately he believed Hitler had ‘not 
shown half the ferocity which Cromwell showed towards the Irish Catholics.’88 Lloyd 
George’s reaction was typical of other public figures. 
Hitler’s first foreign policy speech was less virulent than feared. It affected British 
responses. The Times claimed it showed that ‘[b]ehind the demagogue and showman’ 
was a ‘statesman’. His speech was said to be ‘earnestly and moderately worded’, could 
have been ‘spoken by any of his recent predecessors’ and represented the views of both 
‘official Germany’ and ‘the German people.’89 The presence of nationalists in the 
German Cabinet reinforced the view that Hitler was influenced by moderates and 
speaking for the German majority. Hitler demanded revision of Versailles but affirmed 
countries surrounding Germany had a right to exist and appeared to reject military 
action.90 The Times uncritically accepted this despite violence and on-going legislative 
oppression. The editorial helped to create a benign sense of continuity between 
Germany past and present.  
Despite Anglo-Jewish warnings that the German government was excluding Jews from 
mainstream life by ‘administrative chicanery’, the Foreign Office perceived a change 	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of heart within the German hierarchy.91 Sir Horace Rumbold had on 26 April filed a 
despatch stating it would be misleading to expect ‘a return to sanity or a serious 
modification’ of Nazi views. On 11 May he maintained Hitler was ‘responsible’ for 
German anti-Jewish policy.92 Yet on 16 May, the day before Hitler’s speech, he 
reported the regime was ‘steadily consolidating itself’ with ‘signs lately of a saner and 
more responsible attitude…[by] Hitler, Goebbels and Göring.’93 At the end of May, in 
a letter to Vansittart, Rumbold interpreted Hitler’s speech as ‘a volte face’ compared to 
‘the last thirteen years’.94 In under a month, Rumbold seems to have forgotten his 
previous warning. He now implied Hitler’s restraint would increase in proportion to the 
security of his position. Indeed, he suggested ‘Hitler has even given way a little where 
his pet racial theories are concerned. The stronger Hitler becomes at home, the more he 
can afford to be conciliatory abroad.’95 Presumably, Hitler’s alleged compromise on his 
‘racial theories’ was the shift from outright violence to legislative persecution.96 
Although he acknowledged Hitler would ‘not shrink from downright brutality…to stay 
in power’,97 Rumbold’s despatch arguably encouraged torpor. Vansittart submitted 
Rumbold’s ‘illuminating analysis’ to the Foreign Secretary.98 It was ominous for all 
persecuted groups that the respected British Ambassador saw the strengthening of 
Hitler’s position as crucial to peace. Hitler became a man with whom Britain could do 
business. Yet consolidating diplomatic relations with the Nazi government meant 
Jewish protests became an irritant. For example, a resolution supporting Jews by the 
London Textile Trade was dismissed on the basis they were ‘under close Jewish 
control’.99  
Articles ‘explaining’ Nazism featured in the press. For example, Enid Bagnold in The 
Times provided snippets of interviews with Germans who predominantly backed Hitler. 
She sympathetically explained German anti-Semitism with a Jew providing the only 
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note of dissonance.100 Bagnold’s overall impression was that Nazism gave hope and 
purpose to ordinary Germans.101 Sympathetic pieces also appeared in Liberal and Left 
wing publications. The New Statesman published a long letter by Clifford Sharp, 
another visitor to ‘Hitler’s Berlin’.102 Sharp highlighted the ‘injustices and stupidities’ 
of Versailles and post war Allied ‘blunders’.103 Although recent events were seen as a 
‘[r]evolution’, the regime was portrayed as electorally legitimate. He advised readers to 
accept an ‘era of Hitlerism as long as’ those of Mussolini, Stalin, or Kemal. Sharp 
acknowledged the prospects for Jews were ‘bad’ and that legally-based persecution 
would ‘continue indefinitely’ but ‘without further violence’. He mitigated German anti-
Semitism, suggesting that Jews had taken advantage of German post-war difficulties 
and provoked ‘popular hatred as food profiteers, usurers, anti-national intriguers, and 
so on.’104 It appeared therefore that German opinion had a point about Jews who 
brought violence on themselves. Sharp claimed Hitler would probably establish a 
constitutional monarchy similar to that of Britain. He therefore connected Germanness 
and Englishness. Both allegedly preferred gradual change and venerated institutions. 
Sharp’s letter did not provoke editorial comment and prompted only one adverse 
response and that was from a Jew.105  
The News Chronicle sent Liberal M.P. Robert Bernays to Germany. Bernays was from 
an old Jewish family, long since Christian. His report on ‘the Jewish problem’ 
acknowledged that violence had largely ceased but noted ‘atrocities to-day are more 
calculated and systematic.’106 Indignation, however, gave way to an analysis of 
German anti-Semitism. Jews had ‘flaunted their riches’, adopted ‘a mocking, cynical, 
destructive kind of outlook’ and ‘made vast profits out of the inflation.’ However, their 
‘real crime’ was to be ‘cleverer’ than Germans and therefore ‘so inflamed [their] 
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inferiority complex that they have converted it into a persecution complex.’107 German 
Jews were portrayed as not just distinct from Germans but parasites that undermined a 
vulnerable nation. Moreover, a hierarchy of compassion is evident in Bernays’ critique. 
Whereas Germans were not unlike the English in preferring simplicity, so-called 
Jewish extravagance ran counter to this.108 This reinforced the notion that Jews brought 
persecution upon themselves. Although he advocated a ‘relief fund’ for Jews, more 
generally he believed ‘moral pressure’ should be applied to Germany. In other words, 
he recognised Jewish suffering, but he echoed something of old liberal imperialism, a 
belief in the superiority of Britain’s ‘voice’. The News Chronicle, which played such 
an effective part in the campaign to aid China, thus undercut indignation.109  
In June the Board of Deputies reported, ‘[t]he German situation is tending to lose its 
novelty and so its news value.’110 This was acknowledged by Vansittart, who in an 
interview with Laski on 29 June at the Foreign Office, noted that the press ‘except for 
the Manchester Guardian’ were ‘less prolific’ about Germany.111 At a subsequent 
meeting on 18 July the Permanent Under-Secretary insisted any form of boycott should 
be ‘a personal and quiet matter’. When Laski mentioned that a planned protest meeting 
was to be held on 27 July, Vansittart stated ‘[h]e would view with anxiety and alarm 
any fiery speeches’ suggesting ‘speeches should be carefully edited beforehand.’112  
Jewish leaders hoped this meeting, to be held at Queens Hall, would reflect the 
indignation associated with British traditions of altruism. Their inability to secure a 
venue symbolic of national feeling such as Mansion House or the Albert Hall reflected 
official obduracy and lack of public interest. News of the meeting was covered in the 	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national and local press although without achieving headline status. Members of both 
houses were invited, as were a selection of scholars, authors and journalists.113 It is 
unclear how many actually attended. Most major church groups were represented and 
the main speaker was the Archbishop of Canterbury who concluded that ‘it was not 
only the Jewish community who were suffering. It was increasingly their fellow 
Christians in Germany.’114 The resultant resolution pleaded for tolerance and equality 
for Germany’s Jewish minority but disclaimed ‘any right or desire to interfere in the 
internal affairs of another country’ and appealed for ‘friendly relations’ between 
Britain and Germany.115 Prominent humanitarians denied the centrality of Jewish 
suffering. Expressions of protest were laced with deference to Germany. The 
accompanying editorial in the Manchester Guardian attacked Germany’s ‘morbid 
racialism’ but also stated that Jews had achieved ‘more than [their] proper place’. 
Furthermore, it could not be ‘denied that there are unpleasant elements in Jewish 
culture like those which have displayed themselves in [a dispirited] Germany in the last 
dozen years.’116 Pro- and anti-Semitic arguments mingled with empathy for the 
Germans and created a case detrimental to inspiring sympathy.  
Two other protest meetings occurred in 1933. One was organised by British Jews who 
disagreed with Laski’s restraint, the other by the non-Jewish Refugee Assistance 
Committee.117 The latter was held at the Albert Hall on 3 October. Albert Einstein was 
the key speaker. The content and tenor of the meeting weakened rather than raised 
public indignation. The New Statesman commented, the meeting ‘was quite 
unpolitical…In no speech was there an appeal to passion against the Nazis…No 
political attack on Hitler was permitted: the urgent question of what the world is to do 
about Nazi barbarism was not raised.’118 Editor, Kingsley Martin received criticism for 
his coverage on the basis that there was ‘much too much about the Jews.’119 The 
Beaverbrook and Rothermere press disparaged the meeting. The Evening News, for 	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example, denigrated Einstein’s speech which was an appeal to the traditions of 
European humanism and intellectual freedom and honour, claiming it was ‘a piece of 
alien agitation on British soil.’120 Austen Chamberlain’s vote of thanks included an 
observation on how un-accommodated refugees could become an irritant. Sir William 
Beveridge, announced that there would only be room in Britain for scholars who could 
contribute something Britain needed.121 Other influential figures were absent. For 
example, H.G. Wells who later associated himself with the Spanish Republican cause, 
had, a few days previously, warned his audience at a Foyle’s literary luncheon not to 
let the ‘advertising and monopolizing energy’ of Jews who were a ‘viciously and 
incurable nationalist race… blind them to the reality of what was happening in 
Germany. The German affair was not a pogrom. Jews made the most noise, but it was 
not only Jews who suffered.’122 The public meetings in late summer 1933 effectively 
marked the end of public outrage during the first years of Nazi rule. 
The Abyssinian crisis in early 1935 sidelined events in Germany. The Manchester 
Guardian commented that the Nuremberg Laws, announced on 15 September 1935, 
did not receive the attention they deserved.123 The New Statesman denounced the laws 
as ‘medieval’ but suggested they offered ‘German Jewry the process of law in place of 
arbitrary bullying and local tyranny.’124 According to this interpretation the German 
government were effectively protecting Jews from regional and individual persecution. 
The Times’ Berlin correspondent provided ‘an inspired commentary on the “Jewish 
Laws”’ claiming ‘the relationship between the German and Jewish communities has 
now been clearly established and for good.’125 With Britain stirred by Abyssinia, 
opinion over anti-Semitism in Germany was ‘calmed by the legislation, because it 
created the impression that a legal separation of ‘Aryans’ and ‘non-Aryans’ would 
bring an end to illegal and violent persecution.’126 Furthermore, 1936 was perceived as 
a ‘quiet’ year in Germany especially because of the Berlin Olympics. Pressure on 	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German Jews began to escalate during 1937. Nevertheless, after the Abyssinian crisis, 
Spain and China tended to take centre stage in the British atrocity discourse. 
When Germany annexed Austria in March 1938 there was widespread acquiescence in 
Britain. German troops entered Austria on 12 March. By the evening of the 13th a Law 
providing for the annexation of Austria had been approved by a reconstituted Austrian 
cabinet and signed by Hitler, who was driven through the country to wild acclamation. 
Between 12-13 March, 21,000 ‘opponents’ of the new regime were arrested. A 
plebiscite held on 10 April resulted in a ‘majority’ favouring inclusion into the German 
Reich. Evans states, ‘All the various stages of antisemitic policy and action that had 
been developing over the years in Germany now happened in Austria at the same time, 
telescoped into a single outburst of rabid hatred and violence.’127 Jews were subjected 
to looting, brutality and public humiliation.128 
As in 1933, the Press set the tone for reactions to the Anschluss. The Express, keen to 
play down any talk of war, warned ‘1914 Is No Parallel’.129 Its advice was to ‘[m]ind 
our own business!’130 The day after the Anschluss a feature article on the editorial page 
by the respected Australian historian Stephen H. Roberts extolled Hitler.131 Hitler was 
portrayed as a dreamer and romantic. According to Roberts ‘the brutal sides of his 
movement passed Hitler by’132 The Times downplayed anti-Jewish measures, 
predicting that crude anti-Semitism ‘now [came] under the administrative anti-
Semitism’ evident in Germany which ‘at least’ protected Jews ‘from casual theft.’133 
The Anschluss was portrayed as inevitable, whilst Jewish persecution, for The Times, 
was an irritant. The task of merging the two countries was hard enough without 
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‘complicating it by persecuting Jews.’134 The Manchester Guardian believed the 
Anschluss ‘as brutal as that of Japan’s into China or Italy’s into Abyssinia’.135  
However it was a minority voice. The News Chronicle argued briefly for a response 
based on collective security but thereafter coverage was sporadic. However, it pointed 
out (in bold print) that officials had been axed not ‘on racial grounds but…because 
their “ideology” is not in harmony with the one prevailing now in Austria.’136 It was 
difficult to portray Austrians as victims because of belief in widespread acquiescence 
to Hitler’s action.137 The press diminished the immediate effect of the Anschluss. 
According to Louise London, the ‘government moved rapidly to re-introduce a visa 
requirement to stem the influx of refugee Jews.’138 There had been worries that 
unnecessary or wholesale restriction would occasion ‘a strong reaction of public 
opinion’ which would ‘find expression’ in the Commons.139 However, Foreign Office 
staff believed the Anschluss played on public fear of increased immigration and now 
they ‘should have no difficulty in meeting any criticism’.140 Expressing solidarity with 
Home Office colleagues, they believed German emigration restrictions would keep 
Jews from leaving and mean that those ‘trying to flock to Britain’ would ‘not be the 
class about which the Home Office are now concerned.’141 Hoare’s Commons 
statement expressing the government’s ‘sympathetic’142 attitude towards refugees 
should be seen in this light. He was more concerned over ‘a curious story…that the 
Germans were anxious to inundate this country with Jews’, thereby ‘creating a Jewish 
problem in the United Kingdom.’143 
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Although Eleanor Rathbone described April 1938 as ‘the blackest month since 1914’, 
concern over Parliamentary protest proved unfounded.144 Colonel Wedgewood tabled a 
motion calling for the admission of refugees but it was roundly defeated.145 Sympathy 
for Germans helped. Liberal leader, Archibald Sinclair for example, was indignant 
about ‘the persecution of Jews, Protestants and Catholics’ but believed the German 
people ‘had been goaded into supporting it’ because of unfair treatment since the 
war.146 Hoare’s firm stance was largely applauded in the press. Richard Butler, Under-
Secretary for Foreign Affairs, reassured the House that ‘[r]epresentations had been 
made’ in Berlin. This was disingenuous. A ‘non-official’ approach had been made on 
the ‘personal initiative of the British Ambassador’ and the new Foreign Secretary, Lord 
Halifax later added ‘there was no question of an official assurance in reply either being 
expected or given.’147  
In effect, the official response reflected the stance of the press and the Church. Lord 
Londonderry, who was highly sympathetic to the Nazi regime, was pleased at press 
restraint that reflected ‘the moderate attitude of [the public] mind’.148 He expressed 
satisfaction in the Lords that ‘[b]y the drastic action of the German 
Chancellor…bloodshed had been saved’.149 The Archbishop of Canterbury after 
advising the best response was ‘silence’,150 as evidence of increasing anti-Jewish 
persecution continued, he stated, people should ‘be thankful that it took place without 
any bloodshed whatever.’151 The Primate’s view coincided with that of Londonderry.  
Evidence from Mass Observation suggests differing reasons for lack of public 
indignation. One observer gleaned a general view that Jewish persecution normally 
evoked ‘a shrug of the shoulders’. A ‘Communist’ could not understand the ‘fuss about 	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Austria’ complaining that it had ‘been going on in Spain for almost 2 years’. An 
actress, Elizabeth Crowfoot, reported that her friend had been moved by the plight of 
an Austrian cellist who had been so badly treated that he might ‘never play so well 
again’.152 A few days later, her mind had been changed after a conversation with a 
British businessman and Nazi sympathiser. She now believed the ‘expulsion of the 
Jews had saved Germany from another big financial crash.’153 The evocation of Jewish 
stereotypes cut across compassion. Furthermore, everyday conversation about anti-
Jewish atrocities seems to have vied with pro-German sympathy. A string of letters to 
the Spectator revealed an entrenched faith in German virtue. Anti-Semitism was said to 
be ‘effected by all-powerful Nazi extremists’ or the result of ‘persistent propaganda’.154 
The only hope, according to one correspondent was ‘the fundamental good-heartedness 
of the German.’155 Others saw British criticism of German anti-Semitism as contrary to 
the British tradition of ‘fair-mindedness,’156 whilst Jews were singled out for 
expressing ‘actual hatred towards Germany’.157 Only one letter emphasized the plight 
of Viennese Jews. 
Jewish leaders, conditioned in part by public opinion and in part by their assimilationist 
outlook, which perhaps made them over-sensitive to protests overtly focusing on 
Jewish suffering, questioned the usefulness of ‘mass meetings’ and ‘resolutions’, 
doubting ‘whether an effective platform could in present circumstances be obtained.’158 
Anglo-Jewry was also placed on the defensive as they perceived ‘a ceaseless and 
pernicious anti-Jewish propaganda going on of the most subtle kind, not only in the 
realm of foreign, but also in domestic politics.’159 The siege mentality of leading 
English Jews was demonstrated by Montefiore who stated ‘[n]ot by their own 
desire…but by force of circumstances over which they had no control, Jews, alas, had 
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become front-page news’.160 He feared highlighting persecution would generate anti-
Semitism rather than compassion.  
The swiftness and completeness of the Anschluss made it a short-lived crisis. One 
contributor to Mass Observation got ‘very excited over crises’ but after ‘a heavy week, 
forgot about them’ only to find when he read the press, ‘it was all over.’161 Another 
commented ‘[e]veryone seems to already have forgotten all about it - & have just 
accepted the situation.’162 Victor Cazalet, Conservative M.P. and Zionist advocate 
wrote to The Times in early May after visiting Vienna. He outlined Jewish hardships 
but suggested the ‘worst period’ was over.163 He cited the ‘exemplary’ behaviour of the 
German army as reason to take comfort. He believed military personnel were stricken 
by ‘a sense of shame and sympathy’. In any case he wondered ‘whether the real facts’ 
reached ‘those in the highest places.’164 By 10 June The Spectator was advising that 
holidaying in Austria was ‘perfectly safe’ and that despite all the notices forbidding 
Jews entry, ‘an Englishman can take his Jewish friends where he pleases.’165 Therefore 
by the time Lord Lytton, Violet Bonham Carter, Dorothy Gladstone and Cazalet, who 
must have regretted his previous letter, ‘reluctantly’ protested to The Times about on-
going persecution, the crisis was seen by most to be finished. There were no public 
meetings, no letter writing campaigns and no other tangible expressions of outrage 
comparable to other responses to the demise of a country like Abyssinia or atrocities 
such as those in Spain and China. 
On the night of 10/11 November 1938 the Jewish population of Germany and Austria 
were subjected to organized pogroms ‘carried out in the full glare of world 
publicity.’166 The Third Reich ‘unleashed a massive outbreak of unbridled destructive 
fury’. About 90 Jews were killed during the pogrom and hundreds died later in 
concentration camps.167 The orders came from the high echelons of the Nazi party. 
They were a ‘response’ to the murder of Ernst vom Rath, a Legation Secretary at the 
German Embassy in Paris. Herschel Grynszpan, whose parents had been deported to 	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Poland under atrocious conditions, had carried out the shooting.168  Many Britons were 
shocked at the violence but condemnation was not, as early histories of press responses 
have argued, unequivocal.169 
The Mail and Express tended to privilege the official German version. The ‘riots’ were 
characterized as spontaneous and as an attempt to defy authorities who were portrayed 
as restoring order.170 The Manchester Guardian ‘accepted the Nazi Government’s 
claim to be uninvolved in issuing orders’ for the pogroms.171 The Herald and News 
Chronicle were convinced of the innocence of ordinary Germans who were alleged to 
‘feel pity and shame’ because ‘kindness and brotherhood’ were ingrained in the 
German character.172 Both suggested German public opinion was instrumental in 
forcing the Nazi leadership to call a halt.173 The Times and the Telegraph accurately 
reported the violence was planned and officially condoned.174 The latter’s 
correspondent claimed he saw ‘fashionably dressed women clapping their hands and 
screaming with glee, while respectable middle-class mothers held up their babies to see 
the “fun”’. However, the assertion that ‘[r]acial hatred and hysteria seemed to have 
taken complete hold of other-wise decent people’, showed their acquiescence was seen 
as an anomaly.175 Right and Left wing periodicals also believed that the majority of 
Germans were not only innocent but condemned the atrocities. The Spectator saw 
‘sufficient evidence’ of ‘pity and disgust inspired in the ordinary, decent German 
citizen to make it both unreasonable and unjust to draw an indictment against a nation 
for crimes that are to be laid at the door of a party.’176 The New Statesman agreed. The 
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majority of Germans ‘were no party to them, and are indeed…aghast at the 
savagery’.177  
A string of public figures echoed these pro-German sentiments. A meeting of the LNU 
in Northampton addressed by Archibald Sinclair passed a resolution condemning the 
‘criminal and brutal retaliation’ against ‘innocent people’ but added they had no wish 
to ‘charge the German people with this shame.’178 Lord Rothschild was partially 
correct when he stated, the idea that the pogrom was ‘spontaneous’ was ‘the grossest 
defamation of the character of the German people as a whole.’179 Sir Thomas Inskip, 
Minister for Defence, spoke of Britain’s duty to ‘[a]id Jews’, but struggled ‘to believe 
the German people approve.’180 A meeting, convened by the Anglo-Jewish community, 
was held at the Albert Hall on 1 December. Amery who was asked to attend by 
Conservative Central Office observed the audience to be ‘very largely composed of 
Jews’ who were ‘anxious to hear our public men speak sympathetically about their co-
religionists.’181 The principle speaker, the Archbishop of York claimed Germany’s 
regime was largely ‘the creation of ourselves and our Allies.’ He outlined a history of 
injustices suffered by Germany since the war suggesting the Nazi Press was right in 
pointing out the ‘dark pages in the story of the British Empire.’182 He ‘refused to 
identify the German people’ with the actions of the Nazis.183 Cardinal Hinsley, the 
Archbishop of Westminster and Herbert Morrison concurred.184 The British public 
initially received mixed messages about anti-Jewish violence, but after a few days the 
innocence of ordinary Germans emerged as the dominant theme. In reality the 
extensive brutality had been carried out ‘without encountering any meaningful 
opposition’.185 There were isolated attempts to ameliorate the guilt of German leaders, 
but it was increasingly difficult for commentators to find excuses.186  
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Responses to the pogroms were complicated by reaction to the recent Munich 
agreement.187 Chamberlain’s efforts to avert war over Germany’s claims on 
Czechoslovakia immediately met with resounding plaudits ‘at home and abroad, high 
and low’. The press was ‘nearly as enthusiastic; and the vehement defence of the 
Munich settlement continued until the end of the year.’188 However, there was also 
evidence of a hardening of public opinion against Chamberlain’s willingness to 
sacrifice part of Czechoslovakia. The National Council of Labour published a 
manifesto on 7 September entitled Labour and the International Situation: On the 
Brink of War. It denounced what it saw as a string of capitulations since the 
Manchurian dispute and argued that the time had come ‘for a positive and 
unmistakable lead for collective defence against aggression and to safeguard peace.’189 
Labour leaders ‘organized scores of meetings of protest’ nationally.190 The November 
pogrom did not evoke such a coordinated reaction. 
Nevertheless, there were signs that explicit violence touched a public nerve. Church 
leaders quickly announced the formation of ‘The Christian Council for Refugees from 
Germany and Central Europe’, although this ‘especially’ focused on ‘Christian 
refugees.’191 Furthermore, isolated resolutions condemned the pogroms. The Durham 
miners called on British leaders to disassociate themselves with the German 
Government,192 whilst a letter signed by representatives of religious and political 
organizations at Oxford University asked the government to ‘register its disgust and 
active opposition’ to Germany’s ‘ruling party’.193 A deputation from the Executive 
Committee of the Liberal Party Organization to Downing Street requested greater 
numbers be given asylum.194 Established humanitarians wrote to The Times on 22 	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November stating, ‘[w]e wish to record our solemn protest before the conscience of 
civilization, against the persecution of the Jews in Germany.’195 Its brevity was notable 
compared with fervent letters from similar figures relating to previous atrocities. There 
was no accompanying editorial, no challenges to British authorities, no calls for a 
public response or financial help and no ‘English’ characterisations of Jews as worthy 
victims.  
On 15 November a delegation from the Council for German Jewry met the Prime 
Minister.196 They believed ‘their hand would be strengthened’ if a renewed appeal was 
‘endorsed by distinguished representative men’ and hoped, ‘[i]f the Archbishop [of 
Canterbury] and the Lord Mayor asked His Majesty’s Government for guidance…the 
Government would feel able to advise agreement.’197 This suggests the government had 
some influence over public expression by notable figures. Chamberlain was 
‘horrified’198 by Jewish persecution and affected by the delegation, but only took 
limited steps to relax entry restrictions for refugees to ‘ease the public conscience.’199 
This meeting was possibly the genesis of the Kindertransport and the Baldwin Fund 
for Refugees. Authorities struck a balance between anti-refugee public opinion and fear 
of outrage over the pogroms.200 They were also guided by concern over Britain’s 
international reputation, an idea pushed at Cabinet level by Foreign Secretary, Lord 
Halifax.201 The News Chronicle, no supporter of the Chamberlain government, was 
remarkably sanguine about the meeting. Its front page headline announced ‘Powers 
Move to Rescue Victims of Nazi Terror’ and in contradistinction to its pessimism when 
confronted with government action over Spain or China assured readers that the ‘cry of 
the Jewish victims…will not go unanswered.’202 Measures such as ‘finding a place in 
the Colonial Empire for Jewish refugees’ were under consideration and announced by 	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Chamberlain in Parliament. The Times was confident ‘that something is actually being 
done.’203 Nothing actually transpired, but a public appeal for refugees was launched by 
ex-Prime Minister, Lord Baldwin. 
Baldwin launched his appeal on 7 December via the B.B.C. The Times helped facilitate 
the fund. This caused tension amongst the newspaper’s staff. Its correspondent ‘lately 
in China’ believed Jewish persecution was ‘wholly negligible’ compared with Chinese 
suffering at Japanese hands.204 On 12 December The Times was forced into the first of 
three editorial apologias because Baldwin’s announcement had apparently stimulated 
anti-Jewish responses. The newspaper attempted to counter the argument that ‘rich 
Jews’ should ‘provide for their poorer brethren’, arguing many refugees were ‘not 
Jewish by religion.’ Arguments that the problem was ‘too big for private charity’ and 
that ‘charity begins at home’ were also addressed.205 Two days later The Times refuted 
the idea that ‘subscriptions’ from ‘prominent’ Jews were ‘incommensurate’ with their 
‘special responsibility’, stating there was ‘no foundation’ that ‘rich Jews have been 
waiting for others to help Jewish refugees or that they have restricted their own help to 
refugees of the Jewish religion.’206 A third editorial argued along similar lines and 
emphasized ‘promising announcements’ that refugees would be accepted elsewhere.207 
Christian leaders were also obliged to refute persistent criticisms of Baldwin’s Fund by 
those who saw refugees as ‘a Jewish problem’, and that Jewry should cope ‘without 
seeking outside assistance.’208 They emphasised the ‘non-Aryan Christian’ plight, the 
generosity of the Jewish community and denied Jewish leaders had requested 
assistance.209  
Collections for the fund in cinemas and theatres met with ‘widespread Fascist protest’. 
They interrupted a newsreel appeal by the Archbishop of Canterbury and paraded in 
the theatre quarter.210 Two million leaflets were circulated by the British Union of 
Fascists ‘in and around London alone’.211 This seems to have occurred outside London 	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too. In Worthing, physiotherapist Joan Strange reported similar protests.212 Strange, a 
refugee activist, was subjected to personal intimidation. In May 1939 she wrote, on 
‘our front step, path, wall and pavement outside had been written out in tar ‘Jews get 
out’, ‘Britons before aliens’’.213 ‘Fascist’ bullying or the threat of it cannot be 
discounted as a factor preventing pro-Jewish activity. Although the British Union of 
Fascists peaked in influence in the early 1930s, allegiance to at least some of their 
central tenets ‘stretched much further than outright supporters’.214 P. Vos, Joint 
Honorary Secretary for the Fund, was forced to counter protests in the medical 
profession that it was being used to establish ‘foreign medical competitors “in our 
midst”’.215 Roger Makins, of the Foreign Office and Lord Winterton,216 united ‘to 
curtail the effectiveness of Baldwin’s appeal.’217 Donations ultimately amounted to a 
significant sum but the appeal also encountered considerable opposition.218  
In addition to the Baldwin Fund, over half a million pounds was raised by the Lord 
Mayor’s Fund for Czech refugees, although, proceeds were not specifically for Jews. 
The Council for German Jewry also raised a similar amount, predominantly from the 
Jewish community. Eleanor Rathbone was particularly pro-active. Historians have 
rightly singled her out for praise for her commitment to persecuted Jews. Her 
admiration for Jewish contributions to society meant she ‘viewed them as deserving of 
help.’219 She founded the Parliamentary Committee on Refugees in November 1938. It 
was designed to act as a pressure group to ‘influence the government and public 
opinion in favour of a generous yet carefully safeguarded refugee policy.’220 Rathbone, 
along with Harold Nicolson was part of a deputation of M.P.s who met Sir John Simon 
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on 19 December pleading for more money for refugees. Although the response was 
disappointing, the government did streamline procedures for refugee entry.221  Consular 
officials in Germany sped up departures to Britain. The Council for German Jewry 
created a refugee camp in Richborough, Kent.222 By the end of August 1939, 9,354 
children had been rescued from Nazi terror through the so-called Kindertransport. 
Some public figures were involved in the rescue such as Sir Wyndham Deeds, 
previously Chief Secretary to the British High Commissioner of Palestine and 
Professor Norman Bentwich who had been Director of the League of Nations High 
Commission for Refugees from Germany. Disparate groups such as the Y.M.C.A, the 
Society of Friends and other non-Jewish and Jewish organizations worked together to 
house the children. However, as London suggests ‘[a]dmission saved the children’s 
lives. Exclusion sealed the fate of many of their parents.’223 The British mandated 
territory of Palestine was effectively closed off as a major escape route in May 1939, 
although the government had to fend off a ‘storm of protest’.224 Kushner states many 
‘ordinary people in Britain, especially after ‘Kristallnacht’ were willing to put 
themselves out to help the refugees.’225 However, the level of national outrage 
associated with other atrocities and more importantly, other victims, was largely 
missing. 
A spate of letters to the press in December showed British sympathy for ordinary 
Germans remained undiminished. A New Statesman correspondent questioned why 
ordinary Germans had not protested. Replies defended the German people.226 A letter 
to The Times claimed the ‘ordinary German’ was ‘sympathetic’, ‘kind’, ‘helpful, and 
genial’, with ‘all the homely virtues. He is hard-working, honest, economical, home-
loving, law-abiding [and] religious.’ In other words remarkably ‘similar’ to Britons. It 
was apparently ‘from fear of not doing the right thing that he does the worst thing 
imaginable’. He predicted that ‘decent Germans’ would ensure Germany would ‘once 
more become a State of law and justice’.227 The letter evoked a favourable response, 
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the most interesting from R.A. Williams, Schröder Professor of German at Cambridge. 
He believed there were ‘very many’ Germans who possessed admirable ‘intellectual 
and moral qualities’ but ‘capable of approving’ Jewish persecution. He explained that 
for Germans, the State trumped individuality. Therefore,  
persecution will appeal as a tragic necessity laid by fate upon the German 
nation, but at the same time as a mere accident in the deathless progress of the 
State…such people see hundreds of thousands of Jews sacrificed to the State, 
and see it almost with indifference, because they are ready to sacrifice 
themselves on the same altar.228 
Williams added to mitigation of violence a sense of heroism and self-sacrifice. 
Although unbending deference to the State was not necessarily perceived as a British 
characteristic, readers may have recognized the popular British self-image of 
stoicism.229 His argument reflected deep discomfort that ordinary Germans could 
condone violence. Their loss of civilized values perhaps meant the British might be 
susceptible to similar forces. If so, his views provide a clue to the fear of latent British 
anti-Semitism and sensitivity towards past British atrocities.230  
The Times also published a letter from historian G.M. Young in which he claimed that 
after the war, ‘Germans were most harshly dealt with, and suffered the most galling 
indignities, at the hands of individual Jews, of Jewish firms, and public authorities in 
which the Jewish element was dominant.’ Furthermore he refused ‘to deny’ that 
German recovery had been ‘grievously impeded by false views urged in London, Paris, 
and New York by Jews who only saw in the German lands a promising field for 
international exploitation.’231 Young was a ‘reluctant’ Conservative supporter,232 yet 
his views on German Jews and Germans tallied with the liberal left, as expounded, for 
example, by Bernays in 1933. Many seemed to believe that Nazi arguments about Jews 	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had substance and brutality was to some extent understandable. Young’s sympathy, 
like many others, was for Germans, not their principle victims.  
There was a persistent tendency in Left wing liberal circles to weaken their 
compassionate arguments by attempting to ‘understand’ the ‘Jewish problem’.  For 
example, Mary Agnes Hamilton, biographer of Ramsey MacDonald and Sidney and 
Beatrice Webb, who belonged to what might be termed ‘enlightened’ society, wrote an 
article for the Spectator arguably reflecting attitudes within her milieu.233 Predictably, 
she condemned Nazi outrages but could not deny that most people ‘dislike[d] Jews’ or 
‘dread’ there being ‘too many’. She provided examples of how, when faced with a Jew, 
most experienced ‘instinctive…“shrinking”’. For her, years of persecution explained 
the ‘many’ apparently unattractive Jewish attributes such as ‘the inclination to cringe 
before the strong and bully the weak’ as well as, 
that general insensitiveness of which tiny, yet unbearable, traits are the butting-
in on intimate conversations, button-holing and boring you when you want to 
get away, standing, the while, too near: involving you in the entire clan when 
you have accepted the individual, and so on – in a word, taking an ell when 
given an inch.234 
Her criticisms applied to the individual and the ‘race’. Jewish ‘historical’ 
characteristics were exacerbated by clannishness, which inhibited ‘any saving self-
criticism’. Their self-proclaimed status as a chosen people was a sign that Jews and 
Nazis were afflicted with the same delusion.235 Generally, Jewish ‘faults’ were 
perceived in the light of common ideas of Englishness. According to Peter Mandler, for 
interwar Britons, ‘the line between ‘national character’ and ‘manners’…was constantly 
being blurred’. They believed ‘gentlemanly’ virtue was intrinsic to the national 
character.236 Characteristics ascribed to Jews, although not necessarily deemed their 
fault, were the opposite of how the English viewed themselves. This was a key factor 	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when responding to anti-Jewish brutality. When reacting to other atrocities in broadly 
the same period, there were invariably successful attempts to project certain English 
characteristics onto those perceived worthy of empathy. In other words, in order to 
identify with suffering the British had to see something of themselves in the victims. 
When humanitarians saw evidence of anti-Jewish violence, their subsequent attempts 
to understand the ‘Jewish problem’ led them to the conclusion that it was impossible to 
endow Jews with ‘English’ qualities. They remained the ‘other’, and thus outside this 
compassionate paradigm. However, Hamilton along with most others found more 
empathy with ordinary Germans whose ‘minds and imaginations’ had been ‘distorted 
and poisoned’ since 1933. Germans were ‘redeemable’ having suffered under the Nazi 
aberration, whereas Jews were less so. Attitudes towards Jews were not so much 
ambivalent as subject to a hierarchy of compassion. The British were more inclined to 
be disturbed about persecution per se, especially when performed by a German nation 
that had been reconstructed in the British imagination since the Great War as civilised, 
than about Jewish victims. 
That ingrained prejudice affected the attitudes and actions of humanitarians working on 
behalf of Jews is evident from a Mass Observation investigation conducted in early 
1939. The timing and content of this survey on anti-Semitism, brings the results within 
the scope of responses to the November pogroms. One commentator recognised the 
‘almost unanimous’ angle of the reports showed how:  
[o]ver and over again the Observer states that the area isn’t anti-semitic, goes 
on to show that secretly he or she is. And this is equally true of working class, 
middle class and upper class Observers, for all ages, sexes, areas, occupations, 
political views, educational standards. Many are ashamed of their covert 
hostility. Many who are openly pro-semitic, Communists, etc., nevertheless 
confess a secret contempt or dislike.237 
A ‘[l]eft-winger’ from Bloomsbury shared with his social circle ‘a vague general 
aversion’ towards Jews and ‘spent much time and thought trying to rationalise it.’ 
Someone from Milford-on-Sea stressed, ‘the Jew is as good an Englishman as the rest 	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of us…But, and it is a big but…this opinion has been formed only…by making a 
conscious effort to be fair and tolerant.’ This attitude was summed up by the statement, 
‘I instinctively dislike Jews but am trying to teach myself not to.’ A response from 
Yorkshire revealed ‘an antipathy to Jews, and, while realising that it is unreasonable, I 
am unable to overcome it’. Clearly, there was wide acceptance that anti-Semitism was 
wrong. However, this was not enough to overcome ‘instinctive’ aversion to Jews.  
Innate antipathy cut across the activities of humanitarians who traditionally contributed 
to compassionate causes. One ‘enlightened’ individual who mixed with others who 
spent ‘their leisure in good works’, talked of a ‘highly educated and cultured man’ who 
‘deplored the persecutions’ but ‘could never feel quite the same towards a Jew as a 
European’. This was due to ‘a slight feeling of physical aversion which would make 
him shrink from close contact.’ The root, he believed, lay with the ‘undoubted and 
deeply rooted racial differences which could never be resolved’. An elderly woman of 
‘exceptional enlightenment and energy’ devoted ‘to the cause of liberty and 
democracy’ felt similarly. She said ‘she could easily imagine herself getting to feel a 
horror of Jews, if she had been subjected to constant propaganda on the subject.’ 
Empathy for ordinary Germans went hand in hand with a propensity for disliking Jews. 
Such attitudes created a hierarchy of compassion. Someone from Sheffield felt ‘sorry’ 
about Jewish persecution but did not feel ‘the same urge to help the Jewish refugees as 
I do the Spanish’ adding the ‘Jews are a wealthy race, let them look after their own 
people.’ Another stated ‘[t]here does not seem to be very much interest at Cambridge 
in the Jewish Problem. Occasional appeals…do not arouse the enthusiasm stirred up, 
e.g. by appeals for Spain.’ One commented that in Liverpool ‘[t]hey get worked up 
about minorities…but so far as Jews are concerned they do not seem very perturbed’. 
Another in Cornwall suggested:  
People in the village do not seem to think of the Jewish Question as one 
affecting English people…Personally I rather admire them and deplore anti-
Semitism, but I care less about Jewish than other sorts of refugees and 
persecutees [sic]. 
Jewish stereotypes and a perceived lack of ‘Englishness’ sometimes underlay attitudes. 
In Portsmouth and Southsea one Observer stated there ‘seems to be [an attitude] of 
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tolerance combined with a certain after-all-they’re-not English air of superiority’, 
adding there existed ‘a feeling of distant sympathy for their troubles’,  
i.e. The Jews are alright – providing they don’t interfere with us…I am 
continually having my judgment distorted by the vision of the traditional Jew – 
waving hands, bulbous nose, and greasy, crinkly hair. Much as I would like to 
give the Jews my whole-hearted sympathy, this idiotic Music-Hall charicature 
occasionally finds its counterpart in real life, with the result that the physical 
revulsion I feel warps my vision. 
Such attitudes had a real impact on the readiness with which the public donated to 
Jewish causes. Evidence suggests fear of external social pressure sometimes overcame 
reticence. When a collection was made for Jewish refugees in an Ealing cinema, an 
Observer noted that although most gave something, many ‘probably contributed merely 
because they did not wish others to think they were ungenerous, while at least one 
person was heard to remark “I suppose we must give something.”’ In Reigate, there 
was ‘a surprising indifference among those who are the first to give to charities to the 
treatment meted out to German Jews – to Baldwin’s [Fund]’. Finally, the survey 
suggested negative attitudes were not dependent on personal contact with Jews. One 
stated ‘I don’t mind the thought of the jews [sic] being prosecuted [sic] as a race, but I 
do mind when I think of them as individuals’, whilst a Sheffield Observer claimed ‘I 
have only met an odd Jew occasionally myself and have no particular feeling towards 
them individually but, at the bottom of my soul I do not like them as a race.’238  
Overall the evidence suggests instinctive anti-Semitism often compromised 
compassion. In a period crowded with humanitarian responses to atrocity, those most 
inclined towards action were hampered by anti-Jewish prejudices. Humanitarian action 
on behalf of Jews was not only embarked on with greater reluctance but also met with 
more resistance than other contemporary examples. Discourses on other atrocities, 
without fail, contained a marked propensity to inscribe aspects of Englishness onto the 
victims. For the most part, Jews were deemed un-English and often responsible for 
their own suffering. Tension caused by the juxtaposition of entrenched compassionate 
traditions and the recognised unacceptability of particular anti-Jewish prejudice meant 	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Jewish suffering could become the object of humour. This is perhaps why E.M. Forster 
wrote,  
People who would not ill-treat Jews themselves, or even be rude to them, enjoy 
tittering over their misfortunes; they giggle when pogroms are instituted by 
someone else and synagogues defiled vicariously.239 
Six months after the survey Britain declared war on Germany. This closed down most 
escape routes for persecuted Jews. A White Paper detailing pre-war German atrocities 
published in October 1939 caused an adverse reaction. The ‘British public again 
believed they were being manipulated by the government.’ and officials saw the 
document as a propaganda failure.240 This was not the only criticism. Strange 
commented that the information was ‘perfectly horrible’, but ‘we know the majority of 
Germans must hate the camps as we do. We must not work up hatred against the 
German people.’241 A letter to Arthur Ponsonby written the day after war broke out 
from a village in the Midlands observed that ‘people don’t seem at all excited or 
bloodthirsty about this war’ but were united by an anti-Hitler attitude and ‘broad 
sympathy for the German people who were compelled to follow him.’242 
During the war reports of increasing anti-Jewish atrocities were quickly transmitted to 
Britain. The Times briefly became more overt about the particularity of Jewish 
suffering. For example, it commented on a German plan from ‘well informed circles’, 
that ‘[t]o thrust 3,000,000 Jews, relatively few of whom are agriculturalists, into the 
Lublin region…would doom them to famine. That, perhaps is the intention.’243 In 
December after detailing the deportations,244 it reported a Nazi plan which envisaged ‘a 
place for gradual extermination’ which might lead to ‘tens of thousands’ dead and 
many more refugees.245 This type of reporting eventually gave way to interpreting 
victimhood within a more national framework. In other words, Jews became conflated 
with other occupied peoples. 
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The Foreign Office was kept informed about conditions for Jews in Poland. However, 
the Jewish origins of the reports hampered acceptance. Vyvyan Adams, the 
Conservative M.P., passed eye-witness testimony giving details of the casual approach 
of German authorities to Jewish murder. Adams felt compelled to point out the Jewish 
witnesses were ‘educated and sensible’ and ‘by no means hysterical’. The response was 
a handwritten note stating ‘Jewish sources are always doubtful.’246 Rex Leeper, 
Director of the Political Warfare Executive, added ‘as a general rule Jews are inclined 
to magnify their persecutions. I remember the exaggerated stories of Jewish pogroms in 
Poland after the last war which…were found to have little substance.’247 Leeper was 
key to the British propaganda effort and well placed to use atrocity reports for 
galvanizing public opinion. However, the legacy of mistrust attached to the Jews after 
the Polish atrocities hampered the thinking of those most able to act.  
Another factor limiting action was the continuing myopic tendency towards the 
culpability of ordinary Germans among those perhaps most disposed to indignation. 
This was evident in a bitter debate sparked by Lord Vansittart’s Black Record. It was 
first published in January 1941, broadcast on the B.B.C. Overseas Programme and 
serialized by the Sunday Times. Vansittart claimed most Germans were inherently 
aggressive and Nazism was ‘no more than the extension and popularization of the old 
imperialism and militarism.’248 He suggested ‘fallacies about “Hitlerite Germany” 
calmly overlook the last war altogether.’249 For him, Germany was ‘carrying out a 
policy of racial extermination as systematically as Imperial Germany exterminated the 
Herreros.’250 He believed Britain’s response to Guernica was ‘charity to the Germans’ 
because ‘the slaughter…was so utter that many people at first just wouldn’t believe it 
of the Germans.’251 Such was the backlash against his theory that it was coined 
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‘Vansittartism’, ‘a bogey so revolting’ he believed, ‘that their consciences may 
legitimately and vehemently reject it.’252  
Critics included government officials, M.P.s, Lords, scholars, The Times, the New 
Statesman, the Catholic Herald, the Evening Standard and The Economist.253 Left wing 
liberals and humanitarians were particularly outraged. Harold Laski wrote, just because 
Germans had not experienced England’s fortunate heritage their ‘different’ qualities 
should not be punished. He evoked past British atrocities including ‘the rebellion in the 
Punjab in 1919’, and the ‘myth’ of the ‘unspeakable Turk’, now a ‘solid ally’, to show 
the British were susceptible to the same errors currently attributed to Germans.254 Laski 
believed atrocities were the work of ‘perhaps ten thousand gangsters’ with ‘unlimited 
power’.255 Journalist, H.N. Brailsford rejected that Nazism was a continuation of 
Prussianism, rather portraying it as an aberration that had swept away enlightenment 
values.256 Allied treatment of Germany post-war had allowed the Nazis to take 
control.257 Like Laski, Brailsford effectively argued that liberalism characterized the 
German nation.  
Publisher, Victor Gollancz, wrote an extensive rebuttal to Vansittart, which became 
The Times ‘Book of the Week’.258 For him ‘Vansittartism’ robbed the ‘war-effort of a 
dynamic as powerful for good as the Nazis’ is for evil as surely as it plays into the 
hands of Dr. Goebbels and so weakens the growing movement of German revolt.’259 
Gollancz used an emotive image of ‘ordinary Germans’ to show they could not be 
characterized as barbaric.260 He drew comparisons with the English to reinforce this. 
He also pointed to a continuum of liberalism in Germany. Gollancz believed atrocity 
reports ‘almost certainly’ exaggerated and claimed ‘there is a difference between 
atrocities committed under the whip of blood-lust and atrocities committed by 	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instruction from above.’261 Gollancz, one of the most vocal advocates of European 
Jewry during the War, confused his supporters.262 He was asked at a lecture whether he 
meant ‘it was wrong to hate the Nazi atrocities in Poland and Russia. Or wrong to hate 
the German people? Or wrong to hate the Nazis? Or wrong, perhaps, even to hate 
Hitler?’263 His advocacy of ordinary Germans cut across efforts to galvanize 
compassion.  
Mass Observer, Edward Stebbing commented on a speech given by Tom Driberg,264 at 
a Daily Express Centre of Public Opinion. He was ‘very glad’ that Driberg pronounced 
himself ‘anti-Vansittartite’ because, 
the idea of all Germans being irredeemably wicked and of waiting to 
exterminate [Jews] was as bad as Dr. Goebels’ racial ideas. For the idea that the 
Germans were a very special race on their own and had evil in their blood was 
simply Nazism inverted – the super-race theory in reverse.265 
That this was written just as news of the German extermination program was 
registering with the public is significant. Many could not believe average Germans 
were capable of outright wickedness or were over-optimistic about the strength of 
German opposition to Nazism. Michael Balfour, who spent the first half of the war 
working for the Ministry of Information, handling publicity on the home front, suggests 
it was the government’s aim to bifurcate the Nazis and the mass of ‘good Germans’ in 
the mind of the British public.266 The Vansittart debate indicates that, for the most part, 
it was an effective policy. 
Gilbert Murray, an influential humanitarian voice over Spain and China, was affected 
by this attitude. The mass murder of the Jewish population of Kiev was reported in The 
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Times on 7 January 1942.267 Murray identified the infamous Reichenau ‘secret order’, 
recently captured and published by the Russian authorities as a ‘villainous 
document.’268 However, he also believed it betrayed ‘in every paragraph the efforts of a 
brutal high command to force its methods upon an unwilling or half-willing army…A 
completely brutalized army would not have needed a Reichenau order.’269 His 
argument in mitigation of the conduct of German troops engaged in mass murder 
shows the strength of feeling in liberal circles regarding the innocence of ordinary 
Germans, in this case the German army.  
Late summer and Autumn 1941 marked the beginning of the Final Solution.270 With 
evidence that Germans were pursuing an increasingly aggressive policy towards 
subject peoples, Churchill and President Roosevelt made a joint statement on 25 
October 1941. Notable was its mention of the territories in which Jews were being 
systematically murdered, but failure to identify Jews as the main victims.271 Churchill 
wanted to make ‘[r]etribution for these crimes…among the major purposes of the 
war’.272 However, official and public resistance to ‘atrocity mongering’ softened the 
impact. In fact, German atrocities did not receive widespread attention until December 
1942.  
The Board of Deputies received increasingly lurid details of life and death in the 
ghettos.273 The Jewish Labour Bund in Warsaw smuggled out a detailed report of 
gassings in mobile vans at Chelmno. However, this information was not part of 
mainstream public debate. British officials were ‘very reluctant to make any public 
statements concerning German atrocities.’274 M.P. Sidney Silverman believed ‘there 
had been something like a conspiracy of silence in the Press’.275 As German authorities 
stepped up mass murder, the British and Allied governments carefully monitored and 	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controlled both the extent of Jewish involvement in negotiations between Allied 
governments about German war crimes and the amount and type of information 
released to the public. 
The dissemination of information about war crimes was a subject of serious debate for 
the government since at least 1941. When Hugh Dalton, of the Political Warfare 
Executive, urged ‘strongly’ that ‘propaganda’ should show that war criminals would 
not ‘go unpunished’,276 he met with stiff opposition in the Foreign Office. R.M. Makins 
was ‘sceptical about the effect of threats’ and did not think the government ‘should 
give way to a desire for revenge or stimulate that desire in other people’. He was keen 
‘to avoid a “Hang the Kaiser” campaign’ and believed a ‘commitment to hunt down 
and try thousands of Germans after the war’ would be embarrassing and impractical. 
He also questioned ‘how far one can really hold subordinate officials responsible for 
the acts of their superiors.’277 After taking soundings from at least one other 
government figure,278 Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden endorsed this view and replied 
to Dalton that ‘I am fortified in this opinion by the experience of that ill-starred 
enterprise at the end of the last war.’279  
On 13 January 1942 Allied governments-in-exile issued the St. James’s Palace 
Declaration condemning atrocities and making the trial and punishment of Nazi war 
criminals a ‘principal war aim’.280 Jewish representatives were deliberately excluded 
from the process on the basis that all representative governments did not ‘make any 
discrimination whatsoever in respect of their citizens.’281 Jewish leaders could only 
send ‘a communication’ which highlighted Jewish suffering.282 General Sikorski, 
Polish leader and President of the Inter-Allied Conference on War Crimes, eventually 
assured Jewish leaders that the ‘crimes and excesses committed against the Jews’ were 
covered by the declaration. Britain and America did not sign the document but ‘Foreign 	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Office efforts to maintain a detached attitude towards Nazi war crimes began to 
crumble’.283 They drafted in legal experts to help formulate British war crimes 
policy.284 However, official reticence to make public declarations remained firm. Once 
again, the experience of the last war influenced decisions. Officials feared ‘getting 
hopelessly bogged down, with a final dismal repetition of…[the Leipzig trial] fiasco’. 
This was buttressed by the dominant view that ‘German atrocities against Jewish and 
non-Jewish German nationals and stateless persons were not in any sense war 
crimes.’285 Jewish leaders attempted to overcome this inertia by persistently pushing 
for ‘every form of publicity’,286 but they were accused of circumventing agreed 
processes to further a Zionist agenda.287 
On 25 June 1942 the Daily Telegraph reported that 700,000 Polish Jews had been 
killed, some by mobile gas chambers.288 In June and July the government was 
increasingly pressurized by exiled governments to take pro-active measures to counter 
German atrocities likely ‘to exterminate certain populations.’289 Churchill ‘suggested to 
Roosevelt the establishment of a United Nations Commission on Atrocities.’290 A set of 
principles was drawn up by the President’s staff and on 6 July ‘approved in principle’ 
by the War Cabinet.291 The Commission was established partly to help the government 
‘deal with any pressure from the Allied governments’ for further action.292 It was 
understood this would be ‘a fact-finding Commission similar to the Bryce Committee 
on Atrocities in Belgium in the last war’.293 Conclusions would be ‘published from 
time to time’ to inform the public of ‘the nature’ of the enemy and by ‘naming their 
names’ thereby letting the guilty know they were ‘being watched by the civilized 
world, which will mete out swift and just punishment on the reckoning day.’294 This 	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amounted to a statement of intent with regard to the regularized flow of public 
information. The Commission was announced in the Lords on 7 October 1942, but the 
first meeting did not take place until October 1943. Although the 1915 Bryce 
Commission was cited as a model, its successor was designed to have the opposite 
effect, to douse, rather than stoke public ire. A Cabinet Committee was established to 
ensure the body operated ‘according to the government’s policy on the matter.’295 It 
was chaired by Lord Chancellor Viscount Simon who had originally defined the brief 
of the original Bryce Committee and as Attorney-General had been a member. He 
quickly changed the original proposals ensuring they ‘investigate crimes committed 
only against nationals of the United Nations, not crimes in general.’296  
Despite pressure from exiled governments the Foreign Office remained firm in their 
control of the war crimes process.297 Dennis Allen reiterated concern over ‘another 
“Hang the Kaiser” campaign’298 and J.K. Roberts warned publicity for the commission 
would mean ‘a whole host of busybodies in this country would be stirred into 
action’.299 It was believed ‘making any public declarations’, would ‘hamper rather than 
help the practical work that still remains to be done.’300 Officials finally suggested a 
compromise. A public statement should be made which would pacify the Allies.301 Part 
of their reasoning was that because the Foreign Office had ‘taken the lead in all this’ it 
was ‘only right that we should get adequate publicity’ to be obtained through a House 
of Commons resolution.302 Even so, in late August Eden ruled the declaration ‘could be 
left until Parlt. reassembled in a month’s time.’303 The draft declaration made no 
mention of Jews. Generally the Foreign Office saw the Commission ‘as largely a 
means of neutralizing calls for acts of retribution against the Germans and creating the 
impression that the issue of War Criminals was being handled.’304 Taking a lead on the 	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war crimes issue enabled the government to set severe parameters around the public 
debate which were in part dictated by memory of the last war. This provided the 
context in which a telegram from Gerhart Reigner, the Geneva representative of the 
World Jewish Congress, claiming that European Jews were subject to an extermination 
plan, was received.305  
After attempting to establish Reigner’s credentials, J.K. Roberts stated on 15 August ‘I 
do not see how we can hold up this message much longer, although I fear it may 
provoke embarrassing repercussions.’ It was eventually dismissed as a ‘rather wild 
story’ and Silverman was to be told that ‘if Jewish organisations themselves wished to 
give publicity to the story, the F.O. would see no objection, although they could take 
no responsibility for the story.’306 The Foreign Office gambled that without official 
sanction Jewish claims would lack weight with the public. 
In July and August Jews in Vichy France were brutally rounded up and deported to 
Poland to be murdered. Churchill expressed outrage in Parliament specifically 
mentioning the ‘mass deportation of the Jews from France’.307 Church leaders used 
B.B.C. broadcasts to denounce Nazi atrocities in early July to a Polish audience.308 An 
‘international meeting of protest against Nazi atrocities in Poland and Czechoslovakia’ 
was held on 2 September.309 It was overseen by the Chairman of the National 
Executive of the Labour Party, but was not a reflection of British socialist indignation 
but rather of the international Labour movement. In late August British official, 
Geoffrey Lias, stated ‘public opinion is greatly exercised about the whole subject’.310 
Although The Times alluded to the ‘extermination’ of the Jews, there is no clear 
evidence that he was right.  
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In response to the French deportations Sir Herbert Emerson, League of Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees, approached America’s Ambassador to intervene because 
the United States maintained diplomatic connections with the Vichy regime. A.W.G. 
Randall of the Foreign Office, present at the conversation, tersely noted ‘H.M.G 
could…do nothing over this.’311 Emerson then approached the Home Secretary Herbert 
Morrison asking that a thousand Jewish children be given visas. J.K. Roberts however, 
saw ‘no reason why Jews as such should receive preferential treatment.’312 Morrison 
agreed and pointed to the ‘anti-foreign and anti-Semitic feeling which was quite 
certainly latent in this country (and in some cases not at all latent.)’313 The Home 
Secretary agreed to accept a ‘handful’ who had ‘one or both parents’ already in 
Britain.314 The Cabinet endorsed Morrison’s policy on 28 September. When Churchill 
repeated his Parliamentary protests in Edinburgh about atrocities he caused 
consternation. The New Statesman urged ‘self-restraint’, fearing that a heated 
atmosphere would detract from the war effort and was contrary ‘to our own rules of 
civilized conduct.’315 Edward Stebbing called Churchill’s references to atrocities 
‘boring’.316 
Nevertheless, there were signs that public figures were becoming increasingly 
uncomfortable about news from France. Eden received a Labour delegation lobbying 
on behalf of persecuted Jews on 22 September. They did not call for refugees to be 
allowed into Britain but to the Belgian Congo following an offer from the Belgian 
government. The Foreign Office denied knowledge of the offer.317 As awareness of the 
plan to exterminate Jews seeped into the public sphere, humanitarians became more 
active. On 28 October Morrison met an ‘illustrious’ delegation including Rathbone, 
William Temple, the Archbishop of Canterbury, Cardinal Hinsley and ‘a number of 
other eminent churchmen and public figures, representatives from the major refugee 
and relief organizations, and members of the Commons and the Lords.’318 The 
government had already decided on the issue so the Home Secretary was effectively 
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managing the protest. One of the delegates, Margaret Corby Ashby, complained that 
‘[n]o smallest concession was made’.319  
On the following day some of those who had made up the delegation to the government 
spoke at an Albert Hall meeting organized by Anglo-Jewish leaders. Although the 
Prime Minister sent a message of support, the gathering was more international than 
British. It was also designed to channel public ire into the war effort and evoke restraint 
not indignation. The Archbishop acknowledged it was ‘hard to resist the conclusion 
that there is a settled purpose to exterminate the Jewish people’ but added ‘the purpose 
of their meeting was not to stir up hatred or the spirit of vengeance…and to pledge 
themselves once more’ to the war effort.320 Temple was perhaps also influenced by 
Morrison’s claim that admitting refugees from France would heighten domestic anti-
Semitism. He believed the ‘introduction of a large number of Jewish refugees of 
working or fighting age would make the prospect seriously worse.’ He was adamant 
that ‘the only thing that would make a difference would be public action, which, for 
these people’s sake, we must avoid.’ His response was also compromised by the belief 
that ‘nothing could be worse for the cause generally than to call public attention to the 
fact that our government is slow to move.’ Reticence to criticize the government in 
wartime proved to be a decisive factor in the absence of necessary pressure for a more 
concerted government plan on behalf of refugees. Rathbone recognized the power of 
this argument, privately admitting that it would be impossible to ‘publicly reproach’ 
Morrison for fear of damaging their ‘own efforts to persuade other people to do 
more.’321 Her desire for a more aggressive protest was not shared within the alliance of 
interests confronting government policy. It is unfeasible that the government would 
have been unaware of these divisions.322 The Albert Hall was not filled to capacity due 
to ‘police regulations.’323  
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On 26 November, M.P.s Silverman and A.L. Easterman called at the Foreign Office to 
hand over a document received from the Polish government ‘detailing the extent of the 
Nazi persecution of the Jews’.324 They suggested a Four-Power Declaration 
denouncing the German plan to exterminate Europe’s Jews. The Foreign Office’s 
Richard Law admitted the government would be in an ‘appalling position if these 
stories should prove to have been true and we have done nothing whatever about 
them.’ He was also concerned that unless the government made some kind of gesture it 
would cause a lot of trouble.325 On 4 December 1942 The Times, having verified the 
story by ‘independent evidence’, finally acknowledged there was a ‘[d]eliberate [p]lan 
for [e]xtermination’.326 However, it also stated that ‘all peoples and all creeds of 
Poland have continually suffered under the worst of many forms of terror’.327 Temple 
on behalf of the Church of England and Free Church representatives, expressed 
‘burning indignation at this atrocity.’ However, he offered little that would rouse public 
anger instead suggesting, ‘the matter seems to be beyond earthly resources.’328 
Cardinal Hinsley, Britain’s leading Catholic, denounced Germany’s ‘savage racial 
hatred’.329 Meetings were arranged at the Commons so Jewish representatives could 
inform MPs. Harold Nicolson could not understand why ‘horrors like this Black Hole 
on a gigantic scale scarcely concerns us.’330 He sensed MPs felt ‘not so much ‘[w]hat 
can we do for such people?’ as ‘[w]hat can we do with such people after the war?”331 
This would seem to echo the Foreign Office’s attitude, which was more concerned 
about prospective Jewish demands at a future peace settlement than considering 
schemes facilitating immediate relief. Rathbone echoed Nicolson’s sentiment. In a 
letter to Temple dated 3 December she wrote, ‘[o]ne would think that the mass 
extermination of “the chosen people,” or a few millions of them, was quite a minor 
incident’.332   
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On 12 December The Times published its first editorial on the extermination program. 
The observation that ‘for a full decade the Jewish race had been on Hitler’s rack’ was 
somewhat hypocritical given the mollifying nature of its previous coverage. Emigration 
was advocated but such measures would ‘only be palliative’.333 Only victory would be 
the ‘supreme act of relief’. Moreover, The Times suggested the Jewish plight was ‘a 
special case only in its scope, not in its kind’ because, the same ‘methodical ferocity’ 
had been applied ‘since 1939’ to the Poles, Czech, Serbs and Greeks.334 That Jews 
were principal victims of an extermination policy was both acknowledged and 
effectively denied in the same passage. The announcement of forthcoming 
Parliamentary debates gives an indication of the importance of the issue in the scope of 
Commons business: 
Prominent among the subjects which various groups of members would like to 
raise if they can on this occasion are the future of civil aviation and German 
atrocities against Jews and others in the occupied territories. Many members are 
also concerned at the volume of criticism reaching them from their 
constituencies about the patchy distribution of fish…335  
The declaration in Parliament on 17 December by Anthony Eden acknowledging 
‘Hitler’s oft repeated intention to exterminate the Jewish people in Europe’ was a result 
of pressure from Allied governments-in-exile, irrefutable evidence of atrocities, 
especially from Polish sources,336 and Churchill’s intervention at the Foreign Office.337 
Public information though, about Jewish massacres, had been carefully controlled and 
modulated. There were expressions of outrage, for example in the form of public 
meetings, but these were offset by largely successful attempts to mollify public 
indignation or channel it towards the war effort. To this extent fear of public pressure 
rather than public pressure itself played a part in the government’s decision to make the 
Parliamentary announcement. That it was an Allied declaration rather than merely 
British effectively signaled that the mass murder of the Jews had become a ‘matter of 
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international concern’.338 Although this gave the appearance of greater weight behind 
potential proposals to help the persecuted, in reality it created a level of diplomacy and 
bureaucracy that British protesters could barely penetrate. In January the British and 
Americans agreed to a joint conference ‘as a device to hold off pressure for action.’339 
This was to be held in Bermuda. In the meantime a new Cabinet Committee was 
convened. According to London, the role of these officials was ‘largely reactive: they 
deflected pressure and defended inaction.’340 
Nonetheless, the Declaration brought the Jewish plight to the attention of the British 
public. The Times described ‘a deeply impressive scene’ as members of the Commons 
rose ‘spontaneously and remained standing for a minute.’ However, to offset 
indignation it spelt out the help Britain had already given.341 The Daily Herald saw the 
event as a ‘vivid testimony to the sincerity of British war aims’ adding,  
[w]e must not deceive ourselves. There is little, very little that we can do to 
arrest at this stage the campaign of extermination…let us not imagine that we 
shall help the Jews, or our United Cause, by the simple act of threatening 
homicidal maniacs with undefined punishment.342 
The New Statesman ridiculed the idea that indignation should be expressed as revenge 
citing the ‘futility’ of retribution schemes in the last war.343 It also speculated about the 
dearth of British interest: 
[w]hen the first atrocities of the German concentration camps were reported, 
most of us were first incredulous and then so aghast many of the papers 
deliberately withheld the details. But familiarity grows with repetition, and 
contempt with familiarity, so that to-day, “all pity choked with custom of fell 
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deed,” we shrug our shoulders at horrors which have ceased, by dint of 
repetition, to be “news.”344 
It counseled against an anti-German campaign suggesting the real perpetrators were ‘a 
special corps of Lithuanians, Latvians and Russian Whites.’345 The B.B.C. ‘failed to 
report on the atrocities.’346 
Arthur Balfour’s niece, ardent pro-Zionist and close friend of Weizmann, Blanche 
Dugdale, wrote an article for the Spectator entitled ‘All Ye That Pass By’. She felt 
compelled to state that the desire to believe atrocity stories were exaggerated was 
rooted in ‘the instinct to spare oneself pain’. She added ‘scepticism cannot much longer 
serve as excuse for inaction.’347 General Sir Neill Malcolm complained about the 
impotency of the Parliamentary declaration and suggested practical action on behalf of 
Jewish refugees in Spain and Portugal. The Spectator responded, it was ‘not a problem 
to be solved by facile gestures.’348 In the same journal Nicolson argued, the declaration 
would ‘oblige the government to act with generosity’ towards refugees and help ‘dispel 
the froth of anti-semitism which always gathers on disturbed or poisoned waters.’349 He 
speculated again as to why the news had been met with reservation, suggesting it was 
‘the calculated magnitude of this present cruelty which arouse[d] skepticism.’350  
On 25 December 1942 Gollancz wrote a plea for European Jewry entitled Let My 
People Go as part of a publicity campaign by refugee campaigners.351 The pamphlet 
was praised in the New Statesman for keeping ‘strictly to the facts and possibilities.’352 
The Spectator commented on Gollancz’s ‘strikingly temperate tone, having regard to 
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the fact that the writer is himself a Jew’.353 The pamphlet had a positive effect with 
many offering to send money and clothes and others offering a home to Jewish 
children. The Secretary of State received a ‘spate of letters’ expressing ‘horror’ at 
Jewish persecution.354 Some offers were notable for their generosity and self-sacrificial 
nature.355 Freda Bax, for example, whose husband was in the army, already had ‘two 
children’ but ‘would welcome a Jewish boy to live with us.’ The Foreign Office noted 
they were ‘getting a good many letters of this type now, containing a definite offer to 
adopt or give a home to a Jewish child.’356 Eleanor Rathbone attempted to galvanize 
others to make a coordinated response, urging activists: 
to launch our campaign on Governments, and on public opinion accordingly. It 
won’t do just to mention “an offer to Hitler” and to encourage Archbishops and 
Bishops to give it limited publicity and then to let it drop.357 
She appealed directly to the public, and cajoled the government.358  In early 1943 
Rathbone was instrumental in the formation of the unofficial National Committee for 
Rescue from Nazi Terror. It was ‘an alliance of activist clergy, the main Jewish leaders, 
and the parliamentary advocates for refugees’, although its effectiveness was 
doubtful.359 Dugdale attended a meeting at the Commons to coordinate the disparate 
Committees working to rescue Jews. She believed ‘[l]ittle or nothing will come of this, 
and the whole idea was so fantastically unthought [sic] out that it was almost funny.’360 
Church leaders made public appeals and there were many regional endeavours either in 
the form of resolutions from local organizations or individual financial contributions.361 
However, the idea that ordinary Germans were either ignorant of atrocities or coerced 
into action held firm in church circles.362 Far from dissenting from government 
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inaction, senior Church of England figures exhorted the public to ‘support the 
government in the efforts they were now making’.363  
Over two hundred M.P.s from all parties signed a Commons motion assuring the 
government of ‘support for immediate measures, on the largest and most generous 
scale’ but this needed to be ‘compatible with the requirements of military operations 
and security’.364 Notwithstanding the idea that deference to war aims allowed for 
considerable latitude in interpretation, it should not be assumed that M.P.s were 
entirely united in indignation. Firstly, the number of consenting M.P.s did not 
constitute a Parliamentary majority. Secondly, the Liberals who only had twenty-one 
seats were the only mainstream political party to issue a resolution condemning 
atrocities. Thirdly, evidence from Foreign Office files suggests opposition was active 
and subtle. David Robertson, M.P. for Streatham, enclosed a letter from six 
constituents complaining of the government’s response to Jewish persecution. He 
added a cover note stating it was ‘perfectly obvious that a campaign’ was ‘being run by 
the Jews in this country, and by others’. He therefore agreed to Chair a meeting of the 
LNU at the South London Liberal Synagogue in order to ‘[praise] the Government for 
what they had already done’ and agree a resolution that was ‘innocuous’.365 
A deputation of M.P.s met with the Foreign Secretary, Home Secretary, Colonial 
Secretary and a representative of the Dominions Secretary. It comprised Arthur 
Greenwood, Rathbone, Professor A.V. Hill, Independent Conservative M.P. for 
Cambridge University, Quintin Hogg, Silverman, Graham White and H. Holdsworth. It 
was not a high-profile group and recognized humanitarians were absent. The minutes 
of the meeting give an overall impression of deference to ‘the Government’s 
difficulties’. They specifically, ‘deprecated debate at the present juncture’ and the 
‘deputation as a whole expressed their satisfaction that the Government was doing all it 
could’. They hoped that the response from the other Governments with whom they 
were in consultation would enable really practical measures to be announced without 
too long a delay.366 It was agreed that ‘proceedings should be regarded as private’ with 
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only a short communiqué issued to the press.367 The ‘private’ nature of the proceedings 
undermined its public impact. The government put up a high-powered set of 
representatives, which may indicate the importance they gave the issue. Because no 
action resulted, it can reasonably be assumed they were drafted in to stifle debate. Not 
only did a shared perception of the exigencies of war dampen discussion but the 
contrast between a comparatively low-profile delegation and an unprecedented block of 
senior ministers perhaps constricted a bold approach. The nature of coalition 
government itself may have also minimized friction. The cross-party composition of 
the delegation was offset by the cross-party group of ministers thus emptying the issue 
of combative party politics.368  
Correspondence between William Beveridge and the Foreign Office shows the extent 
to which a consensus existed between those who wished to criticize government policy 
and its implementers. Beveridge was planning a piece for the Observer critically 
examining government and Allied policy towards European Jews. Submitting it to 
Richard Law he agreed to meet and discuss its content and ‘revise it after our talk.’369 
The draft was criticized for over-estimating the United Nations’ ability to receive 
‘scores of thousands of people’; ignoring that ‘the Nazi attack on the Jews is part but 
not by any means the whole of the German policy of extermination’; for failing to take 
into account that ‘an exaggerated segregation of the Jewish question stimulates anti-
Semitism’; and failing to suggest that any offer to Hitler to take Jews would be 
hampered by lack of shipping capacity.370 However, the emphasis it laid on ‘the Jewish 
problem being an international responsibility’ was ‘entirely sound’ and would prove 
‘useful’ considering America’s ‘lack of response.’371 The modified article was 
published in the Observer and the Daily Herald on 4 and 8 February respectively.  
The anti-Semitism of scepticism surfaced soon after the Allied Declaration. Olive 
Bennett wrote to the Spectator questioning Nicolson’s assertions about the Warsaw 	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Ghetto.372 She believed he had stretched ‘the bounds of human credulity in making the 
statement of 433,000 Warsaw Jews congregated in a ghetto behind a high wall’, 
adding:  
[t]he figures given are twice the number of the whole of the population of 
Warsaw, and I should like to see the wall enclosing nearly half a million people. 
From close observation of The Times I have discerned that it becomes a wailing 
wall according to our fluctuating fortunes of war and Jewish atrocities act as a 
barometer.373 
By this time some 300,000 Jews had been murdered in Treblinka. Others shared 
Bennett’s attitude. Other forms of prejudice were also evident. One contributor to Mass 
Observation stated that whilst at a meeting of the Soroptomist Club a Mrs Muir ‘was 
blazing about the H. of Commons standing out of respect for the Jews who were being 
massacred in Europe. She thought the world was well rid of the Jews.’374 One 
correspondent to the New Statesman wrote that the extent of anti-Semitism in Britain 
‘to-day is not yet full realised.’375 Underlying anti-Jewish attitudes forced pro-Jewish 
activists onto the defensive. A. Schoyer, Chairman of the Association of Jewish 
Refugees of Great Britain pointed out that although he did not want to appear ‘over-
sensitive to criticism. In times like these…Xenophobia is apt to spread’.376 He was 
compelled to emphasise the considerable contribution of refugees to the war effort. 
Professor A.V. Hill tried to defuse increasingly negative attitudes about the ‘so-called 
Jewish problem’. He wrote to The Times urging the public to ‘be reasonable and trust 
to arithmetic rather than wild hearsay or vague emotions’.377 Nevertheless, papers like 
The Times persisted in printing warnings that even a ‘small’ number of refugees would 
‘be large enough to present grave problems.’378 
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Nearly two months after the Parliamentary declaration Harold Laski wrote an angry 
and sarcastic article on the growth of anti-Semitism,379 which, he believed, was 
‘common knowledge.’ Jews, he suggested, caused ‘relentless and unceasing uneasiness 
by their inability to maintain a dignified silence in the presence of massive wrongs.’ He 
mocked the idea that ‘[p]atriotic Jews would not force the full-scale horror of their 
sufferings upon the national attention. They would develop that sense of proportion 
which enables them to be seen and not heard.’380 If a Jew addressed the issue he was 
‘likely to breed the conviction that he stands permanently outside the tradition in which 
he feels all his being involved.’ Jews, he argued, could normally receive ‘sympathetic 
consideration’ but when looking ‘for decisive action as the outcome of sympathy, he is 
made aware of frontiers within which he must dwell.’381 Laski’s article reveals two 
things; firstly, his frustration is borne out of the juxtaposition of his ability to imagine 
the scale of atrocity and the inability to galvanize action; secondly that one of the 
central problems facing Jews who lobbied for action was that they were simply not 
English and ‘inappropriate’ allusion to Jewish suffering reinforced that view. 
A letter the following week, whilst pronouncing a ‘real and deep regard’ for Jews, 
pointed out Laski had omitted ‘the factor which is producing more anti-Jewish feeling 
than any other…the behaviour of foreign Jews in our midst’ adding it was ‘[s]mall 
wonder that anti-Semitism, a disgraceful reaction, is growing at a really frightening 
rate.’382 The editor of the New Statesman added:  
[w]e have received several similar letters from people whose opinions deserve 
serious attention. They are fully alive to the grave political danger of anti-
Semitism and are not themselves anti-Semitic. But they charge some sections of 
the Jewish community with a number of social faults these, it seems to us, can 
be summarised by saying that some Jews, particularly in areas where refugees 
congregate in considerable numbers, have bad, or at least unEnglish [sic] 
manners, behave inconsiderately and selfishly to their neighbours in shops and 
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buses and generally make themselves unwisely conspicuous. Xenophobia easily 
spreads in wartime.383 
The persistence of this anti-Jewish discourse together with the reluctance of activists to 
make a public issue out of their attempts to influence policy meant the government 
could refute rescue suggestions with relative ease.384 The planned Bermuda conference 
eventually took place in early 1943.385 A cable signed by ‘religious leaders, members 
of both Houses of Parliament, Lord Mayors, members of the council of the Royal 
Society and other scientific leaders, heads of colleges at Oxford and Cambridge, heads 
of other university bodies, trade union leaders, and a number of well-known men and 
women’ was sent to Eden assuring him in the light of the ‘forthcoming Anglo-
American conference’ of public support for ‘any sacrifice consistent with not delaying 
victory.’386 This caveat was crucial and so nebulously defined that if invoked as a 
defence for inaction then it largely remained unquestioned. The magnitude of the 
atrocities was so vast that it became ‘common sense’ for the problem to be 
internationalised. As the Archbishop of Canterbury stated to the Lords ‘it is obviously a 
problem which cannot be solved by this country alone’.387 Britain’s specific role was 
arguably diffused in the individual and collective conscience. 
Whatever its faults, the British liberal tradition could facilitate a strong compassionate 
response for most victim groups. Therefore generic flaws in British liberalism cannot 
fully explain comparative lack of compassion for Jews. Unless the inability of the 
liberal imagination to comprehend violence and ‘liberal ambivalence’ can be applied to 
the spectrum of non-English victims, it ceases to become a useful tool for investigating 
British responses to atrocity. The response to Jewish suffering was particular.  
Three major strands came together to influence British reactions to each major 
manifestation of German brutality. Firstly, German atrocities in the Great War were 
mis-remembered and had been re-written. The British had ‘unjustly’ accused Germans 	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of committing atrocities. They had transgressed their own rules of fair play. The 
construction of this myth had as much to do with the way the British saw themselves as 
how they perceived the Germans. However, not only had German atrocities been 
forgotten but the belief in the propensity for Jews to exaggerate their own suffering was 
persistent.  
Secondly, from 1933 to 1943 there was widespread faith in the essential and enduring 
qualities of the German national character. By distancing the majority of Germans from 
anti-Jewish brutality and blaming a vicious and dominant minority, Britons could 
maintain the legend that millions of people were brainwashed, coerced or ignorant of 
persecution and mass murder. Yet in 2001, Robert Gellately stated that this idea ‘is so 
implausible that it should be dismissed out of hand.’388 But it is a myth that persists. In 
the decade after the Nazis took power all shades of political persuasion advocated some 
version of this fiction. It was arguably one of the main pillars of Appeasement. This 
belief had a particular impact on those likely to respond sympathetically to foreign 
atrocities. Michael Balfour has pointed out that during the war those most liable to 
sympathize with Germany over their treatment after the Great War ‘were just the ones 
most inclined to moral indignation at Nazi misdeeds.’ This created a paradox for those 
most disposed towards compassionate action. Humanitarians clung to the notion that 
‘the great mass of the German people…could be relied on, if they only had a chance, to 
re-establish freedom, responsible government and the rule of law.’389 This committed 
them intrinsically to the war effort because Allied military success would undermine 
Nazi rule and bring forth an uprising inside Germany. Therefore all priorities, including 
those for immediate action on behalf of Jews, were subsumed to this end. Furthermore, 
in order to reinforce this fallacy the government drew a distinction between Nazis, who 
were readily demonized, and ordinary Germans.  
The third strand relates to the tendency of the British in the interwar years to 
superimpose aspects of their national character onto those deemed most deserving of 
sympathy. From 1914, Armenians, Turks, Abyssinians, Spaniards, Chinese and 
Germans rather than Jews were believed to most fit the mould. Jews were not as 
‘redeemable’ as other victims or indeed some perpetrator groups, especially the 	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Germans. Other causes, or more specifically, other victims, provided greater motivation 
for empathy or humanitarian action.390 Whereas, for example, Germans, Turks and 
Chinese could be vilified and then in a remarkably short space of time, rehabilitated, 
there was a persistence and diversity of countervailing belief about Jews which 
prevented them becoming ‘worthy’ victims. There was almost invariably some other 
group, or some other issue, which trumped overt association with a specifically Jewish 
cause. Jews were therefore subject to a hierarchy of compassion.
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Conclusion 
 
Five days after Germany occupied Czechoslovakia Victor Gollancz gave a speech at a 
meeting of the Left Book Club at Chelsea Town Hall. After the false hopes of Munich, 
the inevitability of war was dawning on the population of Britain. Vera Brittain 
recorded in her diary that Gollancz:  
used his speech to make the most terrible, emotional, irrational attack on 
Germany & Fascism which reminded me of the recruiting meetings in 1914. It 
was full of all the old illusion about a War to end War, smashing German 
militarism & making the world safe for democracy, & he used hysterical 
atrocity arguments…quite unworthy of an intelligent person.1 
Quite apart from Brittain’s fervent pacifism, her words convey something of the extent 
to which the memory of German atrocities in the Great War had found an entirely new 
resonance. They had been re-written. Her comments also imply that Gollancz’s 
Jewishness was under scrutiny. His alleged emotionalism was, for her, a barrier to 
indignation. These were long-standing pre-conceptions that had built over time. It is 
partly for this reason that this thesis has tracked the trajectory of these discourses since 
the beginning of the Great War. 
Building on the work of previous historians who have grappled with British responses 
to the persecution of the Jews under Nazi domination, this argument deliberately builds 
a deeper perspective. By taking a generic approach and not restricting the focus to any 
individual atrocity, it has uncovered the many and complex issues that affected the 
atrocity discourse in Britain between the wars. It has explored the numerous facets of 
historical and ideological context and the interplay of contemporary forces. 
Specifically the interaction of memory, perceptions of national identity, the movements 
of public opinion and the interaction of political leaders with public opinion. It has also 
been a comparative study, one that enables contrasts between different responses to be 
made within Britain itself. It explores the construction and re-construction of different 
victims of atrocity and in some cases the perpetrators. Moreover, it assesses the effect 	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of these manipulations on compassionate action. It has been shown that it is not viable 
to examine British responses to any one atrocity without reference to other examples. 
Building a comprehensive context is vital to most studies that deal with any part of 
Holocaust historiography. As Mark Mazower states ‘the Holocaust…may be better 
understood in a historical context that stretches back to the age of empire…’2 Thus, this 
new approach to British responses to atrocity adds knowledge to the existing 
historiography. 
As well as acknowledging the rich vein of knowledge contributed by other historians, 
this thesis has engaged with a broad cross section of primary sources. It has attempted 
to show history ‘from above’, from leaders and opinion formers, and combine it with 
history ‘from below’. The voice of a variety of individuals from a range of political 
persuasions and social backgrounds has created a three-dimensional picture in which 
contemporaries have as far as possible received a ‘fair hearing’.3 For leaders, foreign 
affairs were in many cases part of their job. For ‘ordinary Britons’ what has been 
notable during the course of research is that despite ‘artificial censorships, the 
limitations of social contact, the comparatively meagre time available in each day for 
paying attention to public affairs’, foreign atrocities were very much part of their 
world.4 The sources chosen to illustrate each debate construct an appropriate context 
for the British reaction to the persecution and mass murder of the Jews under German 
control.  The individual chapters come together to create a comprehensive picture of 
the development of British attitudes.  
From 1914 onwards the British were faced with foreign atrocities. During World War 
One, German atrocities against civilians in newly occupied territories in many ways 
brought the war home to them and gave it meaning. Many responded by joining the 
army and ultimately giving their lives in a cause that was, at the time considered worth 
fighting for. In Britain, German ‘frightfulness’ may well have been sensationalized in 
some sections of the press, but to suggest the bulk of the population were manipulated 
by propaganda does a disservice to what was believed at the time. Atrocities were a 
grave issue, seriously investigated, cited at public meetings, and reaching into the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Mazower, Mark, ‘Violence and the State in the Twentieth Century’, The American Historical Review 
107.4 (2002): par.38, <http://www.historycooperative.org/journals/ahr/107.4/ah0402001158.html>. 
3 Marrus, Michael, The Holocaust in History (London: Penguin, 1987) p.157. 
4 Lippman, Walter, Public Opinion (New York: Dover Publications, 1922). 
	   268	  
home. As Horne and Kramer state ‘[a]trocity accusations were central to the ‘war 
cultures’ which emerged in 1914-15 in all the belligerent societies.’5 In Britain, this 
was the start of a long and complex discourse on foreign brutality that infused debate in 
the interwar years.  
Things were complicated almost immediately afterwards by the behaviour of British 
troops and security forces, especially at Amritsar and perhaps even more pertinent, 
because closer to home, in Ireland. Atrocities committed by the British were discussed 
in Parliament and avidly debated in the press. The idea that British subjects were 
capable of ‘frightfulness’ was a deep shock. The shock itself was perhaps more 
pronounced because during the war many had been convinced that they were fighting 
on the side of ‘right’, the side of ‘civilization’. Moralizing about German atrocities and 
more pertinently about the propensity of the German character to embrace violence 
became untenable. This confluence of factors was crucial to the reformation of 
memory. It paved the way for a new ‘myth’, that ordinary Germans, like ordinary 
Britons sought peace and rejected the philosophy of violence. This belief was to have a 
significant effect on reactions to Germany after the Nazis rose to power. 
The Armenians, so long the object of British empathy, were to become another 
casualty of this propensity to reshape past events. During the war the suffering of 
Armenians under Turkish rule evoked widespread indignation. National emergency 
was no barrier to compassion. It is true that many had had enough of war after the 
armistice. Nevertheless, Britons were faced with a dilemma of how to accommodate 
the widely believed national characteristic of defending the weak and oppressed. The 
Coalition government, which believed that a return to wartime patriotic sentiment 
would galvanize public support in favour of minority protection, was tainted with their 
role in condoning British atrocities. Political enemies seized upon public doubts and 
successfully undermined the government by advocating what might be called an 
‘inward turn’. There were too many problems at home to be embarking on moral 
crusades abroad. To facilitate this Armenians, Greeks and Turks were reinvented in the 
public imagination.  
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Jews in Poland who became the victims of resurgent Polish nationalism and anti-
Semitic forces after the war rarely benefitted from British compassion. As soon as 
atrocity reports reached Britain, Jews were designated as unworthy of sympathy. They 
were not merely the victims of realpolitik. It was more a question of widespread fear of 
Bolshevism. The reinstatement of Poland was seen as necessary to create a physical 
and ideological barrier between Soviet Russia and Western Europe. Jews, especially 
eastern Jews, were immediately aligned with the Bolshevik cause. They were deemed a 
subversive element and somehow deserving of harsh treatment. Not only that, but Jews 
who spoke up in support of the persecuted were held to be prone to exaggeration. The 
charge stuck. The advent of the Russo-Polish War sealed the marginalization of Jews 
generally and Anglo-Jewry specifically. They were forced onto the defensive during 
what was perhaps the most anti-Semitic period in modern British history.  
The view that British society was somehow detached or isolated from increasing world 
tensions between the wars ‘has always been a distorted image.’6 As Stephen Spender 
commented ‘[t]he 1930s saw the last of the idea that the individual, accepting his 
responsibilities, could alter…history’.7 In reality, the  
public displayed a sustained appetite for information about the European 
political extremes and debated the issues surrounding them in a cultural and 
organizational milieu often quite independent of the party political system or 
party allegiance.8 
They were informed, they understood, they reacted. Abyssinia, a most improbable 
focus of tension, became the centre of public and political concern. For a while, 
especially after Samuel Hoare’s defiant, but ultimately misleading speech at the League 
of Nations Assembly in September 1935, many in Britain thought that the government 
would again embrace the traditional role of defending the oppressed by providing 
leadership to the League. Lloyd George spoke for many when he looked back on the 
crisis in a speech given in June 1936. He said: 
[t]here never has been such a chance in the history of the World of arraying the 
whole of the nations behind the cause of international right as to-day. Never. It 	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was a heaven-sent opportunity – fifty nations, great and small. There was an 
overwhelming force behind justice, a force that no aggressor could stand 
against if resolutely led.9 
He spoke with a sense of regret because the government had backed down in the face 
of aggression. Public opinion was roused on behalf of a small East African nation. The 
government was rocked to its foundations, and despite the loss of its Foreign Secretary 
prevailed in resting the ideological initiative away from supporters of the League of 
Nations. In doing so it destroyed the credibility of the League once and for all. 
International justice took a severe blow as did the hopes of vulnerable minorities and 
small nations under threat from predatory dictatorships. 
It is now tempting to look back on the Spanish Civil War and believe that the British 
reaction was somehow inevitable. It was not. Spain was on the margins of Europe but 
became the core of European tensions. It was also on the margins of the British 
imagination but evoked perhaps the most widespread and lengthy humanitarian 
campaign on behalf of another people in British history. Atrocity was at the core of the 
debate over Spain in the first year of the conflict. The bombing of Guernica stirred the 
country. For a period it subsumed ideological divisions and most of Britain was united 
in condemnation. Fear of aerial bombing also contributed to an unlikely outpouring of 
sympathy on behalf of the Chinese following the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war in 
1937. As Japanese forces battered Chinese citizens the violence was brought home to 
the British public who found new qualities in the victims, ones that would enable a 
greater sense of empathy.  
The persecution and mass murder of the Jews under Nazi rule did not evoke the 
strength, intensity or longevity of public response afforded to other causes. The subject 
was certainly debated, it also caused discomfort and in some cases Jews were the 
subject of genuine compassion. The discourse in Britain about atrocities against Jews 
shows that there were too many countervailing forces cutting across it to evoke the 
passion displayed elsewhere. The question whether Germans were incapable of 
violence, whether Jews exaggerated their own suffering, whether Jews evoked 
‘shrinking’, whether Jews could not be seen as victims because of their ‘wealth’, 	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whether Jews were just not British, whether other causes were more important or more 
compelling; all of these and more cut across British compassion. Many historians have 
argued that the information about anti-Jewish atrocities remained unassimilated in 
British minds; that they knew but did not really know. I argue there was little barrier to 
understanding atrocity. Atrocities were comprehended, talked about and evoked action. 
Cathy Carmichael in her study of genocide before the Holocaust comments that ‘[e]ven 
when the notion of wiping a whole people out was repudiated in its entirety as morally 
repulsive, it was still something that could be conceptualized.’10 This was as true for 
Britain during World War Two as between the wars.  
As has been shown throughout this thesis, the British reacted in accordance with a 
strong tradition of humanitarian concern for the weak and oppressed overseas. There 
was a strong sense that this form of benevolence was actually something that marked 
Britons out from others. Springing perhaps from the self-satisfaction emanating from 
the ‘Whig interpretation of history’ the British believed they were in a position to help 
those less fortunate than themselves. This was not something nebulous: it had real 
ramifications. Overy points to:  
the absence of serious threat or profound discontinuities. Britain was not 
invaded or occupied during the Great War; its economy survived far better than 
the other major states in the inter-war years; there was no real prospect of social 
revolution; no one was tortured or murdered by the state’s secret police.11 
This had an effect on attitudes and the ability to debate openly. However, in order to 
capture the public imagination, victims were required to become something other than 
the ‘other’. Those who became the object of British compassion were recast in order to 
endow them with some form of English or British characteristic. On this basis, some 
could fall from favour, such as the Armenians; others could be brought back into the 
fold such as the Turks or the Germans; certain groups could be plucked from obscurity 
and catapulted onto centre stage such as the Abyssinians or the Spanish. When it came 
to Jews there was a stubbornness about their image which meant they could not be re-
imagined.  
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The way past atrocities were incorporated into the discourse on later ones has also been 
explored. Neil Gregor has shown that:  
‘memory’ is no more, and no less, than a metaphor for the ways in which, 
through their narrativisation, experiences become rendered as stories which 
circulate through, within and around a society, or section of it, becoming part of 
that society’s ‘shared cultural knowledge’.12 
Some atrocities attained a kind of iconic status, such as Guernica. Japanese bombing of 
Chinese civilians was understood within the framework of that earlier example. Others 
were pushed to the background. For example, it became a kind of ‘common sense’ in 
post-war Britain that German atrocities were a ‘myth’. The role of the word 
‘frightfulness’, a word that now seems antiquated and innocuous, had metonymic 
connotations between the wars. It stood for the doctrine of violence, for the dragooning 
of innocents, for the slaughter of civilians. Somehow though, one aspect of its meaning 
became disembodied from the original context. During the First World War it stood for 
German brutality. After the war it could be applied to anyone except the Germans. This 
illustrates how certain memories could be brought to the fore and others could be 
sidelined. This was a vital component when reinventing ‘worthy victims’.  
The movements of public opinion and their interaction with the political processes have 
been a major part of this thesis. Kushner states that it is ‘impossible to understand state 
policies towards the Jews of Europe in countries such as Britain and the United States 
without reference to public opinion.’13 Throughout the interwar period, politicians 
battled to understand, contain, and manipulate popular conceptions of foreign events. It 
must be stated that in some senses this thesis is more concerned with processes than 
outcomes. British governments throughout the interwar years, especially during the 
1930s, were particularly inert when faced with overseas crises. Public opinion often 
became a political issue but rarely, if ever, diverted an incumbent government from its 
overarching policies. It is the extent to which officials had to wrestle with the electorate 
that has been explored. Therefore attention has been devoted to showing the 
manifestations of public unrest. This project tracks the movements of public opinion 	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and shows that in some instances, such as the Chanak crisis or the Abyssinian affair, 
the government was susceptible to forces beyond their control. In these cases there 
were identifiable political casualties. When faced with the reaction over the Spanish 
Civil War politicians struggled to contain public anger. When it came to China they 
had become better at dealing with overseas crises and were more adept at making the 
right noises to help mollify outrage. When Jews were victims, the force of public 
opinion was less of an issue. To be sure officials sometimes acted out of concern that 
they might become an issue but generally, some mild token taken on behalf of 
persecuted Jews was enough to silence the majority.  
Overall then, I have shown that Britons, whether politicians, officials, journalists, 
commentators, activists or ordinary members of the public were vexed by a world that 
after 1914 became dangerous and unpredictable. They did not shut themselves away. 
Foreign atrocities galvanized massive reactions on behalf of the oppressed. They 
reacted because they understood only too well what atrocity meant. The memory of 
past atrocities, national identity, and contemporary political and social forces worked 
together to formulate circumstances that often led to public outrage that could not be 
ignored by those in power. Each response was unique, but that sense of uniqueness 
should not be overstressed. Common strands bound British confrontation with foreign 
atrocities. What is clear is that a variety of victims were cast and recast in the British 
imagination, but not the Jews. Reactions to anti-Jewish atrocities were particular. The 
Jews were low down a hierarchy of compassion. Indeed, reactions to the fate of the 
Jews between 1919 and 1943 show the limits of British compassion. 
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